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Summer 1991

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Volume 35
Number 3
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Resurrecting Democracy in Eastern Europe — Jean-François Revel — 323

Beijing, the West, and the Approaching Sack of Hong Kong — Bretigne Shaffer — 327

Censorship without Censors

How Regimes Profit by Curbing U.S. Television News — James V. D'Amato — 347

Restricting the Free Press in Romania — Peter Gross — 365

Non-Offensive Defense: Toward a Soviet-German Security Partnership? — Marian Leighton and Robert Rudney — 377

Is There a British-U.S. Special Relationship?

Thatcher's Wholly British Foreign Policy — Paul Sharp — 395

Washington Must Rely on London, Not Bonn — B. Vivekanandan — 411

Moscow Report: Russia's Surprising Reactionary Alliance — John B. Dunlop — 423

Documentation

Averting Moscow's Baltic Coup — Jan Arveds Trapans — 427

Correspondence

How Socialist is Israel? — 441

Brief Reviews

Book Review List, 453 • World Politics, 455 • War Studies, 457 • International Economics, 460 • The United States, 463 • The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 466 • The Middle East, 469 • Africa, 473 • East Asia, 475 • Latin America, 478

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Resurrecting Democracy in Eastern Europe

by Jean-François Revel

The problem of the democratic and economic recomposition of the formerly communist world seems to be a lot more difficult to resolve than had been thought during the first weeks of enthusiasm that followed the great liberation of 1989. In a book I am finishing, *Le Regain democratique* [*Regenerating Democracy*] — I apologize for the presumptuousness of quoting myself, but since I am completely immersed in the work, it is not easy to detach myself from it, and it is closely involved with the subject at hand — I insist on the following idea: to leave communism behind is one thing; to leave the consequences of communism behind is another.

In fact, it is the peculiarity of communism, its only achievement in history, to have destroyed everything that functioned in traditional societies — predemocratic and pre-industrial, or semidemocratic and semi-industrial societies — and to have eradicated at the same time all the potential for modern development that those societies would have had if they had not been sterilized by communism.

Traditional society is poorly industrialized, but it has both an agriculture (which though poorly productive has its coherence and its know-how) and a sophisticated varied craftsmanship capable of making objects that are often of great quality. The transition to modernity takes place on that strong basis.

In the case of communism, however, the millenium-old base of know-how has been destroyed and the know-how of modern farming and industry has not been acquired. Look at eastern Germany, which is floating between two worlds, despite all the money of the Federal Republic. Nobody knows what to do to put it back on its feet; it does not belong anymore to any specific time or epoch; neither its material nor even its labor are adaptable or salvageable.

Those situations are distinct from the situations in countries of the Third World called "newly industrialized" or "intermediately developed," such as Mexico or India, which have side by side an old system of production and a modern one, each functioning rather well in its own style, with continued ex-

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Jean-François Revel, former editor and director of *L'Express*, is the author of *How Democracies Perish* (Doubleday, 1984). This article is adapted from a speech given at the conference "Power and Opposition in Post-Communist Societies: Foundations of Pluralism in East-Central Europe," March 25-27, 1991, in Timisoara, Romania. Sponsors of the conference included FPRI, the Centers for the Study of Post-Communist Societies at the University of Maryland and the University of Cluj, and the Timisoara Society.

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change between the two. We could say the same about the distribution system, from the little store inherited from the Middle Ages to the supermarket created in the twentieth century, not forgetting the weekly market on the square of the village. Those three models assure their own type of supply very well, for a simple reason: none of the three stopped obeying the law of supply and demand.

So we have to understand that the problem of rebuilding a market economy in a society born of communism is an economic problem without any analogy in the past. It is unique and must be considered such. In particular, the notion of the Marshall Plan is misleading. The European countries of the West in 1945 suffered from purely material losses, due to bombing and fighting. The reconstruction of their equipment was therefore entirely a question of obtaining investment and credit. But for the countries which used to be communist, the question is to learn again how to use investment and credit, not just to satisfy superficial needs, which is not going to help. We should always keep in mind the radical originality of this situation.

The problem of rebuilding a market economy in a society born of communism is an economic problem without any analogy in the past.

Democratic recomposition is the key to economic recomposition. As I often wrote: Communism is not an economic system, it is a political system which needs to destroy the economy to exist. Thus, the general solution is above anything else a matter of politics. Any trace still connected to a communist organization must be eliminated as an absolute obstacle to the economic reconstruction. The problem is that freedom at the higher political level is not enough, because the ossification caused by a communist political system penetrated into the heart of all social forms and continues to paralyze them. In Hungary, for example, where the transition was almost perfect, the rotten tissue of the old political system still needs to be extirpated. In other words, privatization, so widely discussed, is for now a theoretical notion.

Thus, the comparison between the famous Spanish "transition" of the years 1976-1980 is deceptive. When Franco disappeared at the end of 1975, the only dictatorial thing that survived in Spanish society was the upper echelon of the state. The civilian society was already democratized; the middle class, industrialized and cosmopolitan, had mastered all the European know-how during the extraordinary economic jump of the sixties. Spanish industry was newly equipped, and the Spanish culture was opened to the whole world. The dictatorship was thus only a moribund epiphenomenon.

In countries that got rid of one-party communist governments, on the other hand, democratization is done from the top and has to descend progressively into the structures of society. Now watch out! I am not forgetting that the

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people rebelled and that it is to their courage, their lust for freedom, that we owe the revolutions of Central Europe. But to overthrow a totalitarian power by revolution is one thing — to implant a democratic civilization that will take the place of that power and that will include the whole of society, is another thing. And that implantation, by fragmenting decision making, restarts economic creativity. For indeed there is an economic creativity, much as there is literary or scientific creativity.

The market is already a form of democracy in itself and by itself. Thus, the comparison between the Soviet evolution and the one, for example, in Chile, which I recently heard, is as untrue as the comparison with the Spanish transition. Those fashionable comparisons misunderstand the specific problem of post communism. To start with, the Chilean economy, despite the reforms of Allende, was never really a collectivist society. For example, one year after the agrarian reforms of Allende, which sliced up the big private estates to distribute the fragments to the peasants, the peasants sold them back to the old owners. Why? Because, contrary to what the socialist propaganda was pretending, those big domains were not latifundia but ultra-modern concerns, managed according to the latest program of agronomy and high productivity. The peasants realized that they made more money and had more security in their jobs as workers on those domains than they would by having their own land without capital and technology. Today, Chile pays for all its imported oil with its exports of fruits and vegetables. Thus, the economic liberalization of the eighties reconstituted the conditions for initiative by society — the political liberalization of 1989 with the return of governments elected under universal suffrage was the outcome, not the prerequisite, of the evolution.

More exactly, a democratization that is not at the same time economic and political is not really a democratization — without privatization, democratization is nothing. Consequently, the period of transition often hurts the sensibilities of some because it starts by making more obvious economic differences. This is inevitable. Only later does the range of income in capitalist societies start to narrow — and the prosperity start to become general. But at first it has to be created. That a minority of entrepreneurs get rich faster than others at the beginning must be accepted. This enrichment helps to start the engine of growth. And it is more useful than the inequity of the *nomenklatura*'s political system, which is completely sterile, and is not a compensation for any economic creativity. The common mentality, deformed by fifty or seventy-five years of communism, must learn that egalitarianism in shortage only leads to more shortage for more and more people. If I cannot stand that my neighbor is doing better economically than I am, then I must not dream of becoming part of a society of wealth, because such a society is only possible with competition, and competition causes inequity by definition.

Finally, the political, economic, and cultural reconstruction must itself be accompanied by a geopolitical reorganization. It was crazy of Gorbachev to hope to democratize the USSR without splitting it up, since the ligament which

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kept it together was communism. As for the Balkans, these nations must confront internal tensions that communism had frozen, aggravating them at the same time it smothered them. These must be recognized and confronted head on — from Albania to Bulgaria and from Yugoslavia to Romania, the eruptive forces which have been restrained for a long time are reappearing. No one can recreate either the empire of the Habsburgs, nor the Ottoman Empire, nor the Soviet empire, and that is fortunate; the old problems are at the same time the new ones — problems from the twenty-first century — which are unsolvable without democracy and without a state based on law.

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Beijing, the West, and the Approaching Sack of Hong Kong

by Bretigne Shaffer

Hong Kong is probably the only major city in the world that has had a magazine devoted entirely to leaving it — the bilingual monthly *Emigrant*.[1] And subscribers were not merely reading about flight. Between 1980 and 1989, an estimated 300,000 people left Hong Kong to settle elsewhere.[2] This was more than 5 percent of the colony's population. In 1990 alone, emigration was over 1 percent of the population: 62,000, according to official figures.[3] For the remainder of the 1990s, government estimates project annual emigration will be at least 55,000 to 60,000 per year.[4]

And those are the low estimates. According to other polls, as many as one-third of Hong Kong's residents have plans to emigrate before 1997. For example, a poll commissioned by *The South China Morning Post* found that, in the second quarter of 1988, 24 percent of residents had plans to leave before 1997. By the first quarter of 1989, this figure had increased to 30.7 percent, and the week before the Tiananmen massacre it was 36 percent.[5] Talks with locals leave the impression that the real figure may be higher still. Indeed, virtually everyone seems to have some plan, however tenuous, to establish residency in another country.

As a result of this emigration, Hong Kong has been experiencing a severe brain drain, accompanied by a rapid deterioration in professional standards. According to a 1989 survey by the Government Doctors' Association, 63 percent of doctors then in service were thinking of emigrating. At government hospitals, which account for 89 percent of the territory's hospital beds, staff levels are currently down by as much as 20 to 25 percent.[6]

Other sectors have also been hit. Staff turnover in banking reached 27 percent in 1989,[7] and surveys have indicated that 75 percent of the territory's pharmacists intend to emigrate before 1997,[8] as well as 80 percent of accoun-

[1] The *Emigrant* will cease publication after its August 1990 issue.

[2] Paul C.K. Kwong, *The Other Hong Kong Report* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989), p. 379. This report was published as an alternative to the government's annual report of 1989, which does not deal critically with politically sensitive matters.

[3] Figure given by Hong Kong Government Information Service (GIS) duty officer.

[4] Kwong, *The Other Hong Kong Report*, p. 379.

[5] *The South China Morning Post*, May 29, 1989.

[6] Interview with Anne Hockett, fellow at the Department of Community Medicine, University of Hong Kong.

[7] *The South China Morning Post*, October 7, 1989.

[8] *The South China Morning Post*, April 8, 1989.

Bretigne Shaffer is assistant editor for Hong Kong's *Executive* magazine.

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tants.[9] Forty percent of students at Hong Kong University have said they want to leave before that time.[10]

Even low-skilled fields have been hard hit by the labor shortage, as the territory's unemployment rate has fallen to 1.7 percent.[11] In 1989, the Building Contractors' Association estimated that 80 percent of construction projects would fall behind schedule because of the labor shortage, even though wages for construction workers had risen by an average of 30 percent in the previous year.[12]

Perhaps worst of all, public security has been deteriorating. In 1989, violent crime increased by about 13 percent; murder and manslaughter by 43 percent.[13] Low police morale undoubtedly plays a role in this crime wave, as civil servants grow less certain about their future. But police attribute much of the rise in violent crime to a growing feeling of helplessness, and a rising desperation to secure money for escape.

Less than a year before his own home was robbed in broad daylight, Police Commissioner Li Kwan-ha observed a "change of attitude, especially in young people." He spoke of the attitude as "couldn't care less, no future, take the easy money."[14]

The Joint Declaration

What is happening? Why are the inhabitants of a great city behaving, in peacetime, like the citizens of a town about to be sacked by enemy armies?

The story begins twelve years ago, in the fall of 1979, when British officials began to push Beijing to define the status of Hong Kong after 1997, the year that Britain's lease on the New Territories north of Hong Kong Island will expire. That lease, signed under the Ching Dynasty, was part of the "unequal treaties," which the People's Republic of China (PRC) has never recognized. But Beijing made no distinction between the New Territories and the rest of Hong Kong, arguing that British rule over both came from treaties that were invalid, because they had been forced on China by imperialist coercion. At the same time, Beijing had made no attempt to interfere with Britain's administration. Nor, prior to 1979 and Britain's prompting, had Beijing gone further than stating that they did not recognize the validity of the unequal treaties that ceded Hong Kong to Britain. Moreover, Liao Chengzhi, then senior PRC official for Hong Kong affairs, said on a number of occasions that Hong Kong's status would not change until the resolution of the Taiwan issue. By 1979, however,

[9] *The South China Morning Post*, December 16, 1989.

[10] *The South China Morning Post*, October 24, 1989.

[11] Government Information Service, figure for November 1990 to January 1991, according to GIS Duty Officer, February 1991.

[12] *Building Prosperity: A Five-Part Economic Strategy for Hong Kong's Future* (Hong Kong: SRI International Project Team, September 1989), p. 169.

[13] *The South China Morning Post*, January 24, 1990.

[14] Ibid.

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

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London's maladroit negotiators had prompted the Chinese government to announce that China would retake the colony in 1997, and thus negotiations began over the terms under which Hong Kong would be transferred to Beijing.[15]

By late 1984, Beijing and London had arrived at an understanding, a simple three-page document called the Sino-British Joint Declaration,[16] which was signed in Beijing on December 19, 1984, by then prime minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain and the (now disgraced) Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang.

According to this Joint Declaration, Hong Kong will return to Chinese control on July 1, 1997, becoming the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. Under this arrangement, the Declaration promises, Hong Kong will retain a "high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs."[17]

Indeed, the Declaration asserts that:

> The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.[18]

According to the Joint Declaration, the details of this autonomy were to be spelled out in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, essentially a mini-constitution to be promulgated by the National People's Congress of China, and due to go into effect in 1997. According to the first paragraph of the Joint Declaration's Annex I, this Basic Law would "stipulat[e] that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policy shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and lifestyle shall remain unchanged for fifty years."

The British government maintains that the Joint Declaration and its annexes are "a formal international agreement, legally binding in all its parts."[19] However, few Hong Kong residents ever had much faith in the 1984 Joint Declaration's assurances for Hong Kong's post-1997 autonomy and freedom. Many, such as Professor Joseph Cheng, relegated these pronouncements to the stature of provisions in China's own constitution, which also promises freedom of speech and the right of assembly. "The Joint Declaration is no guarantee," said Cheng in 1987, when he was with the Chinese University of Hong Kong, "if

[15] Ross H. Munro, "Who Lost Hong Kong?" *Commentary*, December 1990.

[16] This is the Chinese name for the document. "In Britain, it was issued as a White Paper and termed 'The Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the future of Hong Kong.'" Kevin Rafferty, *City on the Rocks: Hong Kong's Uncertain Future* (New York: Viking, 1989), p. 421. The British White Paper also contains three Annexes and an exchange of memoranda.

[17] Joint Declaration, Article 3, Paragraph 2.

[18] Joint Declaration, Article 3, Paragraph 5.

[19] The British White Paper, quoted in Rafferty, *City on the Rocks*, p. 424.

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China wants to take us over, she will. There is nothing we can do about it."[20] But some in Hong Kong initially hoped a Basic Law could be framed that would live up to the promises of the 1984 agreement. One of the territory's most outspoken democrats, barrister and legislative councillor Martin Lee, was initially satisfied with the Joint Declaration. He told *The Asian Wall Street Journal* that he "could see a distinct possibility of this unprecedented policy of 'one country, two systems' being successfully implemented via democracy."[21]

The Basic Law

As it turned out, the drafting of the Basic Law became, by itself, a cause for concern.

In June 1985, the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee appointed a fifty-nine-member Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), with thirty-six members from the PRC and twenty-three representatives from Hong Kong. Of the latter group, at least ten held foreign passports that would allow them to escape the constitution they were crafting. Thus, though the Chinese had guaranteed themselves an unassailable bloc of votes, they rarely faced staunch opposition from the Hong Kong representatives.

On April 28, 1988, a first draft of the Basic Law was presented, with 172 Articles, 3 Annexes, and more than a few surprises. For example, the Joint Declaration had stated that Hong Kong's "chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally."[22] Under the proposed Basic Law, five alternative methods of selection were put forth, including election via a "broadly representative electoral college . . . composed of about 600 members," election via a "functional electoral college," selection by an advisory group, and direct and nearly direct elections.[23]

In addition, where the Joint Declaration had promised "independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication,"[24] the draft gave Beijing ultimate authority over the Hong Kong judiciary. Specifically, the draft gave the NPC's Standing Committee the ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law, and the NPC could even amend the Basic Law at its discretion.[25]

During the next five months, a Basic Law Consultative Committee supposedly sampled sentiment toward the draft, but the principal sentiment was indifference. Said the *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "Those who are concerned feel they are incapable of changing things because Beijing will not listen."[26]

[20] Interview with the author, March 1987.

[21] Cait Murphy, "How Hong Kong Democracy Perished," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, February 6, 1990.

[22] Joint Declaration, Article 4, Paragraph 1.

[23] The Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China, April 1988, Annex I, pp. 78-82.

[24] Joint Declaration, Article 3, Paragraph 3.

[25] Basic Law, Article 158, Paragraph 1; Article 17, Paragraph 3.

[26] Emily Lau, "Breach of Promise," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 12, 1988, p. 36.

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By January 1989, when the BLDC voted on a revised version, opposition within the committee had virtually disappeared. "Szeto Wah and Martin Lee, who represent the territory's pro-democracy lobby, tried to table more than 30 amendments to the draft law but none received the five votes required for tabling."[27]

That spring, however, the citizens of Hong Kong showed they were not as apathetic as their representatives on the BLDC. Though not known for their public criticism of authority, Hong Kong residents reacted to the events at Tiananmen Square with uncharacteristic anger.

On the Sunday before the June 4 massacre, nearly one million people filled the streets calling for the downfall of Prime Minister Li Peng and others in the Chinese leadership. On June 4, according to some estimates, the numbers swelled to as many as one and a half million — perhaps a quarter of Hong Kong's 5.7 million people.[28]

Also on June 4, Szeto Wah and Martin Lee of the BLDC announced that they would stop their work on the Basic Law drafting and consultation committees. "We can no longer work under any body appointed by the Chinese National People's Congress," said Lee.[29]

Of course, it was only a matter of time before the Chinese government took the two men up on their announcement. In November, the NPC Standing Committee voted to expel Szeto and Lee because of their hostile attitude towards the Chinese regime. They were accused of trying to overthrow the Chinese government through an organization they had formed earlier that year in support of the prodemocracy movement in China — the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. The Chinese government branded this alliance subversive (note the term), and Szeto and Lee were singled out for their outspoken criticism of the Chinese government.

By the time the BLDC passed its final version of the Basic Law on February 16, 1990, even cynics were outraged. In addition to the NPC's power to amend the Basic Law, the power to apply Chinese laws to the Hong Kong SAR in the event of "a state of war" or "state of emergency" was retained in the final version, against the objections of many in Hong Kong.[30] The Basic Law also provided for the stationing of Chinese troops within the territory — a provision hotly opposed by those in Hong Kong.[31]

Worst of all, the Basic Law required that the Hong Kong SAR enact laws prohibiting acts of "subversion."[32] The first draft had prohibited acts of treason

[27] Emily Lau, "The Kowtow Constitution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 26, 1989, p. 10.

[28] According to *The South China Morning Post*, May 29, 1989, police estimated the demonstration at about 500,000, while organizers claimed as many as 1.5 million. The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, one of the main organizers of the demonstrations, says that between 1 and 1.5 million people demonstrated on June 4. Police have since rescinded their May 28 estimates, and refused to give an official estimate for any of the gatherings.

[29] *The South China Morning Post*, June 5, 1989.

[30] Basic Law, Article 18, Paragraph 1.

[31] Basic Law, Article 14, Paragraph 3.

[32] Basic Law, Article 23, Paragraph 1.

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and sedition against the government, but evidently this was not enough for the Chinese leaders, who feel their power threatened if they do not control the very thoughts and words of those under them. The subversion clause met with fierce opposition in Hong Kong, because (as the accusation against Szeto and Lee showed) the Chinese regime uses the term "subversion" to denote any activity the government sees as potentially threatening. And the charge is usually backed up with severe punishment. In February of 1991, for example, prominent Chinese dissidents Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were sentenced to thirteen years in prison for their activities during the 1989 demonstrations. Chen had been the director of the Beijing Research Institute of Social and Economic Sciences and publisher of the *Economics Weekly* before it was banned. Wang had been an editor and economist at the same institute. The two men were accused of "bringing together illegal organizations and conducting a series of activities to subvert the government."[33] Despite the opposition from Hong Kong, however, the vague prohibition against subversion remains in the Basic Law.

The first draft of the Basic Law prohibited acts of treason and sedition, but this was not enough for the Chinese leaders, who feel threatened if they do not control the very thoughts and words of those under them.

As for the freedom of association promised by the Joint Declaration: Local political organizations will be prohibited from establishing ties with foreign political organizations, and foreign political groups will be prohibited from conducting political activities within the territory.[34]

What constitutes a "political" organization is, of course, left for Beijing to decide. One group that is unlikely to pass scrutiny is the seventy thousand-strong enclave of Rennie's Mill. In 1949, members of the defeated Kuomintang Nationalist party (KMT) who were unable to flee to Taiwan settled in Rennie's Mill. Today, they maintain allegiance to the KMT, fly the Nationalist flag, and dream of one day retaking mainland China.

Clearly, inhabitants of Rennie's Mill will be forced to abandon any public displays of loyalty to the KMT after 1997. Whether they will find themselves persecuted by mainland authorities after that date is less certain.[35] Other groups that might be affected by the clause are not such obvious targets: Amnesty International says that potentially the clause could apply to any political, religious, or labor organizations with foreign ties.[36]

[33] Amnesty International, *People's Republic of China: Trials of Dissidents, Sentences and Releases in Beijing* (London: Amnesty International External Document, February 1991), pp. 2-3.

[34] Basic Law, Article 23, Paragraph 1.

[35] Ute Dickerssheid, "Flags Furled at Last," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 10, 1991, pp. 22-23.

[36] Correspondence with Serena Lim, press officer for Amnesty International, London.

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The Joint Declaration states that two international human rights treaties (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) will continue to be applied to Hong Kong after 1997. Previous to June 1989, there had been talk of enshrining the aims of the covenants in a single piece of legislation. After the June 4 massacre, public pressure intensified for a bill of rights that would put some teeth behind the intentions of the international treaties.

Finally, in March 1990, a draft bill of rights was completed that seeks to put into law most of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and legislators drafting the bill have raised the question of whether or not it would have supremacy over other Hong Kong laws. One legislator suggested the bill should have a "special status," similar to the American Bill of Rights, which would make all future laws contingent upon conformity to it. In July, the bill was endorsed by the Legislative and Executive Councils of Hong Kong, and it is currently awaiting a second round of debate.

Predictably, this bill of rights has come under attack from the Chinese government, which calls it a British conspiracy to sabotage the Basic Law. In April 1990, in one of many official attacks, the then director of China's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Ji Pengfei, said that any bill of rights was "not simply a legal question. In essence, it is aimed at overriding the Basic Law."[37] Legislators will probably be spared the bother of wrestling with the issue of its status, however. Chinese officials have said that they may simply repeal the Bill after 1997.[38]

Democracy Abandoned

Traditionally, Hong Kong has not had a democratic government. But where the benign rule of British administrators kept down demand for a popular government, the coming of rule by Beijing changed that dramatically. That is why the Joint Declaration promised that "the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections."[39] Only a government responsible to the residents of Hong Kong seemed likely to stand up for the freedoms promised in the Joint Declaration.

Thus, sentiment for democracy began to rise in the mid-1980s, and the British administration began to respond. In 1985, indirect elections via geographic and functional constituencies were held for twenty-four members of an expanded Legislative Council (Legco). In 1986, direct elections were held for urban and regional councils.

With the writing of the Basic Law, however, hopes for an administration accountable to the local populace were dashed. In an April 1987 speech to the BLDC, Deng Xiaoping said: "Our opinion is that the people who are to manage

[37] *The South China Morning Post*, April 26, 1990.
[38] *The South China Morning Post*, March 17, 1990; April 7, 1990; April 28, 1990.
[39] Joint Declaration, Annex I.

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Hong Kong affairs should be those Hong Kong people who love both the motherland and Hong Kong. Can a general election guarantee that such people will be elected?"[40] Once Deng's antidemocratic opinion was known, Beijing representatives swung into line. The legislative model included in the Basic Law was approved by the ten mainland members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee's political subgroup, against the objections of all six Hong Kong members. Under the approved model, only a third of Hong Kong's sixty-member Legislative Council would be directly elected in 1997, and only half by the year 2003.

Converging on Dictatorship

The 1991 elections — Hong Kong's first direct elections for Legco — will determine only eighteen of the sixty Legislative Council positions. Earlier, Hong Kong officials had suggested this number be moved up to twenty, but their calls were rejected by Beijing. However, the Chinese government does not gain control of Hong Kong for another six years. Until then, Hong Kong is under British rule, and the British administration could in principle hold direct elections for all sixty Legislative Council seats should it so desire. To do so, however, would conflict with the British government's policy of "convergence."

The end of free speech seems to be another goal on which the British are "converging."

This concept was first articulated in January 1986 by the British cabinet minister with special responsibility for Hong Kong, Timothy Renton. Political developments in Hong Kong leading up to cession, he stated, should begin to converge with the aspirations of the Basic Law. Clearly, full democracy would not converge with the restricted democracy envisaged by Beijing.

The end of free speech seems to be another goal on which the British are converging. Ever since 1989, when it became clear that people in Hong Kong supported the prodemocracy movement in China, Beijing has been terrified that the territory would turn into a base for subversion against the Chinese government. Prime Minister Li Peng warned in March, 1990, that "we have to be alert over the move of a very small number of people who use Hong Kong and Macau as a base to subvert the Central People's Government and socialism."[41] Zhou Nan, de facto ambassador to Hong Kong, echoed these sentiments, when he warned that local activists should not demand that China not interfere with Hong Kong's capitalist system, while they were themselves trying to interfere in China's socialist system.[42]

[40] *Ta Kung Pao*, September 20, 1987, quoted in Rafferty, *City on the Rocks*, pp. 450-51.
[41] *The South China Morning Post*, March 19, 1990.
[42] *The South China Morning Post*, November 30, 1990.

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In late 1990, a full-scale attack was launched on the Hong Kong press. *The People's Daily* wrote in November that China suffered from "the re-import of exported rumors," that is, rumors from China that appear in the Hong Kong press, only to make their way back to Beijing and "disturb the hearts of the people."[43]

Similar attacks were carried in other Beijing-supported papers and magazines, such as the Hong Kong-based *Bauhinia* magazine. Mainland writers accused the Hong Kong press of spreading rumors, and demanded that local journalists reveal their sources.

Local journalist Willy Lam noted the irony of Beijing attacking Hong Kong reporters for spreading rumors about China, while heavily restricting access to information on the mainland. "The best way to combat rumors and to showcase China is to let foreign and Hong Kong reporters freely gather information on the mainland," suggested Lam. Instead, reporters based outside of Beijing "have to put in requests four weeks in advance before being considered for a journalist visa. Of course, 'China-bashing reporters' need not apply."[44]

Even before the 1990 attacks on the local press, and on local activists, the British administration was well aware of Beijing's concerns, and was ready to accommodate them. In October 1989, William Ehrman, political advisor to the governor, wrote a letter to officials at the New China News Agency (NCNA), China's de facto embassy in Hong Kong. The letter assured the Chinese leadership that the local government was doing all it could to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a base for anti-Chinese subversion.

In the letter, Ehrman pointed to the earlier arrests of several prodemocracy activists who had been protesting at the NCNA Chinese National Day celebrations in September 1989. Police had seized a local television station's videotapes of the demonstration and later arrested protestors, charging them with unlawful assembly. The arrests were held up as an example of the local government's willingness to quash subversion in the territory. "The Hong Kong government will continue to have a prudent regard for the special circumstances and concerns of the Chinese government," read the letter.[45]

In accordance with this "prudent regard," Hong Kong's Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) decided in late 1989 to ban a segment of a Taiwanese documentary showing interviews with prodemocracy leaders during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Those who had bought tickets to the film's screening arrived to find a notice inside the theater, telling them that sixteen minutes of the film had been cut out because they contained material that could "seriously damage good relations with other territories."[46] As a film industry source said: "TELA, if not bowing directly to outside interests, is doing something much more insidious, which is censoring themselves on the

[43] Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Mainland's War of Words," *The South China Morning Post*, November 14, 1990.
[44] Ibid.
[45] *The South China Morning Post*, October 26, 1989.
[46] Film Censorship Ordinance, Section 10, Subsection 2, p. 8.

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basis of what they think other people would want them to censor."[47] In another example of self-censorship, both of Hong Kong's commercial television stations decided against broadcasting a U.S.-made music video that supported the Chinese democracy movement.

Such caution has extended to the press as well. For example, in October 1990, when Hong Kong's most widely read English-language newspaper, *The South China Morning Post*, was about to publish a special section on the forty-first anniversary of the People's Republic of China, it allowed the NCNA to view the articles in advance — and then removed a story at NCNA's request.[48]

Incentives to toe the line are strong: visa approval for reporters can be denied (correspondents from major international news organs still have trouble getting Chinese visas, and harassment of foreign journalists in China remains a problem); advertising from Chinese-affiliated companies can be withdrawn; and always there is the more nebulous possibility of retaliation after 1997.[49] The overall quality of reporting in Hong Kong has not yet suffered drastically as a result, but subtle signs indicate a changing tone in many of the major local news organs. Even those hard news stories that go to the fundamental role of the free press — watching for abuse of government power — seem to be affected by a desire to please the Chinese government, as the following incident suggests.

Abuse of Power

In May 1990, five prominent prodemocracy activists were arrested for participating in a demonstration the previous February. They were charged with using hand-held loudspeakers in public without a permit, and collecting money in public without a permit. According to Assistant Commissioner of Police John Clemence, no one had been prosecuted for either offense in at least seventeen years.[50] Moreover, the government's motive was obvious from its timing. Although the offenses had been committed in February 1990, the charges came only two weeks before the first anniversary of the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre, when officials expected further demonstrations. The government's decision to prosecute was thus an ominous one: the law was used to stifle political dissent.

The international media gave prominent coverage to the story, picking up on the salient issues. In a June 21, 1990, *Asian Wall Street Journal* article, Frank Ching wrote that Hong Kong's last line of defense against abuse by Beijing — its legal system — was under attack:

[47] *The South China Morning Post*, December 20, 1989.

[48] Sheryl Wu Dunn, for *The New York Times* in *The International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 1990.

[49] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) announced in late April that it would be moving its Hong Kong relay station before 1997. Although the BBC's lease is up in 1997, the Chinese government has said that it would allow them to continue broadcasting after that date, as long as the broadcasts contributed to "bilateral relations." BBC representatives say that they are now looking for an alternative site in Asia from which to retransmit the station's signals. *The Hongkong Standard*, April 22, 1991.

[50] *The South China Morning Post*, July 18, 1990.

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Even if the government is not politicizing the legal system . . . it is giving the impression that it is. . . . And if China believes that the present Hong Kong government makes decisions on arrests and prosecutions on political grounds, why should it not continue this convenient tradition after 1997, when it takes over?[51]

In spite of the critical issues involved, local English-language coverage of the arrests and trial was sparse. *The South China Morning Post*, for instance, waited nearly two months after charges had been filed before running stories dealing with the central issue — the government's decision to invoke seldom-used laws to discourage political demonstrations.

Ultimately, the five demonstrators won an appeal against their earlier convictions. And in January of this year, Chief Justice Sir Ti Liang Yang ruled that the prosecution constituted an abuse of the court process; but this abuse of power was never followed by any punishment.

The Conservative Reaction

One of the most ironic elements of the run-up to 1997 is the reaction of capitalists to the prospect of being ruled by a communist regime. Li Ka Shing, among the wealthiest *Tai Pans* of Hong Kong, and one of the drafters of the Basic Law, had this to say about the final version: The pace of democracy is better [than under earlier BLDC drafts]. . . . I don't think the Basic Law will have bad effects on Hong Kong. It should not affect the confidence of businessmen.[52]

Vincent Lo, another leader of the local business community, said only that "One cannot expect that the final draft will be totally acceptable to everyone. But on the whole, I believe it is workable. It will give us a pretty good assurance for the future."[53]

The business lobby in Hong Kong has always looked warily on democracy. Before the June 4 massacre, for example, probusiness groups and individuals opposed a high degree of representative democracy on the grounds that it would spawn a burdensome welfare state, as indeed it has in many Western countries. After the Tiananmen Square massacre, these groups softened their position somewhat, but still disagreed about the pace and degree to which democracy should be implemented. In any case, they have taken a strong stance against offending the Chinese government, and they have urged people in Hong Kong not to criticize Beijing or press for democracy and human rights on the mainland.

Nevertheless, many members of the business community, while maintaining a positive public front, admit privately that they plan to divest from the territory either fully or partially before 1997. As of the end of 1990, 61 of the 303

[51] Frank Ching, "Hong Kong Attacks Its Best Defense — The Law," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1990.

[52] *The South China Morning Post*, February 17, 1990.

[53] Mark Roberti, "A Most Reluctant Crown Prince," *Executive*, April 1990, p. 34.

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companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange had moved their domiciles out of the territory.

The most dramatic move came on December 17, 1990, when the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation announced the formation of a London-based parent company (though the bank will remain headquartered in Hong Kong). Technically, the bank is private, but it serves many of the functions of a central bank. For example, it issues 80 percent of the colony's currency (the remainder comes from the Standard Chartered Bank.) The chairman of the bank, William Purves, said the move did not reflect a lack of confidence in the territory's future, but had been "forced" on the corporation by concerned overseas investors.

Investors joined the Hong Kong government in backing the move. The bank's share price rose sharply the day after the announcement, as the most active stock of the day. Governor Sir David Wilson also supported the restructuring, saying that the bank would retain its role as the territory's quasi-central bank, and senior executive councillor Baroness Dunn said that the move was in the long-term interests of Hong Kong's economy.

Beijing's response was less enthusiastic. Senior Chinese economic advisor Yang Zhenan complained that it was "very bad timing for the Hongkong Bank to move its domicile to Britain, when the latest [sic] Sino-British relationship is once again locked in a strained position." Yang said he believed the move would have "a very negative impact" on confidence in Hong Kong in the run-up to 1997.[54]

Such criticism reflects the regime's perverse view of the reality that Hong Kong citizens face. Instead of recognizing that lack of confidence in the Chinese government results from the government's nature and behavior, Beijing blames the bank for undermining confidence, because it refuses to play along with the illusion that Beijing will be a benevolent ruler after 1997.

The Great Airport Fiasco

Though the rising restrictions on personal freedom have not much worried Hong Kong's capitalists, early indications of Beijing's economic control have. In particular, the business community remains quite nervous about the ongoing battle between Beijing and the local administration over Hong Kong's plans to build a second airport. The Chinese government insists it should have a say in the matter, under the doctrine of convergence. After all, the airport probably will not be finished before 1997, and certainly will not be profitable before then. For the same reason, private investors want to know that Beijing supports the project before they invest in it. But the Hong Kong administration has excluded Beijing from the decision-making process, and Beijing consequently has withheld its support.

[54] *The Hongkong Standard*, December 19, 1990.

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In January of this year, Chinese vice prime minister Wu Xueqian asserted that China alone had the right to speak on behalf of the Hong Kong people in the years before the transfer.[55] Of course, this statement blatantly contradicts the Joint Declaration's promise that until 1997, "the government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong."[56] Consequently, the Hong Kong administration sees China's stance as unwarranted meddling in the territory's economic affairs. But on what grounds can the administration protest, having endorsed convergence with respect to human rights? Moreover, the Chinese demand for "consultation" comes from the provision in the Joint Declaration that reads " . . . in the second half of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July 1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will therefore be intensified during that period."[57]

Beijing's confidence in its own economic wisdom has kept private investors at a distance from the airport project.

The concern of the Chinese government regarding the airport is that Hong Kong will employ the territory's surplus funds, which would otherwise be available for the post-1997 SAR. What they have alleged, however, is that the stability of the Hong Kong dollar could be affected if the Hong Kong government dipped into its Exchange Fund to finance the project. In reply, the Hong Kong government points out that its Exchange Fund is composed of six accounts. Those used to back the colony's currency (which is pegged to the U.S. dollar) are included, as are most of the government's surplus revenues. But the accounts in the Fund are separate, says the administration. If money for the airport were to be taken out of surplus revenues, as proposed, it would have no effect on the portion of the Fund used to back the Hong Kong dollar.

Beijing's ignorance of Hong Kong's financial institutions, though worrisome in itself, is not the most troubling aspect of the airport flap. "More fundamentally," as *The New York Times* reported, "it struck some as bizarre that Chinese leaders should be lecturing Hong Kong on finance."[58] (See cartoon.) Beijing's confidence in its own economic wisdom has kept private investors at a distance from the airport project, and has fueled fears that the Chinese government will be unwilling to leave Hong Kong's economic matters to Hong Kong after 1997.

Nevertheless, in his talks with Beijing leaders in early April, British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd agreed in principle to several of the Chinese demands. The most significant of these was that the British government's guaran-

[55] T.L. Tsim, "Beijing Hijacks Hong Kong Autonomy, *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, January 29, 1991.
[56] Joint Declaration, Article 4, Paragraph 13.
[57] Joint Declaration, Annex II, Article 5.
[58] *The New York Times*, December 28, 1990.

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THROUGH THE TIGER'S EYE

Cartoon reprinted from *The Hongkong Standard*, December 19, 1990.

tee that an "adequate" amount of funds would be left in the Hong Kong treasury after 1997. In addition, Hurd agreed in principle to the establishment of an advisory body on infrastructural development in Hong Kong, and to the appointment of China-affiliated members to this body. Hurd also agreed to open a seat on the future Airport Authority to a Beijing representative. What the British government would not agree to was China's demand for veto power over the airport project, or to consult with Beijing on important issues straddling 1997.[59]

Thus, Beijing's interpretation of "cooperation" turned out to be too much for even the British government to swallow, and on April 13, talks between the two governments ended. Later, the Hong Kong government indicated that it would be willing to drop the proposed airport project, rather than compromise Hong Kong's autonomy in the years leading up to the handover.[60]

Hong Kong's Executive Committee is now considering upgrading Hong Kong's existing airport, a solution that the Hong Kong Tourist Association says will not accommodate expected traffic growth.[61]

Meanwhile, Beijing is looking at a proposal put forward by Hong Kong tycoon Gordon Wu.[62] Wu is notable for his powerful connections in Beijing and his enthusiasm for pouring enormous amounts of money into infrastructure projects in China. Wu's proposal had previously been rejected by the Hong Kong government; but he alleges that the government copied his plan, which bears a striking resemblance to the one adopted by the government. Wu's plan, however, proposed a shorter bridge linking the airport to the New Territories, and according to Wu, could be financed entirely from private sources. Wu has

[59] *The South China Morning Post*, April 7, 1991; April 8, 1991; April 13, 1991.
[60] *The South China Morning Post*, April 20, 1991.
[61] Ibid.
[62] *The South China Morning Post*, April 25, 1991.

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not yet released the revised version of his proposal, which he presented in Beijing, but he has said that his new plan would not necessarily use the site chosen by the Hong Kong government.[63] Whether private investment will be forthcoming for the project — even if Wu's proposal should get Beijing's blessing — remains doubtful. Having witnessed the Chinese government's inflexibility and desire for control in Hong Kong, potential investors will not be overly eager to participate in such a long-term project.[64]

Why, with so much at stake, is China willing to risk damaging investor confidence in Hong Kong by making an issue over the construction of a much-needed second airport? One answer is that China remains desperate for foreign exchange, and Beijing is counting on having access to the surplus funds the Hong Kong government has accumulated over the years. Contracts for the construction of the airport and surrounding facilities also present an enormous temptation to Beijing-connected firms.

A second reason lies in the hierarchical nature of economic decision making within the Chinese system. As anyone who has attempted to do business in that country will confirm, Chinese bureaucrats have yet to grasp the concept of incentives, and prefer to make threats, even if it means driving away the very foreign investment they are seeking.

Thirdly, China is in the process of building its own international airport in Shenzhen, directly across the border from Hong Kong. While the Shenzhen airport will be on a much smaller scale, and is not expected to compete directly with the Hong Kong airport, Shenzhen authorities have voiced concern over Hong Kong's plans. Shenzhen will be seeking both foreign investment and loans for its project, and sees the Hong Kong airport as a source of competition for these funds.

China's Intentions

The Basic Law has put to rest the idea of an autonomous Hong Kong after 1997, as was promised by the Joint Declaration of 1984. The Basic Law, supposedly implementing the Joint Declaration, creates an administration accountable to Beijing rather than to the local populace, and it grants effective final judicial review to the Chinese government through the right to interpret the Law. Already, Beijing is exercising controls of the sort it forswore in the Joint Declaration, and, far from holding Beijing to its word, the British government has helped to speed up this Chinese control through the policy of convergence.

Publicly, the local business community continues to assert that Hong Kong is such a valuable source of foreign exchange that the government of China will not seriously exercise its legal authority to interfere with it. Privately,

[63] *Asian Finance*, March 1991, pp. 41-44.

[64] As this article was going to press, the British government announced its willingness to reopen talks with Beijing on the airport. However, London had not indicated whether it would be willing to make any further concessions.

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however, many businessmen are arranging to get their businesses and themselves out.

Presumably, they realize that the line of reasoning they mouth is flawed — in at least two ways. Firstly, given Beijing's limited understanding of free markets and given its deep-seated belief in the need for government economic management, even a communist leadership with the best of intentions will be strongly motivated to interfere with Hong Kong's businesses. Secondly, and more important, political considerations far outweigh economic considerations in Beijing. Leaders in China see Hong Kong as a golden goose — true. With a foreign debt of nearly $50 billion, the government of China is currently starved for foreign exchange. It is equally starved for the technology and information that the government believes will enable the country to modernize.

Publicly, local businessmen assert that China will not seriously exercise its legal authority to interfere. Privately, many are arranging to get out.

The PRC's leaders see Hong Kong as a source of both foreign exchange and technology transfer, and are eager for the territory to provide both. But Beijing also sees Hong Kong as a potential base for subversion, and this second perception is fully justified. Hong Kong citizens have been active in smuggling prodemocracy dissidents out of China, for example.[65] As a result, says Donald Anderson, the American consul general to Hong Kong who resigned in 1990, Beijing has already become "paranoid" over Hong Kong's support for China's democracy movement.[66] When Beijing learns that freedom in Hong Kong is becoming contagious in nearby provinces, it is certain to override any concerns for the territory's economic well-being and to crack down in such areas as freedom of speech and of the press, using the Basic Law's antisubversion clause.

Hong Kong is still one of the most attractive cities in Asia from an investment standpoint. Its status as a free port, combined with low corporate tax rates, a strong infrastructure, and the government's relatively "hands off" approach to business make it a major business and financial hub for the region. As of 1990, U.S. firms alone had invested $7 billion in the territory, and employed 250,000 people. Hong Kong currently imports nearly $1 billion worth of U.S.-made goods annually.[67]

If the Chinese government is allowed to intervene with the territory's economy, the results could be devastating to foreign companies with an interest not only in Hong Kong and China but anywhere in the surrounding region, as many foreign firms have their regional headquarters in Hong Kong. Even if

[65] *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, March 15-16, 1991.
[66] "Peking Replaces Top Officials," *Asian Bulletin*, January 1991, p. 37.
[67] *Amcham*, July 1990, p. 83.

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China does not impose a more interventionist government, the damage to confidence in Hong Kong done by the mainland leaders' apparent willingness to interfere, combined with the free hand granted them in the Basic Law, will drive away investors and residents alike.

What Can the West Do?

While substantial confidence in Hong Kong is not likely to be regained as long as the Communist government remains in power in China, the British government, the West generally, and the people of Hong Kong should undertake four actions to minimize the damage done to the territory.

Above all, the West must offer a safe haven to those who would like to stay in the territory, but who fear for its future. Britain has already done this, to an extent, with a residency package of 225,000 passports given to residents deemed essential to Hong Kong. But the scope of this program is not nearly broad enough. Other countries, including the United States, have been and should continue to be helpful in providing an escape route for Hong Kong residents. Last October, for instance, the U.S. Congress passed a bill doubling Hong Kong's immigration quota from 5,000 to 10,000 a year, and offering 36,000 special ten-year visas for Hong Kong executives of U.S. firms. Likewise, the French government has pledged to grant 1,000 special visas to French-employed Hong Kong residents after 1997.

Canada and Australia, however, the two most popular destinations, have begun to tighten immigration restrictions. The Australian Labour Department has trimmed the 1990-91 immigration quota to 126,000, from 140,000 in 1989-1990.[68] The Australian government, however, is considering offering a package similar to that offered by the American government.[69] The Canadian Commission in Hong Kong has raised significantly the fees for visa applications, and has begun to charge HK$2,350 (US$301) for dependents, who used to be included free of charge.

Secondly, the British administration in Hong Kong should hold a public referendum on the pace of democratization, and, assuming democracy proves to be in accordance with the wishes of the Hong Kong public, increase the number of directly elected seats in the Legislative Council before 1997.

The Hong Kong government conducted two widely-criticized surveys in 1987 on the question of how many Council members should be directly elected, and how soon these elections should take place. "The surveys were so flawed, however," said *The Asian Wall Street Journal's* Cait Murphy, "that in the first, 30 percent of the respondents said they didn't understand the question or had no opinion. In the second, that percentage rose to 45 percent."[70] Yet, on the basis of these surveys, the government concluded that the Hong Kong

[68] *The South China Morning Post*, November 16, 1990.
[69] Australian Chamber of Commerce, press release, April 23, 1991.
[70] *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, February 6, 1990.

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populace was divided on the issue of direct elections, and decided not to have any directly elected seats in 1988. Similar surveys conducted by private polling organizations found that between 70 and 80 percent of the Hong Kong populace favored a faster pace of democracy than that offered by the government. Specifically, a series of five surveys commissioned by *The South China Morning Post*, and conducted by Inrasia Pacific between January 1987 and June 1989, found that 80 percent of respondents favored a faster pace of democracy, and that two-thirds felt that the number of directly elected seats in 1991 should be doubled.[71] (Eighteen percent felt that even this would not be sufficient.) A poll undertaken in 1989 by *Ming Pao* (a local Chinese-language newspaper) found that 70 percent of respondents felt that the chief executive and principal legislative authorities of Hong Kong should be elected by universal suffrage.[72] An open vote is needed to decide the truth of the matter.

Western countries can apply various forms of pressure on the Chinese government, the most widely publicized being the withholding of Most-Favored-Nation trading status. But this is not the best way of applying pressure on Beijing. The bulk of the damage done will be felt by the Chinese people who are dependent upon foreign trade for their livelihood, as well as by the Hong Kong firms who have manufacturing facilities in China. Although government revenues would be affected, they would not be crippled in the way that those of export-producing enterprises might be. In addition, wielding MFN as a political tool presents an uncomfortable dilemma for anyone trying to encourage China to open its own doors to international trade.

A more appropriate tool would be pressure on the World Bank and IMF to make assistance to China contingent upon both the government's human rights record at home, and its treatment of Hong Kong. Assistance from both organizations is channeled through the central government, and is used in connection with government-approved projects. The impact on the Chinese government would be more direct than that of revoking MFN status.

In sum, respect for Hong Kong's autonomy is not going to emerge spontaneously from Beijing, and the power brokers of Hong Kong cringe at the prospect of doing anything that might offend the Chinese government. Thus, only a populace prepared to speak out, backed by support from the international community, can hope to avert the approaching sack of Hong Kong.

[71] *The South China Morning Post*, October 31, 1989.
[72] *The South China Morning Post*, January 27, 1989.

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A NEW WORLD ORDER?
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Howard J. Wiarda

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How Regimes Profit by Curbing U.S. Television News

by James V. D'Amato

Television news is the most influential source of information in the United States. It sets the political agenda for the country by concentrating on certain issues to the exclusion of others. Because what viewers see on television has a profound impact upon their opinions of events, issues that are given network coverage are much more likely to be perceived as important by the public than those that the networks ignore.[1] This is particularly true because the print media, rather than acting to balance television, usually follow the agenda set by television news. While the print media's coverage of the news is more in-depth and analytical than the news supplied by television, it often remains within the context of the issue as developed by the networks.[2]

Because in a democracy public consciousness eventually influences government policy, the ability of television news to shape and influence American public opinion makes it an extremely powerful institution. But what is shown on television news often does not mirror reality. Instead, television news focuses on visual — and often violent — action, and thus creates its own simplified reality.[3] Therefore, if an issue is difficult to cover visually, it is often overlooked by television, regardless of its importance.

Television's coverage of political unrest is particularly illustrative of the networks' emphasis on visual action. Political unrest contains the visual elements of violence and conflict that television news finds attractive. When these images can be portrayed in an easily understood ideological context, such as fighting for democracy, independence, or civil rights, they become particularly potent.

But showing such images on television can produce profoundly negative consequences for the government of a state experiencing unrest. In the simplified visual milieu constructed by the networks, the government is often portrayed as the bully and the government's opponents as sympathetic underdogs. This then creates political pressure to accommodate the opposition.

[1] Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News That Matters* (Chicago Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 12.

[2] Philip Weiss and Laurence Zuckerman, "The Shadow of a Medium: How TV Has Transformed the Telling of the News," *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 1987, pp. 33-39.

[3] Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, *Nightly Horrors: Crisis Coverage by Television Network News* (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennesee Press, 1985), p. 15.

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In such cases, government censorship, or the direct denial of the media's access to critical events, begins to appear useful. While the United States government is severely limited in practicing prior domestic censorship, censorship of American television news is seen as a real option elsewhere — particularly when the government facing unrest is dependent upon the good will of the United States politically, economically, or militarily.

If an issue is difficult to cover visually, it is often overlooked by television, regardless of its importance.

Censorship of American television news has been imposed in a number of instances in recent years, most notably in coverage of racial unrest in South Africa, the *intifada* in the territories occupied by Israel, and the events at Tiananmen Square in China. What were the consequences of this censorship for the governments of South Africa, Israel, and China? What were the consequences for the United States?

South Africa

On September 5, 1984, violent unrest began in five townships around Johannesburg, spreading quickly throughout the country and, despite attempted government suppression, continuing essentially unabated until 1986. Clashes between police and black demonstrators soon broadened to include the "necklacing" of alleged black collaborators, terrorist car bombings of white areas, and violent clashes among proponents of many different political and tribal groupings. By the middle of 1986, the casualty toll included over two thousand dead.

Television coverage. South African unrest contained many of the elements sought by television news, such as widespread violence, ongoing drama, and easily understood symbols. The beating and whipping of black children by white police; mass funeral marches, protests, and demonstrations; police dogs, armored cars, and tear gas; and squalid townships and tearful bishops became daily fare on American television. To millions of Americans, such images became the reality of South Africa.

Although the story of South African unrest may have been a boon to American television, it was decidedly detrimental to the South African government. The U.S. news media's portrayal of increasingly violent unrest in South Africa did much to mobilize American political pressure upon the Republican majority in the Senate to accede to Democratic demands for punitive economic sanctions against South Africa. This had several results.

Firstly, the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement — based upon establishing confidence-building measures with Pretoria in order to facilitate internal reforms — came to an end. Secondly, because of ad-

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verse publicity and the legal inability to invest in South African subsidiaries, American (and some other foreign) firms began to divest their holdings in that country by selling their assets to South Africans. Although this may have been beneficial to the Republic in the short term — South Africans acquired these assets at bargain prices — the long-term effects were potentially catastrophic: without foreign investment, South Africa's economy could not expand to accommodate its rising number of black workers. Finally, the prospect of a failing South Africa emboldened the many detractors of the Republic to instigate new campaigns against the government.

Censorship. From the South African government's perspective, the potential damage to South Africa's image was too great to allow continued free rein to the media, especially television. On November 2, 1985, the government banned the use of cameras in certain locations where unrest had been common. On June 12, 1986, the South African government — as part of its nationwide state of emergency on the eve of the ten-year anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising — prohibited the filming of any public disturbance and made it illegal to publish or report any "subversive" statements that might serve the interests of an outlawed political group.[4] Later regulations prohibited journalists from remaining "within sight" of unrest, and forbade the publication or presentation of unauthorized accounts of violence, deployments of security forces, boycotts, restricted meetings, the setting up of alternative structures of rule within the townships, or speeches by those identified by the government as hostile.[5]

One of the more unusual yet effective aspects of the South African restrictions was the reliance on journalists to censor themselves. On the surface, such a tactic appeared to allow network news relative freedom. But the broad scope of the restrictions and the penalties for transgressing them — namely, possible expulsion of the offending network from South Africa — were sufficiently onerous to transform journalists into effective, if frustrated, censors of their own material. As Peter Jennings, anchorman of ABC's evening news program, declared: "We have been put in the insidious position of having to censor ourselves under the framework of some guidelines which are deliberately ambiguous. It is absolutely worse than direct censorship."[6] These restrictions made it virtually impossible for American television networks to acquire new film footage of South Africa in crisis, thus taking advantage of television's inherent problem: the difficulty of reporting a story without being able to show it.

The networks' reaction. The networks vowed to continue to report the story despite the government restrictions. In the view of Dan Rather, anchorman of CBS's evening news program, the restrictions would ensure that the networks would have "one hell of a time trying to make [the story] accessible and

[4] *The New York Times*, July 14, 1986.
[5] *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1986.
[6] Quoted in *The New York Times*, June 18, 1986.

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FIGURE 1
U.S. TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN UNREST



interesting, but we are determined to continue to report the reality, not the unreality that the government would like us to report."[7]

When only selected areas of unrest were forbidden to cameramen, some American networks used telephoto lenses from hilly and neighboring white areas to film ongoing trouble in the townships. After areas of unrest were redefined to include surrounding regions — thus nullifying long-range photography — CBS purchased an amateur film of a funeral for seventeen blacks killed by the security forces in the black township of Alexandra. The South African government responded by expelling the resident CBS cameraman and his crew.[8] Finally, networks turned to reporting new unrest in off-limits areas in conjunction with maps, graphs, and footage of similar unrest in less important, accessible regions, all the while explaining to the American public why the networks had no new footage.[9] When the government announced its nationwide state of emergency on June 12, 1986, and filming of all unrest was declared illegal, even that stratagem was closed to the networks.

The results. The results of the South African restrictions were nothing less than monumental. Coverage of unrest-related events declined significantly following the June 1986 restrictions — from over 125 minutes in June to less that 45 minutes in July (see figure 1).[10] Over the following three months, American

[7] Quoted in *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1986.
[8] *The Washington Post*, March 8, 1986.
[9] *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1986.
[10] This material was compiled from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, *Television News Index and Abstracts*, January 1984 to February 1987.

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FIGURE 2
U.S. TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF SOUTH AFRICA



coverage of South African unrest declined to and remained at insignificant levels for the first time since the beginning of 1985.

After the restrictions were imposed, the networks did attempt to stay with the South African story by extending coverage of events directly unrelated to the unrest (see figure 2). As will be shown also in the cases of China and Israel, there exists a lag time of one or two months between a regime's implementation of strict media restrictions and its effect upon television coverage. During this period, the networks attempt to prolong the life of their story by reporting news in conjunction with old file film, or by presenting background reports on various peripheral aspects of the original story. Such maneuvers, however, can be sustained for only a few months. The networks eventually will be forced to turn to areas where lack of footage is not a liability.

Thus, in the case of South Africa, the loss of graphic and action-oriented pictures directly contributed to the networks' loss of interest in South African unrest. Once American television screens no longer carried violent images from South Africa, South Africa began to recede as an issue, and the networks' — and America's — interest turned to other, more accessible areas.

Israel

In mid-December 1987, the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence service, and the border police moved into Balata, the largest Palestinian refugee district in the West Bank. Once there, the Israelis sought to suppress the influence of the Shabiba — a Palestinian youth organization loyal to both Yasir

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'Arafat and Fatah, a wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — responsible for politicizing the local populace around the Palestinian banner. The spark was lit when a border police patrol, surrounded and pelted with stones by angry residents, opened fire on the crowd, killing three people. The subsequent uprising, known as the *intifada*, quickly spread through Palestinian areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Lacking a force trained and equipped for riot duty, the Israeli government responded by deploying regular troops to the riot-stricken areas. By April 1988, the Israelis had killed more than one hundred Palestinians, with thousands more arrested.

In Israel's case, image is not merely a matter of vanity; it is a question of national survival.

Television coverage. Like unrest in South Africa, the Palestinian uprising was irresistible to American television news. Pictures of young Palestinians being beaten with truncheons and rifle butts, being shot by Israeli soldiers, and being brutally arrested by Israeli security forces began to appear regularly on American television. The Palestinians were young, unarmed, and untrained, while the uniformed Israelis, well-trained and equipped with the most modern weaponry, appeared as bullies on American television news.

In mid-January 1988, following a month of Palestinian unrest that appeared to be escalating out of control, Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin announced a policy of systematic beatings to deter further rioting. Ironically, this policy was intended to mitigate criticism of Israel by substituting non-fatal methods of riot control for live ammunition, which was creating a rising number of Palestinian deaths. This policy of "might, power, and beatings" backfired badly; after three days of beatings, over two hundred Palestinians were admitted to hospitals with broken bones and more serious injuries.[11] More important, footage of the beatings provided the networks with close-range images of violence.

In reaction to these images and the criticism they provoked, the Israelis attempted to backtrack. Within days, the government was denying that beatings had ever been a conscious Israeli policy.[12] Simultaneously, the government ordered its local commanders to abandon the policy — an order that was not always obeyed. In late February, a CBS news crew filmed a group of Israeli soldiers beating two Palestinians who had been detained in connection with a stone-throwing incident. The footage graphically portrayed a systematic and almost sadistic beating lasting for over forty minutes.[13] Widely shown on American television and in Western Europe, the footage threatened to damage severely Israel's previously favorable image.

[11] *The New York Times*, January 25, 1988.
[12] Ibid.
[13] *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 7, 1988.

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In Israel's case, image is not merely a matter of vanity; it is a question of national survival. Israel receives $3.6 billion a year in military and economic aid from the United States — more than any other state in the world. Moreover, the Israelis have access to American technology, intelligence, and weapons systems on a level comparable to America's most important European allies, and this support has given Israel its overwhelming military superiority in the region. American Jews also provide substantial financial support to Israel and are the backbone of support to the Israeli lobby in Washington. A continued deterioration of Israel's image could conceivably threaten these essential sources of support.

Even before the CBS film footage, American Jewish leaders had become increasingly critical of Israeli actions regarding the Palestinians. Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, called Israel's policy "an offense to the Jewish spirit" and a betrayal of "the Zionist dream." In a letter to Israeli president Chaim Herzog, Schindler pleaded for an end to "this madness."[14] A more telling protest was registered by Morris B. Abram, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Abram — initially one of the strongest American supporters of Israeli action against the Palestinians — expressed stern criticism of Israeli policy, and bleakly warned about shrinking American support for Israel.[15]

The Israeli government, greatly upset over its portrayal on American television, reacted as best it could. In late December, for instance, Moshe Arens, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, charged that "the American public cannot grasp what is going on here from what it sees on television." Avi Pazner, the government spokesman, said "only those things that give Israel a negative image have been screened."[16] Similarly, President Herzog attacked the American television press for not covering similar incidents in Arab nations — particularly regime repression of pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Tunisia and Jordan.[17]

Censorship. On February 16, 1988, following these accusations of American television bias, the Israeli government began to experiment with selective bans of the media around Nablus, the largest Palestinian town in the West Bank. On March 4, pleased with the results of the first ban, the army enforced a blanket ban on news coverage in the West Bank by setting up check points north and south of Jerusalem and by turning back journalists who attempted to cross into the occupied areas.[18]

While Pretoria had passed new laws to restrict television and other media, Israeli officials used existing practices that allowed local army commanders to declare an area a closed military zone and to order the media to vacate the area.[19] If Palestinian demonstrations were expected or in progress,

[14] *The New York Times*, January 25, 1988.
[15] *The New York Times*, January 27, 1988.
[16] Quoted in *The New York Times*, December 29, 1987.
[17] *The New York Times*, January 27, 1988.
[18] *The Washington Post*, March 14, 1988.
[19] *The New York Times*, March 20, 1988.

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FIGURE 3
U.S. TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN UNREST



the army would declare a closed zone and clear the media from the area, then deal with the disturbance. By April, Israelis were declaring closed military zones every Friday — the Muslim sabbath — in virtually all major population centers in the occupied territories.

The Israeli government then moved against American journalists who had supposedly violated Israeli strictures. For instance, the Israelis suspended the press credentials of Glenn Frankel of *The Washington Post* and Marvin Fletcher of NBC, who had reported the Israeli connection to the assassination of PLO leader Khalil Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. The reason given was that Frankel and Fletcher had not cleared the report with the Israeli military censor in accordance with a traditional requirement designed to deal with Israel's ongoing state of war with the Arab states. However, Western journalists had often failed to submit topics of a military nature to the censor. Moreover, it was freely admitted off the record by Israeli officials that Israel indeed had been responsible for the assassination. Thus, the Israeli moves against Frankel and Fletcher may have been retribution for previous negative reports and "a deterrent to future transgressions by a recalcitrant foreign press corps."[20]

The results. Israeli moves to block foreign journalists (especially American television) from the occupied territories appear to have been successful. Network coverage of Palestinian unrest declined somewhat in February 1988 when the government began excluding the media from selective areas, specifically Nablus (see figure 3).[21]

[20] Glenn Frankel, "Why the Israelis Lifted My Press Card Last Week," *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1988.
[21] *Television News Index and Abstracts*, December 1987 to April 1988.

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Television coverage did rise from that point, however, both in March, when the full restrictive measures took effect, and in April. These increases once again illustrate the lag time between the initiation of restrictive measures and the success of an engineered decline in the amount of coverage. In those months, as one would expect, the networks focused on other events that were tangential to the *intifada*, but were presented by the networks as part of the Palestinian problem. In March, for instance, U.S. secretary of state George Shultz was in the area for an extended period in an attempt to facilitate negotiations between Israel and the more moderate Arab states and the Palestinians. In April, a teenage Israeli girl was killed when her hiking group was attacked by a group of Palestinians in the West Bank. And in Tunisia, the Israelis assassinated Abu Jihad, the PLO leader allegedly responsible for overseeing the uprising in the occupied territories. These events were directly linked to the story of Palestinian unrest, even though the uprising itself was mentioned only briefly as part of the introduction to each story.

In May, however, the full effect of the Israeli measures became evident. Network news coverage of the uprising fell from 128 minutes of coverage during April, to less than 20 minutes during May. Although coverage increased somewhat in June because of another trip by Shultz to the region, and in December on the first anniversary of the Palestinian uprising, the overall trend through December 1989 was toward a much reduced level of network news coverage. Moreover, print media coverage followed and reflected the general decline in television coverage: from a high of over 3,100 column inches in January 1988, coverage in the five newspapers sampled (*The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, The Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*) declined steadily to insignificant levels by the middle of that year (see figure 4, page 356).[22]

Despite this reduction, however, the Palestinian uprising did not lessen either in response to more vigorous Israeli efforts, or because of the lack of foreign news coverage. If one assumes that the number of Palestinians killed per month as a result of Israeli actions is an accurate indication of the intensity of the revolt, there was little or no correlation between the intensity of the *intifada* and concurrent coverage by the American news media (see figure 5, page 357).[23] Indeed, following the first anniversary of the uprising in December 1988, media coverage fell again to insignificant levels, but the number of Palestinian deaths remained relatively constant at levels approximating those attained at the beginning of the revolt.

While the Israeli success in reducing coverage of an ongoing revolt could be interpreted as firm evidence of the political utility of government censorship, the situation is more complex. Although some commentators ini-

[22] Print media coverage was tabulated from the Information Access Company, *National Newspaper Index*. Sunday supplemental magazine articles were not included as part of the print media total.

[23] The number of Palestinian deaths resulting from Israeli action was compiled from "Chronology," *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 1988 to Summer 1990, and from *The New York Times*, December 1987 to January 1990.

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FIGURE 4
U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN UNREST



tially believed that coverage of the *intifada* had little or no negative impact upon American public opinion, more recent evidence suggests that this is not the case.[24]

In a February 1989 *Washington Post*/ABC news poll, for example, 56 percent of the respondents thought Israel an unreliable ally compared to 24 percent in October 1981.[25] In a June 1990 *New York Times*/CBS news poll, 47 percent of those polled supported a Palestinian homeland in the occupied territories, compared to 40 percent a year earlier. And when asked if the United States should be more sympathetic to the concerns of Palestinians, respondents were now evenly divided, while in 1988, the same question evoked a negative response by a 2 to 1 margin.[26]

Thus, as the results of these polls imply, the continued existence of the *intifada* contributes to a progressive, albeit gradual, decline in American support for Israel. For censorship to be totally successful in mitigating damage to a government's image, restrictive measures must be combined with a rapid and effective effort to eradicate the need for such censorship. Restrictions on the media can only alleviate immediate pressure on the government and grant it additional time to find a solution without international or American pressure.

[24] Eytan Gilboa, "The Palestinian Uprising: Has It Turned American Public Opinion?" *Orbis*, Winter 1989, pp. 21-37.
[25] *The Washington Post*, February 21, 1989.
[26] *The New York Times*, July 9, 1990.

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FIGURE 5
U.S. TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE VS. PALESTINIAN DEATHS



China

In mid-April 1989, Chinese students initiated a nation-wide political protest; it ended six weeks later, when the government massacred prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Squrare. The crisis began on April 15, with the death of former Communist party general secretary Hu Yaobang. A victim of the conservatives' resistance to political liberalization, Hu had been forced to resign in 1987, following his efforts to initiate a number of political, social, and economic reforms.

On April 22, the day of Hu's funeral at the Great Hall of the People, 50,000 students confronted security forces at the adjacent Tiananmen Square, but they departed peacefully. Six days later, however, 50,000 students — with wide support from Beijing's citizens — marched to Tiananmen Square and began an occupation in defiance of local authorities. By mid-May, the occupying crowd had surged to over 250,000, and protests had spread to Shanghai and five provincial capitals.

Television coverage. Television news was quick to see the dramatic potential of these events. Firstly, student protests seemed to mirror a concurrent political battle within the Communist party between conservatives, led by Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng, and more moderate political leaders, including party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who supported many of the goals of the students. The future of the students within the square, therefore, became symbolically linked to the future political direction of the People's Republic of China. Secondly, the networks drew parallels between the occupation of

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Tiananmen Square in China and the evident decline of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Events in China seemed to confirm the belief that communism was dying.

The events in Beijing fitted nicely into the preferred methodology of television news. The television media portrayed images of fragile, young students on the one hand, and of a massive totalitarian structure governed by recalcitrant old men on the other. Student leaders, for their part, masterfully used the medium of television. They wrote protest signs in English and French; they designed and built a Statue of Liberty replica, the "Goddess of Liberty"; and they organized a dramatic hunger strike for democracy, whose participants were constantly monitored by the international press.

The government seemed impotent in the face of the students' protest. This powerlessness was transmitted to the viewer through scenes of the military sympathizing and fraternizing with the students, and of party leader Zhao tearfully pleading with the students to end their hunger strike.

Censorship. The government's response, often confusing and contradictory, reflected the ongoing power struggle within the party. The government was aware of the damage being caused by television transmissions, however, and on May 20, as part of the imposition of martial law on selected districts of Beijing, it ordered CBS and CNN to halt satellite transmissions of live footage. (Both networks had brought their own satellite uplink stations to cover the mid-May visit of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev for an historic Chinese-Soviet summit that fortuitously coincided with the escalation of student unrest in Tiananmen Square.)[27]

Three days later, however, the government appeared to change its mind, and once again allowed live coverage. Although the regime insisted that networks use Central Chinese Television facilities in Beijing to transmit reports — thus maintaining theoretical control over damaging material — live coverage did appear to violate the government's own martial law restrictions.[28] In fact, network correspondents openly violated other restrictions by filming scenes of unrest or interviewing Beijing residents. As CBS correspondent Susan Spenser noted, the foreign press corps fully expected the government to lift existing media restrictions since "nobody's paid any attention to [them]" and because "martial law has been such a joke."[29]

On May 24, the government again reversed its policy and reimposed restrictions on live video transmissions. Seen at the time as further evidence of government ineptitude, the new ban was in reality the beginning of a strict policy of censorship designed to limit the damage of impending measures to crush the student uprising. Such restrictive measures were also evidence that the conservative faction within the government had triumphed over its moderate opposition. The foreign media attempted to counter the latest restrictions

[27] *The Los Angeles Times*, May 20, 1989; *The New York Times*, May 20, 1989.
[28] *The Los Angeles Times*, May 24, 1989.
[29] Ibid.; *The New York Times*, May 24, 1989.

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by shipping film to satellite relay stations in Hong Kong or Tokyo, where they would be transmitted to the networks in conjunction with live telephone reports from Beijing by the network's correspondents.[30] This stratagem, however, was defeated by the next and most comprehensive government move.

On June 1, the government announced sweeping restrictions designed to stem, if not totally eradicate, foreign media coverage of the Chinese student uprising. Under these restrictions, the government banned "press coverage, photographing and videotaping of activities" prohibited by martial law (such as demonstrations), "press coverage in a disguised form, such as making appointments with Chinese citizens . . . for interviews," and "press coverage, photography, and videotaping of the troops enforcing martial law."[31]

The June 1 restrictions had three primary goals. Firstly, the government wished to stop the insinuations about its lack of competence in dealing with the demonstrations. The government resented strongly the way the situation in Beijing was being portrayed by the foreign press as a symptom of the government's inability to govern its population and of the decay within the communist system.

Secondly, the regime wished to prevent the positive portrayal of the students and their democratic movement. Since many citizens and some members of the government appeared to support the students, and since the students were espousing democratic values, the foreign media were implicitly portraying the students as the country's true leadership. American television coverage in particular conveyed impressions of an undefeatable People Power destined to sweep away a decrepit regime.

Lastly, and most important, the regime introduced harsh press restrictions because it was readying itself to suppress the student movement violently, and it knew how damaging such actions could be to its international image. Since 1979, China had become increasingly linked to the capitalist world economy. By 1987, direct American investments in China totaled $3 billion, multinational corporations found China a lucrative and expansive market, and, after receiving most-favored-nation trade status with the United States, the American market had become important, with China achieving a trade surplus with the United States of more than $4 billion. China had become, moreover, heavily dependent upon the transfer of Western technology for its program of economic modernization.[32] By implementing restrictions on the foreign media, the leadership hoped to mitigate the damage caused by the violent suppression of the students.

The Tiananmen Square massacre. On the night of Saturday, June 3, troops moved into Tiananmen Square. In the resulting clashes, hundreds — perhaps thousands — of students and others were killed. (The difficulty of es-

[30] *The Los Angeles Times*, May 25, 1989.

[31] *The Los Angeles Times*, June 2, 1989; *The New York Times*, June 2, 1989.

[32] *The New York Times*, June 6, 1989; *The Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 1990; Arnold Miller and Francis W. Rushing, "Update China: Technology Transfer and Trade," *Business*, January/March 1990, p. 25.

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tablishing a casualty figure exemplified the success of the regime's restrictive measures on the press.) To their credit, the foreign media attempted to stay with the story, despite regime restrictions and personal endangerment. One enterprising photographer filmed events by riding around Beijing on a bicycle with a video camera hidden in a basket. Another hired a taxi to drive through the city, stopping to film events when regime forces were absent, and moving on when they appeared.[33]

Many journalists stayed in their hotels and reported events from their suites or from the roof. Indeed, the best-known image of the massacre — a young man confronting and halting a column of tanks — was taken from a room of the Beijing Hotel by an ABC cameraman.[34] The image itself was perfect for television, because it encapsulated television's interpretation of the event — the weak against the strong, the morally superior against the corrupt, the fragile individual against the totalitarian state.

Presented within this framework, the brief images transmitted by television news did severe temporary damage to the image of the Chinese government. Previously, China had been perceived as a moderate, pro-Western, reformist state undergoing political and economic modernization; now it was seen as a corrupt Stalinist regime that could only control its population through terror.

Censorship reinforced. To combat the negative media assault, the regime enforced its previous censorship measures even more stringently. During the early hours of the massacre, for instance, some cameramen and journalists were beaten and arrested by police after filming the unrest. In mid-June, the government ordered the expulsion of several journalists — including the Voice of America bureau chief — accusing them of illegally gathering news, spreading rumors, distorting facts, and "instigating turmoil and counterrevolutionary rebellion."[35] In addition, the regime pirated television signals from Hong Kong and Tokyo that portrayed scenes of unrest and interviews with Chinese critical of their government, then innovatively used these scenes as televised wanted posters for the individuals in question. Such tactics dramatically reduced the number of Chinese willing to risk being televised by the Western media, thus contributing to the subsequent reduction of network coverage of Chinese unrest.

The results. Network television news coverage of student unrest increased from 45 minutes in April to over 360 minutes in May (see figure 6).[36] While 20 percent of May's unrest was linked to Gorbachev's Beijing visit, the majority focussed directly on the student movement. In June, the month of

[33] *The New York Times*, June 25, 1989; *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1989; *The Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989.

[34] "China: The Weeks of Living Dangerously," *Broadcasting*, June 12, 1989, pp. 29-30; *The New York Times*, June 25, 1989.

[35] "China Expels Reporters," *Broadcasting*, June 19, 1989, pp. 46-47; *The Washington Post*, June 15, 1989.

[36] *Television News Index and Abstracts*, April to December 1989.

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FIGURE 6
U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE OF CHINESE STUDENT UNREST



of the Tiananmen Square massacre, network television news coverage soared to over 500 total minutes. The major print media followed: from 460 column inches in April, the five major newspapers sampled increased their coverage to 4,154 column inches in May and to 7,602 column inches in June.[37]

Although at first glance these figures suggest that Chinese restrictive measures had little effect, the case is much more complex. The Tiananmen Square massacre was a story of major dimensions, and no amount of censorship could suppress such a story in its initial stages. Restrictions did have an impact, however, on how long the story could be sustained. In the absence of visual material from China, the networks began to rely upon frequent analyses from China experts and journalists, as well as stories of events that were tangentially related to the Tiananmen Square massacre. For instance, networks pursued stories on Chinese students in the United States, Congressional outrage over the massacre, Chinese government propaganda, and the influence of the massacre on Western tourism, business, and investments.

A story cannot survive indefinitely, however, without input from the original source. The delayed but inevitable link between the initiation of censorship and the evidence of its effect eventually asserted itself. Both network news and American print media coverage dramatically decreased in July following the implementation of strict government restrictions on the media (see figure 6). From a high of over 500 minutes of television coverage in June, network coverage plummeted to less than 62 minutes in July, and then continued

[37] Information Access Company, *National Newspaper Index*.

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to decrease to insignificant levels throughout the rest of the year. The print media's coverage registered a significant decline in July to 1,320 column inches from the June high of over 7,600 column inches, and then — like television — to insignificant levels throughout the remainder of 1989.

When the massacre occurred, Washington was outraged, and Congressmen from both ends of the political spectrum called for punitive sanctions. The Bush administration resisted, however; by implementing some minor sanctions, it was able to placate congressional outrage until the issue obligingly receded from view. In May 1990, eleven months after the massacre and its rapid disappearance from the television screen, the administration was able to defeat feeble congressional efforts to terminate China's most-favored-nation status. With the onset of a new televised crisis, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, China again became a respectable member of the United Nations Security Council and a helpful ally against Baghdad. When the September 1990 Asian Games began in Beijing — a year and three months after the massacre — China's relationship with the rest of the world appeared to have returned to the status of its premassacre days.

Conclusion

In the three studies of political unrest offered here, South Africa, Israel, and China implemented censorship measures to prevent or lessen damaging footage of unrest. In South Africa's case, although the government was ultimately successful in restricting damaging television footage of black unrest, the regime restrictions were employed too late to prevent harsh American economic sanctions in the early fall of 1986. In the case of China, the regime implemented relatively rapid censorship measures that were successful both in blocking extensive images of regime violence against the students and limiting the duration of the crisis. If extensive images of regime repression had been shown to the American television audience over an extended period, as occurred in South Africa, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the Bush administration to defeat the congressionally mandated sanctions directed at the Chinese government.

But in Israel's case, the government was unable to suppress the Palestinian opposition. Thus, the Israeli example is much more interesting. While it could conceivably be argued that media attention to South Africa and China was reduced because those regimes successfully crushed the internal unrest (more so in China than in South Africa), the same could not be argued in the Israeli case. Here, following Israeli censorship measures, there was a significant drop in coverage in both the television and the print media, even though Palestinian unrest, as indicated by Palestinian deaths resulting from Israeli actions, continued at a relatively constant rate.

In addition, recent evidence shows that Israeli success in reducing coverage of a continuing revolt has not had its desired effect of preserving strongly favorable American public opinion toward the regime. Thus, for restrictive

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press measures to be totally successful in eliminating the possibility of American sanctions toward a regime, a government must implement such measures in tandem with a successful and rapid suppression of political unrest. Paradoxically, this implies that the more ruthless a regime — like the Chinese government — the more likely it is to avoid permanent American censure.

What does this mean for U.S. policy concerning foreign censorship of its television coverage? The policy implications are difficult to assess. If the state facing unrest is a friend or vital ally of the United States (or if the opposition represents an element anathema to American interests), a government's use of censorship to limit American public pressure on it may actually be in the best interests of the United States — especially if the government uses the time won to deal with the root causes of the unrest.

Moreover, American foreign policy has generally sought to encourage peaceful and evolutionary change where such change is considered desirable. In all three cases reviewed, official American statements not only criticized the censorship measures, but also stressed the need for some type of negotiation.

The conflict between television news and national governments is certain to increase as television technology becomes more sophisiticated. Governments, for their part, are certainly loath to yield total control over such transmissions to a private industry — one that seeks, by its very methodology, to capitalize on simplistic images that can do much harm to that regime or to that regime's efforts. On the other hand, if that government is a democracy with a tradition of a free press, it can impose censorship only at its own peril. For although the networks are private institutions, they are attempting to fulfill a vital public and constitutional function.

Television must be willing to lessen its dependence on dramatic, simplistic, and visually-oriented images. And the government must be willing to accept criticism and harmful film footage, as long as that footage is presented within the clear context of a well-understood and broader question. Unless such a compromise can be attained, both participants could continue their struggle in an escalating confrontation until one finally lies at the foot of the other. The result would hardly be in the interests of a democratic society, or of a free press.

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

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Restricting the Free Press in Romania

by Peter Gross

Foreign journalists and other observers attributed the results of the May 20, 1990, Romanian general elections — in which Ion Iliescu won the presidency with 86 percent of the votes and the National Salvation Front (NSF) won over 65 percent of the parliamentary seats — to an immature polity and to electoral cheating by the NSF.[1] Both explanations are true, but too simplistic. Many factors were responsible for the NSF victory, but perhaps the most important was the absence of a developed public sphere able to foster well-informed public opinion. A society's mass media, in particular, should be capable of educating the population in the necessary tenets, habits, processes, and life of a democratic society. So far, Romania's mass media have not lived up to this task. What are the reasons for the media's failure? How did this failure contribute to the NSF victory? An analysis of these questions could aid Romania in developing a civil society — a development that may make the difference in the next Romanian general elections, scheduled for 1992.

Continuity in Change

Just days before the May elections, Stelian Tanase, editor of the intellectual weekly *22,* published by the Group for Social Dialogue, anticipated the NSF's victory. He commented, "It will take time to make people understand what a democracy is." But, he added, "As long as our independent mass media are allowed to function and grow, we will succeed in getting rid of all vestiges of communism and build a democracy."[2] Tanase understood that a successful democratic society requires forms of citizen participation beyond voting and forming very small, often overlapping political parties. It requires the knowledge and inclination to carry out a political dialogue, and a sense of what democracy is and how its processes work. It also means accepting the notion of a loyal opposition and, perhaps above all, tolerance of differing opinions. The mass media have to aid this dialogue and the process of political education. In a transitional society, such as Romania, the media's task is more difficult be-

[1] *The Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 1990; *The New York Times*, May 22, 1990. See also U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Report on the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Romania*, May 30, 1990.

[2] Author's conversation with Stelian Tanase on May 17, 1990, in the editorial offices of *22* in Bucharest.

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cause the media are required to play a central role in reshaping the nation's political culture, and the mentalities of the polity. Unfortunately, Romania's mass media were not prepared and structured for this enormous task. The Ceausescus thoroughly controlled the mass media; they did not allow underground or alternative media to emerge; and the media lacked the technical facilities needed to be effective.

During more than forty years of communist rule in Romania, the truth was sacrificed for a party-led exercise in indoctrination, dissimulation, mobilization, and fiction writing.

Romanian journalism during more than forty years of communist control, and particularly in the last fifteen years, was much more than just slanted reporting of domestic and foreign news. The truth was sacrificed for a party-led exercise in indoctrination, dissimulation, mobilization, and fiction writing.[3] The ultimate result was a loss of credibility vis-á-vis the print and broadcast audience. People kept up with the news mainly out of "the fear of being 'tested' by local party leadership about current events."[4] Although people sharpened to an edge their ability to read between the lines, they began to rely more on foreign news broadcasts.[5]

Thus, while the December revolution significantly altered Romania's media scene, the problems caused by communism, the difficult transition to a democratic society, government actions and inaction, lack of professionalism among journalists, and the general sociopolitical situation inhibited the media's role in the May elections. The December revolution cut the Romanian mass media free from the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), but the sudden separation set the mass media adrift without any particular goal, except opposition to the Ceausescus, the recounting of years of oppression, and the revolution itself.

The Post-Revolution Media

The media achieved rapid diversification between December 22, 1989, and May 20, 1990. The print media grew fastest, adding an estimated nine hundred to one thousand new publications nationwide, ranging from satirical

[3] See, for example, Paul Lendvai, *The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Made the News* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).

[4] Ivan Volgyes, ed., *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 23.

[5] *The Washington Post*, December 29, 1989; see also Peter Gross, "Small Signs of Great Changes . . . at a Romanian TV Station," *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June 1990, pp. 37-39; and Peter Gross, "The Small and Large Role of Mass Media in Romania's Revolution," in David Paletz and Karol Jakubowics's forthcoming book (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publications).

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and religious dailies and weeklies, such as *Catavencu* and *Romania Mare*, to party and independent newspapers, like *Azi* and *Expres*. In many instances, one publication ceased operating and a new one replaced it. Some unconfirmed reports described a number of publishers bribing printers to print their products, and as a result, these publications were not included in the total national tally of print media output. Thus, a true accounting of the number of publications available to the reading public was impossible.

In the broadcast media, six regional radio stations, closed since 1985, officially re-opened, and an undetermined number of new, independent (pirate) stations were established. Two television stations — independent of official Romanian Television (renamed Free Romanian Television) — were established in Timisoara and Brasov, but did not have their own frequencies and had to broadcast over the frequency of official Romanian Television during off hours.[6]

This new mass media adopted three basic forms: (1) media sponsored by government, (2) media sponsored by political parties, social, religious, or academic organizations, and (3) commercial media mostly established by individuals or nonpolitical groups. The existing, prerevolution media changed their political orientation away from Ceausescuism and Marxism-Leninism, and appointed or elected new directors and editors.

In many cases, the printed press altered its banners, as in the case of the RCP's daily, *Scinteia*, which became *Scinteia Poporului* between December 22 and December 25, and subsequently became *Adevarul*. All Romanian mass media, including the government-controlled television and radio stations, labeled themselves independent, except for the new opposition press disseminated by the emerging political parties.

Politics dominated the mass media in the period between the revolution and the political elections. Specifically, coverage focused on two points: (1) support for one or more of the eighty-two registered political parties, including the NSF and (2) a reexamination of the last forty-two years of communism in Romania, of Marxism-Leninism in general, and of Western democratic principles. As a result of the partisan political stance of the press, a number of problems developed.

Political Polemics

Romania's media divided into two camps: one that supported the emerging, yet ill-defined status quo, and another that supported immediate political, social, and economic reforms. The latter forcefully opposed the newly emerging powers, and strongly questioned the government's divorce from socialist mentalities and authoritarianism. The anti-NSF independent and opposition media (extremely small in the broadcasting field, but much larger in print) set no other definable sociopolitical tasks for themselves. As Herbert Passin has

[6] See Gross, "Small Signs of Great Changes," pp. 37-39.

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asserted in his examination of journalism in transitional states moving towards liberty, the mass media "finds it difficult to transform itself into the kind of responsible, non-partisan press that the new situation requires."[7]

After the December revolution, most publications in Romania were far more concerned with political polemics than with political education, news reporting, and news analysis.

Consequently, few if any publications in Romania were objectively independent — with the exception of *Romania Libera*, a fiercely independent national daily. The rest were far more concerned with political polemics than with political education, news reporting, and news analysis. Diatribes about politicians and their pasts, and the rehashing of prefascist, fascist, or communist history, dominated both the print and broadcast media. Thus, objective examination of present problems, developmental issues, and future visions for Romanian society took a back seat, if they were dealt with at all. When these themes were dealt with, it was in intellectual weeklies, such as the Group for Social Dialogue's *22*, where the language and concepts proved too sophisticated to make an impact on the general public — even if the majority of this public could have gained access to these publications. Hence, an informed public did not exist to any great extent as election day approached. As a result, the now-transformed prerevolution media that chose to support Iliescu and his NSF had the upper hand. After all, they had considerably more experience at propaganda, mobilization, indoctrination, and agitation than the newly established media.

Given their overwhelming concentration on opinions and polemics, the mass media (particularly print media) contributed minimally, and mostly symbolically by way of their diversity, to establishing a democratic political culture in the first post-Ceausescu year.[8] The media did not help the process of establishing a collective, democratic orientation toward the fundamental political institutions and processes of a new, democratic political system. As a result, their influence on public opinion, such as it was at the (micro) level of the individual, was a limited one, resulting largely in the polarization of voters and not in their reorientation away from the mentalities of the last forty-two years. As a result, this public opinion was expressed in either the rejection or acceptance of the ruling National Salvation Front, and its immediate policies.

The general lack of professionalism can, in part, be attributed to the make-up of the new corps of Romanian print and broadcast journalists. Two-thirds of working journalists joined the ranks of the profession after the Decem-

[7] Herbert Passin, "Writer and Journalist in the Transitional Society," in Lucian W. Pye et al, *Communication and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 102.

[8] Gross, "The Small and Large Role of Mass Media in the Romanian Revolution."

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ber revolution and had little or no journalistic training. While most were graduates of institutions of higher learning with degrees in a variety of academic subjects, their exposure to professional journalism was limited to reading the communist press and, in extremely few instances, the foreign press smuggled into the country, and listening to foreign broadcasts. The new journalists did not know how to gather news or present it to the reading, listening, or viewing public.

Dilatory Decentralization

While the media's diversity and the greater freedom of expression established after the December revolution pointed to a free, uncensored press, the media's liberation from government control did not occur. Government ministries retained control of printing facilities (with their few, antiquated presses); paper manufacturing, purchasing, and distribution; and the distribution of publications. Whether coincidentally or not, editors of anti-NSF independent and opposition publications reported cuts in their paper allocations, limitations on press times, and mishandling of their publications' distribution as election day approached.

Paper production in Romania did not keep up with demand after December 1989, and the government continued to allow newsprint to be exported.[9] Exacerbating the difficulties of the print media were the limited facilities available. For example, in Brasov, only one printing facility was available to service seventy publications. In April 1990, the NSF decreed that weekly newspapers should appear every two weeks and daily newspapers, with the exception of the party's *Azi*, should cut their circulations in half.[10]

Because of decreased paper allocations and press time, *Romania Libera* was down to 800,000 daily issues in May from a high of 1.2 million in January. The political opposition's publications, as well as other independent publications that opposed the NSF and its candidates, reported the same problems.[11]

Reportedly, opposition papers only sporadically reached their subscribers. The press that supported the NSF reported no such problems. Editors of *Romania Libera*, *Express*, and *22* reported that their subscribers received the NSF-supporting newspaper, *Adevarul*, instead of their publications. Not infrequently, bundles of opposition newspapers shipped by train to other cities were found alongside train tracks in the countryside. Reports of opposition and non-NSF-supporting newspapers being burned or stored in warehouses (and reported distributed) became a weekly affair in pre-election Romania.[12]

[9] Ursula Ruston, *Index on Censorship*, Briefing Paper No. 354, September 1990, p. 4.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Author's discussions with editors of independent and opposition papers in Bucharest, Timisoara, and Brasov in May, August, and November 1990.

[12] Ibid. See also Ruston, *Index on Censorship*, pp. 6, 7; and International Journalism Institute, *Mass Media in the World. Special Issue on Central and Eastern Europe* (Prague: International Journalism Institute, 1990), pp. 25-28.

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In short, a concerted effort existed on the part of NSF supporters, if not (officially) the party itself, to inhibit the production and distribution of the independent anti-NSF and opposition press. Partly because of this, and the decree reducing the press runs of independent publications, the media that supported the NSF and its candidates reached more people. In the countryside, home to roughly 40 percent of Romania's twenty-one million people, they had virtually no competition.

Reportedly, opposition papers only sporadically reached their subscribers. The press that supported the National Salvation Front reported no such problems.

The broadcast media did not fare any better than the print media. The few antiquated facilities were state controlled, including the all-important Romanian Television — whose news and analysis generally leaned toward the NSF. The West donated the very limited new equipment available to some radio and television stations, but these donations made little overall difference in the operation of these stations or in the quality of their programs.

Official Romanian Television — broadcasting approximately 160 hours per week (combined) on Channel 1 and Channel 2 — had little competition from the quasi-independent television stations operating in Timisoara and Brasov. Prior to May 20, the Romanian government did not give permission to individuals or groups wishing to establish independent or opposition radio or television. For example, the government refused to give Ion Ratiu, the presidential candidate for the National Christian Peasant party, permission to open his own television and radio station despite — or perhaps because of — his willingness and financial ability to import new equipment and set up technically modern operations.[13] Furthermore, a recent report confirmed that Romanian Television forced opposition parties to share half of the airtime alloted for political broadcasts and used the other half for its own purposes.[14] Thus, because the broadcast media have a far more extensive reach, the NSF had a significant advantage in the race for votes.

The Post-Election Mass Media

After May 20, 1990, the pace of media growth hardly slowed. The print media grew to nearly 1,500 publications by the year's end, and the number of temporary licenses for independent local and regional television stations grew from zero to fourteen.[15] By spring 1991, seventeen independent local and regional television stations received licenses. Although these independent sta-

[13] Author's discussions with Ion Ratiu in Bucharest, January 1991.

[14] Ruston, *Index on Censorship*, p. 1.

[15] Peter Gross, "Rumaniens Massenmedien: Neue Vielzahl und ungewisse Zukunft," in *Media Perspektiven*, March 1991, pp. 90-95.

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tions serve as important counter-balances to Romanian Television, they are hampered by a myriad of technical, programming, personnel, financial, and legal problems. They are small stations, composed predominantly of part-time, amateurish staffs wrestling on a daily basis to present locally produced programs. Moreover, their existence is severely threatened by the January 1, 1991, increase in rates charged by the Romanian Post Telephone and Telegraph for relaying their signals. The temporary nature of their licenses is also raising questions regarding their long-term survivability. The same is true of independent radio stations, most of which concentrate on cultural and entertainment programming, or are pirate stations that will sooner or later be squeezed out of existence.

Donations and very limited advertising revenues provide the only financial lifeline for the new TV and radio stations. Until a substantial proportion of the Romanian economy becomes market driven, with consumer choice, price, and availability becoming real issues, advertising will not constitute a reliable or significant income for print or broadcast media. For the time being, continued political ferment guarantees the survival of a high number of publications and small, local television stations. However, their lack of economic viability will close many in the foreseeable future.

In the national television field, state-owned Romanian Television is the only game in town. Since February 1991, it has eliminated the weekly "View-Point" program allocated to the opposition parties, and drastically reduced its Hungarian and German language programs. Despite pressure from the Free Television Trade Union, the Civic Alliance, other independent social and anticommunist groups, and the Romanian Society for the Foundation of a National Television Company (SOTI — *Societatea Romana Pentru Infiintarea Unei Companii Nationale de Televiziune Independenta*), the NSF government resists granting licenses to establish independent national television stations. These groups continue to fight vigorously for independent national television stations, and they made the issue a central rallying cry in demonstrations taking place in the country throughout summer and fall 1990 and spring 1991. The Declaration of Unity of the Parliamentary and Extra-Parliamentary opposition on April 12, 1991, made the establishment of independent television a primary demand.

Unexpectedly, the Ministry of Communication and Romanian Television gave SOTI permission in February 1991 to experiment with broadcasting a three-hour-per-day program on the state-owned station's local Channel 2 in Bucharest. Nearly two months later, on April 11, the Romanian Senate gave Romanian Television approval to allow SOTI to begin its broadcasts.[16]

In another surprise move, on April 15, Romanian Television made public a plan calling for its Channel 2 to be taken over by a joint venture to be financed by state, private, and foreign capital. Its Channel 1, whose programs

[16] Romanian Senate's Commission on Culture, Art, and Mass Communication, Communique to Rasvan Teodorescu, president of Romanian Television, no. 83, April 11, 1991.

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reach the entire country, is also to be reorganized as a state-owned "autonomous company."[17] Whether true autonomy will be achieved by Romanian Television remains to be seen. Meanwhile, it continues to wrestle with a sizable credibility problem among its viewers.

Notably, judging by the people's perceptions of its performance in covering the May 1990 election, Romanian Television has moderate to little credibility among the general public, and little or no credibility among the educated classes.[18] No independent data exists to indicate if Romanian Television's image changed by the end of 1990, when it purportedly cut its ties with the state and government. The government's critics speculated that this was a charade arranged to make a good impression on the West and enhance Romania's chance of receiving observer status in the Council of Europe. Maybe so, but the ultimate test of Romanian Television's independence will come in its coverage of issues, political parties, and other groups, as the nation closes in on the next election.

Undoubtedly, the present government has not given up on the idea of controlling or at least harassing and manipulating the press.[19] The organized ransacking of editorial offices of independent newspapers, and the assault on journalists in July 1990, when miners were called in by the government to quell antigovernment demonstrations, was the most vivid symptom of Iliescu's uncomfortableness with an independent, critical press. On March 12, 1991, the government introduced a draft press law in parliament which called for heavy fines and prison terms for journalists who are found guilty of slandering public authority, the president of the country, and the army.[20] The draft law was strongly attacked in the independent Romanian press and the National Convention of Romanian Journalists (an umbrella group for the journalism unions), as well as by foreign governments. It was withdrawn ten days later.

What Washington Can Do

The victory of Iliescu and the NSF in the May 1990 national elections demonstrates the need to establish in Romania strong independent mass media, efficient production and dissemination facilities, and better training of journalists. In a speech at Charles University in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on February 7, 1990, U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III made it clear that assistance in establishing independent mass media enterprises across the region is an important U.S. aim.[21] In the summer of 1990, the United States Information Agency's

[17] Reuters, April 15, 1991.

[18] Pavel Campeanu, "Opinia Publica si Alegerile Prezidentiale," *22*, July 6, 1990, p. 2.

[19] Ruston, *Index on Censorship*. See also Committee to Protect Journalists, *Attack on the Press — A Worldwide Survey*, March 1991, pp. 99-100.

[20] *The San Francisco Chronicle*, March 13, 1991.

[21] Speech by Secretary of State James A. Baker III at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia, February 7, 1990, published as *From Revolution to Democracy: Central and Eastern Europe in the New Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, current policy no. 1248).

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(USIA) Office of the President's Eastern European Initiative, working with USIA's International Media Training Center at the Voice of America (VOA), launched a number of education and training programs for East European journalists. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State announced on August 30, 1990, the formation of the International Media Fund to provide seed money for the establishment of independent mass media. As a result of these endeavors, ten Romanian journalists participated in an intensive two-week training program at California State University-Chico (CSU-C) in July 1990. Additionally, CSUC faculty members held lectures and seminars at the new School of Journalism, University of Bucharest. A number of Romanian journalists have received grants to attend brief university programs in the United States.

The International Media Fund is now financing the acquisition of broadcast transmission and production equipment for the aforementioned universities, and for a number of independent broadcasting operations. Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts, has also made equipment donations to university groups in Romania. Freedom House facilitated the purchase and transport of a printing press from the Netherlands to *Romania Libera* in Bucharest last summer. The Soros Foundation has set up an office in Bucharest and plans to aid the mass media.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of aid (education/training and equipment) to the Romanian media, avoid duplication, increase follow-up, and develop a long-range, comprehensive program, far more coordination of the various organizations dealing with Romania is needed. The USIA/VOA and the International Media Fund are playing an unofficial coordinating role, but loose cannons still exist among the well-intentioned American organizations interested in Romania.

The most urgent training needs in management, news reporting, writing, and editing techniques, and in the principles and concepts of Western-style journalism, are being met by USIA's training programs. Yet, the number of journalists affected is small and, given the large corps of journalists working today, an immediate, major impact on Romanian journalism is almost impossible. The aid extended to the School of Journalism at the University of Bucharest, as well as aid to the University of Timisoara to establish a journalism program, will not bear fruit until the first students who complete the post-revolution curricula enter the profession. The United States needs to continue both the U.S.-based and Romania-based training programs it initiated in 1990, as well as its aid to the existing and planned new journalism programs in Romania.

But supplying material aid to Romania's existing independent mass media, and to those groups planning to establish new media outlets, is a risky endeavor for Washington. On the one hand, the ability of independent television stations to produce more and better programs, and extend their broadcast reach, provides a counterbalance to the mass media supporting the Iliescu government and the NSF. These independent stations contribute to the growth of Romania's civil society and the diversification of mass media. On the other hand, the expected enactment of a new audio-visual law, submitted to the par-

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liament by the Iliescu government on December 15, 1990, may result in the loss of licenses and frequencies now provisionally held by independent broadcasters. What will then happen to equipment donated by the United States?

The new audio-visual law calls for the establishment of a regulatory agency, the Higher Audio Visual Council (HAVC), composed of thirteen appointed members: three each by the president of Romania, the Senate Bureau, and the House of Deputies Bureau (reflecting the political configuration of the House and Senate); three by the government; and one by the Romanian Academy. The NSF controls all of these institutions as well as the Ministry of Communication that issues the program and technical licenses upon which HAVC authorization is granted. Independent broadcasters fear that an NSF-controlled HAVC will not authorize licenses to independent broadcasters for anything but nonpolitical programs. According to the proposed new law, broadcasting without authorization and license will result in the confiscation of equipment.

If the new audio-visual law is not enacted, local, independent broadcasters most likely will be able to retain their licenses and frequencies. But, it may also mean that no independent national television station will be licensed. To date, the Romanian government has been unwilling to assign a license and frequency for an independent national television station, arguing the need to first enact the audio-visual law. By failing to do so for one reason or another, the government may continue to claim that it is unable to allow the establishment of other national television stations that will provide a counter-balance to Romanian Television. At least the government will claim not to be able to do so until after the next scheduled national election in 1992, therefore once again retaining an upper hand in communicating with the polity.

In fact, as the 1992 election day approaches, the continuing absence of an audio-visual law may offer the government an excuse to withdraw the temporary licenses of those independent broadcast (TV and radio) stations it feels have grown sufficiently to pose a threat. Such action would not be without precedent. The independent Oradea Television station was abruptly closed in early April 1991 by order of the Ministry of Communication. The NSF government was apparently embarrassed because the station broadcast lists of informants, including NSF parliamentarians, working for the new Romanian Information Service, the agency set up last year to replace Ceausescu's dreaded Securitate.

The United States must exert whatever influence it can muster to ensure the enactment of an audio-visual law that provides for a regulatory agency that is far more diverse in its membership than the presently proposed one allows, given the institutions (and the party which dominates them) from which it would draw its members. National, regional, and local independent broadcasting stations must be established if democratic concepts and processes are to be taught to Romanians whose political education and consciousness is severely handicapped.

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Risks aside, at this stage of Romania's post-revolutionary evolution, Washington must take a chance and continue to provide material assistance to independent broadcasters, particularly television production and transmission equipment. Furthermore, it should continue its educational and material aid to the print media in the form of printing presses and other equipment. Washington should also assist in the establishment of independent news agencies that can break the monopoly in foreign news now held by the Romanian government's news agency, Rompres (formerly Agerpres).

In sum, the United States must do everything possible to help foster a strong, independent media capable of facilitating Romania's transition to a true democracy.

Conclusion

A civil society is slowly emerging in Romania, and a variety of public spheres are being established. Despite problems, independent and opposition media are now attempting to put into operation their own printing facilities, extending their reach by organizing their own distribution system, and looking for paper sources beyond their national paper mills. For their credibility, they are professionalizing their staffs with the help of U.S., Belgian, and French training programs.

But the media still have a long way to go. As long as the national information system and its material basis is controlled by the government, the evolution of democracy is stunted.

More important, as long as the polemical nature of Romanian journalism persists, the media's role in reshaping society will be a limited and limiting one. As the next election approaches, unless the media's very nature changes and their handicaps disappear or are at least minimized, the liberal independent and opposition media will unintentionally inhibit a democratic political evolution and thus help the ruling party.

Hope does exist in the struggle now going on within the Romanian media to professionalize. Additionally, there are increasing pressures from a growing civil society for government to stay out of media affairs, and the educational/training and material aid offered to the Romanian media by foreign organizations is encouraging. The media's direct and indirect role in the next election will signal the degree to which the struggle and the foreign help have been successful.

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Non-Offensive Defense

Toward a Soviet-German Security Partnership?

by Marian Leighton and Robert Rudney

The concept of non-offensive (or defensive) defense, based on a nonprovocative force structure and a political security partnership between East and West, has evolved into the key strategic doctrine linking the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev and the West European — notably the German — Social Democratic parties. Non-offensive defense connotes a massive restructuring of military forces, both in terms of weapons and doctrine, in order to eliminate the offensive, purportedly destabilizing elements designed to seize and hold territory. In its more sophisticated forms, the theory envisions a state of "mutual defensive superiority," in which a reshaping of forces on both sides serves to increase confidence and encourage further arms reductions.

The political ramifications of non-offensive defense concepts, particularly their linkage to the establishment of a European "common security" regime, deserve much greater attention. Non-offensive defense models conceivably could provide the military rationale for an eventual Soviet-German security partnership dominating the structures of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and rendering NATO obsolete. Ultimately, the complete military disengagement of the United States from Europe could result from the adoption of non-offensive policies. The role of the United States and the Western alliance system as a whole is deemphasized in nearly all of these models, which assume a predominantly national, territorial defense.

The Soviet approach to non-offensive defense seems to draw heavily upon the past policy positions of the (West) German Social Democratic party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), its spokesmen and academic advisers. Indeed, Soviet security researchers and commentators have publicly acknowledged their debt to West German theorists for introducing them to non-offensive defense models.

Origins of Non-Offensive Defense

The unique security situation of West Germany — namely, its dependence on its American protector — made it the logical laboratory for debate

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over non-offensive defense formulas. The bitter controversies over nuclear weapons in West Germany led many critics to develop alternative strategies to the official Western doctrine of nuclear deterrence and flexible response. Nearly all of these alternative strategies focus on the redesign of military forces in order to convey a nonprovocative, non-nuclear defensive posture. The logic behind these proposals is to build on the defender's natural advantages (knowledge of terrain, shorter supply and communications lines, ability to mobilize reserves) to deter aggression and reinforce stability. To this end, the elimination of blatantly offensive weapons systems and tactics is meant to assure the opposing side of the defender's peaceful intentions and to blunt any temptation to preempt. The assumption is generally made that nuclear weapons deter only other nuclear weapons and that Germany can be adequately defended by conventional means alone.

German non-offensive defense theorists trace their lineage to the beginnings of the West German army (Bundeswehr) in the early 1950s. At that time, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the policy of complete NATO integration, with its implied dependence on extended nuclear deterrence guarantees by the United States. In reaction to this official doctrine, Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, an army planning officer, put forward a scheme for a fifty-kilometer border zone defended solely by all-German, mobile antitank forces.[1] Von Bonin's arguments paralleled those of latter-day non-offensive defense theorists: that NATO's reliance on battlefield nuclear weapons would be potentially catastrophic for all Germans and that total integration of the Bundeswehr into NATO would effectively block progress toward German unification. For his heresies, von Bonin was summarily dismissed from the armed forces in 1955. His ideas, however, proved attractive to a number of active and retired Bundeswehr officers in the 1960s and 1970s. Horst Afheldt, a retired colonel who worked at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, became the leading proponent of this revisionist school of thought.[2] His model relied upon a network of highly trained, light-infantry "technocommandos" deployed across the entire national territory and operating with a decentralized command structure. The objective of Afheldt's model was to neutralize Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantages — firepower, mass, mobility — by conventional, nonprovocative means. The twenty-to-thirty-man technocommando units, depending mainly on precision-guided antitank weaponry, were not supposed to defend territory, but rather to disrupt the enemy's strategy, essentially through a guerrilla campaign of harassment and attrition. Afheldt's theories have been criticized because they neglect relations among allies (his light infantry would be drawn exclusively from national forces), because they underestimate the impact of enemy air superiority, be-

[1] See Bogislav von Bonin, *Opposition gegen Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik: Eine Dokumentation zusammengestellt von Heinz Brill* (Hamburg: Verlag Neue Politik, 1976).

[2] See Horst Afheldt, *Defensive Verteidigung* (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1983); Horst Afheldt, *Verteidigung und Frieden* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976).

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cause they leave civilian urban areas unprotected, and because of the inherent inability of the technocommandos to mount a concerted counterattack.[3]

The SPD Turns to Non-Offensive Defense

During the first decade of the Federal Republic's existence, the SPD (in opposition to Adenauer) had staunchly resisted German rearmament and NATO membership as obstacles to eventual national reunification.[4] Social Democratic thinking at the time was dominated by the party's first postwar leader, Kurt Schumacher, who advocated a nonaligned, demilitarized (and ipso facto denuclearized) West Germany that would be prepared to negotiate with the Soviets for a neutral, unified state. In Schumacher's view, only a united Germany posing no military threat could contribute to maintaining peace in Europe.

However, by the end of the 1950s, after a decade in opposition, the SPD leadership acknowledged that Germany's division, the Bundeswehr, and NATO membership (with U.S. nuclear guarantees) were established political realities. Only by conceding these points could the party hope to gain the popular credibility it needed to win political office. The erection of the Berlin Wall reinforced the seeming permanence of two separate Germanies. The interim SPD solution was expressed in a 1963 speech by a party journalist, Egon Bahr, who proposed a series of small steps toward relaxation of tensions with the East and toward acceptance of the East German regime's existence.[5] Bahr's conception of *Wandel durch Annäherung* ("change through convergence") presaged Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* but was also a precursor of later common security themes, including the idea of a joint East-West interest in preserving peace on the continent.

The SPD, which was in power from 1969 to 1982, recognized the deterrent value of NATO collective security and committed itself to orthodox NATO doctrine, although with increasing internal dissension after the 1977 neutron bomb controversy. At the same time, the SPD pursued an ambitious policy of détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This two-track strategy was formally endorsed by the Atlantic Alliance in the 1967 Harmel Report, which sought to reconcile collective defense with détente initiatives. Only in the late 1970s, when the two-track formula began to come unhinged, did factions within the SPD begin to question anew the assumptions behind

[3] See David Gates, "Non-Offensive Defence: A Strategic Contradiction?" *Occasional Paper*, no. 29 (London: Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, 1987); David Gates, "Area Defence Concepts: The West German Debate," *Survival*, July/August 1987, pp. 301-17; Stephen J. Flanagan, *NATO's Conventional Defenses* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger/IISS, 1988), pp. 110-20.

[4] Jeffrey Boutwell, "The Politics and Ideology of SPD Security Policies," in Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, eds., *The Silent Partner: West Germany and Arms Control* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 130-31; David Gress, *Peace and Survival: West Germany, The Peace Movement & European Security* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 23-45.

[5] See Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *Shadow and Substance 1945-1963*, vol. 1 of *A History of West Germany*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 510-13.

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NATO solidarity. Heightened East-West tensions, culminating in the INF deployment crisis, alarmed leading SPD figures (including Bahr), who saw the political and economic achievements of *Ostpolitik* jeopardized by Soviet-American competition for influence in Europe. Dissension among the Social Democrats was a key factor in bringing down Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's coalition government. Once out of office, the Social Democrats were freer to pursue alternative strategies for security and peace.

For Bahr, as the "grey eminence" behind *Ostpolitik*, the preservation of East-West linkages was of paramount importance. He contended that the military confrontation in the heart of Europe had to cease in order to overcome the political division of the continent. According to Bahr, the threat to peace transcended ideological differences, since any war in Europe would be a catastrophe for both East and West.

Bahr's common security paradigm found its ultimate expression in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, better known as the Palme Commission. Chaired by Swedish prime minister Olof Palme, the commission was composed of leading political figures from seventeen countries (East, West, and nonaligned), including former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance, former British foreign secretary David Owen, and Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Soviet Institute for USA and Canada Studies. The Palme Commission held its deliberations between 1980 and 1982, at the height of the INF controversy in Europe. Its findings concluded that victory in a nuclear war was impossible and that:

> States can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings. . . . Even ideological opponents and political rivals have a shared interest in survival. . . . International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction.[6]

Bahr, as the West German representative on the Palme Commission, was instrumental in shaping the Commission's findings to reflect his own prognosis. He used the report to give his conceptualization an international imprimatur and a global audience.

In May 1984, the SPD adopted a general proposal, presented by Bahr's "New Strategies" working group, that called for a defensive restructuring of conventional forces, based on "a structural inability to launch an attack" (*strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit*).[7] The latter concept was introduced into the strategic debate by Albrecht von Müller, a disciple of Afheldt. Von Müller's basic premise is that conventional stability can be attained only when both sides reach a threshold of mutual defensive superiority, at which point the structural

[6] Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 139.

[7] Quoted in Dieter S. Lutz, "Security Partnership and/or Common Security?" *Coexistence*, no. 24, 1987, p. 278; See also Lutz, "Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit in Rahmen Defensiver Abhaltung und einer Konzeption Gemeinsamen Friedens," *SPD Materialien*, October 1987, pp. 5-6. In 1984, Bahr took the controversial step of having himself appointed director of the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), thereby providing himself with the services of a think tank.

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advantages of the defender far outweigh the advantages of surprise or preemption on the part of the attacker.

Von Müller's rather abstruse model is most concerned with eliminating or constraining offensive features of the competing force structures to attain a high degree of conventional stability. Mutual cuts in offensive systems to 50 percent of NATO levels would be complemented by restructured infantry and barrier units:

> What we are talking about are attrition-oriented forces without strategic mobility but with high efficiency against both dispersed and massed forces. The basic idea of the proposed conventional stability regime is, therefore, to overcome the present monoculture of heavy armored, highly mobile forces that exist on both sides.[8]

Von Müller's exact formula for attaining this stage is never explicitly spelled out. Nevertheless, he foresees the need for a residual nuclear deterrent of a few hundred warheads in Europe as "a factor of ultimate incalculability."[9] Von Müller's importance lies less in the originality of his theories than in their adaptability for the SPD's political purposes and in his wide circle of contacts in the East and West. His role has been largely that of a proselytizer.

A competing vision of non-offensive defense has been put forward by the Study Group on Alternative Security (SAS), led by Lutz Unterseher, an SPD adviser. Unterseher's intricate "spider-in-the-web" formulation calls for a network of forward-deployed light infantry (the "web") with armored mobile formations (the "spider"):

> It is primarily the area-covering web that would reduce the velocity of the adversary. Occasionally spider formations would assist the web in carrying out this delaying task. Since the web would make it difficult for dispersed forces to advance, it would compel the opponent to concentrate. With the help of spider formations, it would drive the invaders into a bottleneck or in some cases block them by forming a wall. In addition, the mobile formations would cut off the opponent's forces, throw them off balance, and disrupt their cohesion and combat power.[10]

Unterseher insists that such an operational scheme would be compatible with NATO structures — and he has, in fact, consulted for NATO. However, in its ongoing military doctrine review, NATO continues to emphasize the principles of strategic mobility and force flexibility.

[8] Albrecht von Müller, "Conventional Stability and Defense Dominance," in United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, ed., *Nonoffensive Defense: A Global Perspective* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), p. 11. See also von Müller's contributions in Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., *The Foundations of Defensive Defence* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 19-30, 47-54.

[9] Albrecht von Müller and Andrzej Karkoszka, "An East-West Negotiating Proposal," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, September 1988, p. 41. See also the paper written by von Müller in collaboration with the former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR), General Gerd Schmückle, "Das Konzept der 'Stabilen Abhaltung', Umrisse eines Gesamtkonzepts zur Um-und Abrüstung in Europa" (Starnberg: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 1988), p. 6-9.

[10] John Grin and Lutz Unterseher, "The Spiderweb Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1988, pp. 29-30. See also Lutz Unterseher, *The Conventional Land Defence in Central Europe: Force Structure, Emerging Technology and Military Stability*, AFES-PRESS report no. 30 (Mosbach: AFES-PRESS, 1989).

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These more flexible, second-generation versions of non-offensive defense have also served as the military-operational dimension of the SPD's common security strategy. Andreas von Bülow, former state secretary in the Defense Ministry, emerged in the mid-1980s as the leading SPD figure committed to reconciling non-offensive defense with NATO integration. Von Bülow warned against the employment of emerging conventional weapons technologies in what he viewed as a destabilizing deep-interdiction mode (as in NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept).[11] Instead, he emphasized the application of appropriate emerging technologies to shift the equilibrium on the battlefield in favor of the defender. His defense model was incorporated in an 1985 SPD working paper that was leaked to the press and created controversy because of its outright break with NATO force planning.[12] Von Bülow's report also included Bahr-inspired common security concepts for mutual arms reduction and nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe.

The SPD's commitment to launch "a second phase of détente" involving security issues was also reflected in an unprecedented series of negotiations, initiated largely by Bahr, with East Germany's ruling communist party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), and later with the Communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. In 1985, the controversial SPD-SED talks resulted in an agreement on a chemical-weapons-free zone; the following year, the two parties proposed a nuclear-free corridor along the lines of the Palme Commission plan. These accords with the SED were justified by SPD leaders as measures required to preserve and advance the achievements of *Ostpolitik* during a time of East-West tensions. Nevertheless, the periodic negotiations with the East Germans left the SPD open to charges of adopting a policy of moral equivalence between East and West, especially after publication in 1987 of a remarkable joint SPD-SED document in which mutual defense of peace was described as transcending both political and ideological differences.[13] These charges returned to haunt the SPD during the collapse of the East German Communist regime and the subsequent reunification process.

Operating on the assumptions of Bahr's change-through-convergence framework, the Social Democrats thus adopted a revisionist but gradualist security policy that effectively recognized the Soviet-backed SED regime as a legitimate government and sought to exploit West German reservations about the U.S. nuclear connection. The inclusion of non-offensive defense concepts in SPD party platforms was intended to help build diplomatic bridges to the East, to bolster SPD political credibility on post-INF security issues, and to provide

[11] Andreas von Bülow, "Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., *The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 131.

[12] See Boutwell, "The Politics and Ideology of SPD Security Policies," pp. 137-39.

[13] Academy for Social Science attached to the SED Central Committee and the Basic Value Commission of the SPD, *Conflicting Ideologies and Common Security* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 27, 1987). The joint SED-SPD working group on European security questions continued meeting as late as July 1989.

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reassurance to a nervous West German electorate that was increasingly uneasy about its NATO commitments.

Non-Offensive Defense Arrives in the Soviet Union

Although Soviet discussions about non-offensive defense have been linked in the minds of Western observers with Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking," the groundwork was laid several years before he came to power. The U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s was shattered by Moscow's adventurism in the Third World, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The election of Ronald Reagan, who accelerated the U.S. military build-up that began in the last months of the Carter administration, also soured Soviet-American relations. Meanwhile, U.S. plans to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe galvanized the European peace movement. Many officials and opinion molders in the European NATO nations regarded the scheduled INF deployments as a ploy by the Americans to "fight to the last European" while remaining safe in their transatlantic sanctuary. Such European attitudes were no less real for being irrational, and they were exploited brilliantly by Soviet propaganda.

SPD leaders felt obliged to make the trek to the Kremlin in order to reassure Soviet leaders that the hard-line Reagan-Kohl position on INF deployment did not reflect all of German political opinion.

German-Soviet contacts. During the period of strained East-West relations in the 1980s, the major source of Soviet information about alternative defense strategies came from the regular flow of official SPD visitors to Moscow.

Social Democratic leaders felt obliged to make the trek to the Kremlin in order to reassure Soviet leaders that the hard-line Reagan-Kohl position, particularly on INF deployment, did not reflect all of German political opinion. Once out of power, the SPD multiplied its contacts with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) through the establishment of working groups on security questions,[14] and pursued a controversial policy of *Nebenaussenpolitik* ("shadow" foreign policy) reflecting the axiom of *Ostpolitik* that the road to East Berlin lay through Moscow. The SPD regarded the party-to-party talks with the CPSU as a means to educate the Soviets about a new concept of security that could supersede mutual deterrence.

Forums for German-Soviet contacts included von Müller's European Center for International Security (EUCIS), created in 1989, which has sponsored

[14] Boutwell, "The Politics and Ideology of SPD Security Policies," pp. 152-53. See also Edwina S. Campbell, "Nuremberg and Beyond: Defining A New SPD Security Policy," in Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., *Security Perspectives of the West German Left: The SPD and the Greens in Opposition* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), p. 59.

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military simulations involving participation by U.S. and Soviet defense officials.[15] (The EUCIS Council includes former deputy SACEUR General Schmückle, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara, and Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies and a leading Soviet advocate of new military thinking.)

Bahr's peace research institute in Hamburg, the Institut für Friedenforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, also provided a forum for many transnational contacts. Bahr and von Bülow became regular fixtures in the Soviet media and took every opportunity to reiterate their party's common security/non-offensive defense synthesis.[16] SPD visitors to Moscow took advantage of the network of highly-placed Soviet contacts that Bahr had made during his extensive *Ostpolitik* negotiations and participation on the Palme Commission. Bahr has written that:

> At great length I talked to Gorbachev for the first time in April, 1985 and was — as you can imagine — surprised to hear him presenting the concept of Common Security and explaining how it was elaborated in the Palme-Commission. When I addressed my colleague in the Palme-Commission, [Georgiy] Arbatov, on behalf of this, he explained: this was not astonishing, because he had given him detailed reports on the discussion and results of the Palme-Commission at the time when Gorbachev still worked as secretary for agriculture. My impression was: Gorbachev had adopted the concept and was not aware of its origin.[17]

Perhaps the most important channel of communication with Soviet counterparts was the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces in Europe, first established in March 1984, and co-chaired by von Müller and the late Danish physicist Anders Boserup.[18] Scholars, diplomats, and military officers from NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral countries came together to exchange views on how to restructure conventional forces to achieve mutual defensive superiority. Soviet participation and interest in the Pugwash workshop grew as Gorbachev began to articulate his new military thinking. A 1986 Pugwash memorandum entitled "Force Structures Specialized for Defence as a New Approach to European Security" was circulated among the delegations to the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures.[19] On the recommendation of Georgiy Arbatov, in October 1987, four Pugwash representatives (Boserup, von Müller, Robert Neild, and Frank von Hippel) wrote to Gorbachev to describe their efforts in this direction:

> We believe that there should be reductions in non-nuclear forces designed so as to simultaneously cut drastically their offensive capabilities and preserve the defensive capabilities

[15] See Jonathan Dean, *Meeting Gorbachev's Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), pp. 72-73, 78-79; see also Lutz, "Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit," pp. 4-5.

[16] See, most recently, Bahr's interview in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: Western Europe*, August 10, 1990, from *Izvestiya*, August 3, 1990; see also FBIS, *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, February 22, 1990, from *Izvestiya*, February 19, 1990. For von Bülow, see Joint Publications Research Service, *Arms Control*, September 20, 1989, from *Kommunist*, May 1989, pp. 122-25.

[17] Letter from Egon Bahr to the authors, December 1990.

[18] See collected Pugwash papers in Boserup and Neild, *The Foundations of Defensive Defence*.

[19] For text, see *Non-Offensive Defence International Research Newsletter*, July 1986, pp. 5-8.

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on each side. That would implement the doctrine of defensiveness and lead to a stable condition that we would term 'mutual defensive sufficiency.' At that point, we believe that the popular willingness to maintain large armed forces and to sustain the risks of the nuclear confrontation would rapidly erode.[20]

Only a month later, Gorbachev replied by acknowledging the necessity of restructuring conventional forces "in such a way as to keep on both sides the basic capability for non-offensive defense."

Like so many other propaganda schemes developed by Gorbachev, that of a Soviet defensive doctrine was taken from a Western conceptual framework and thus could be fed back to the West in a convincing manner.

Moscow adopts non-offensive defense. Soviet participation in the work of the Palme Commission and in various European conferences on peace and defense issues provided occasions for Moscow's adoption and retransmission to the West of the fashionable notions of the day on security. Many of the Soviet participants at these conclaves later became advisers to Gorbachev. Others were researchers at Arbatov's Institute for USA and Canada Studies and at the Institute on the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Writings by the *instituchiki* played a key role in disseminating Gorbachev's new thinking. The major figures included Andrey Kokoshin; Yevgeniy Velikhov, a space scientist who helped spearhead the Soviet propaganda offensive against Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative; and Roald Sagdeyev, another scientist who worked in the Soviet Space program and was a leader in organizing dialogue groups with Western scientists.

In 1983 and 1984, retired Soviet colonel Viktor Girshfeld, a researcher at IMEMO, held conversations with British Sovietologist Stephen Shenfield in which Girshfeld used the term "sufficient defense" (*dostatochnaia oborona*) — a term rendered in the Gorbachev era as "defense sufficiency" (*oboronitel'naia dostatochnost*).[21]

In addition, Moscow familiarized itself with Boserup's ideas through Lev Mendelevich, who served as Soviet ambassador to Denmark from 1984 to 1986. Mendelevich reportedly developed a keen interest in the work of West German and Danish researchers on non-offensive defense. He "ordered his staff to collect all the literature they could, apparently believing that non-offensive defense could provide a breakthrough for achieving conventional disarmament."[22] In April 1986, Mendelevich became head of the Evaluations and

[20] See text of letter and Gorbachev's letter of response in *F.A.S. Public Interest Report*, February 1988, pp. 14-15. See also Dean, *Meeting Gorbachev's Challenge*, p. 78.

[21] Stephen Shenfield, "The USSR: Viktor Girshfeld and the Concept of 'Sufficient Defence,'" *ADIU Report*, January/February 1984, p. 10. See also Stephen Shenfield, "In Quest of Sufficient Defence," *Détente*, no. 11, 1988, pp. 26-29.

[22] Joergen Dragsdahl, "Are the Soviets Really Serious?" *Nuclear Times*, May/June 1988, pp. 22-25; Lev Mendelevich, "Forty Years in the Diplomatic Service," *International Affairs*, June 1989, pp. 67-76.

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Planning Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his new position, which involved a heavy focus on conventional arms negotiations, he brought to bear the ideas of Boserup and other West European peace strategists.[23]

Gorbachev Endorses Defensive Doctrines

By the time Gorbachev came into office, the Soviet Union had been engaged for two decades in a build-up of its nuclear and conventional power. The correlation of forces, in a purely military sense, seemed to have shifted to the socialist camp. President Reagan's military build-up and his Strategic Defense Initiative, however, threatened to nullify the enormous Soviet investment. Another dilemma facing the Soviet Union during this period was that it had not obtained the political returns that its military investment was designed to achieve. Illustrative of Moscow's failure to reap political dividends from its military power was NATO's decision — in the face of the largest peace rallies in West European cities since World War II — to permit America's INF deployments in Europe. Moreover, Moscow's longstanding strategy of driving wedges between the United States and its European NATO partners had backfired; the cohesion of the alliance actually seemed greater than ever before.

It became clear to Gorbachev and his entourage that the Soviet Union's quest for maximum security had exacerbated feelings of insecurity among its adversaries and sparked their own military build-up. Under these circumstances, the notions of "equal" or "mutual" security culled from the Palme Commission and other forums recommended themselves to Soviet foreign policy makers. Their statements began to emphasize that security no longer would be a zero-sum game. Gorbachev and his supporters also asserted that the Soviet Union no longer would strive to possess military forces as strong as those of all its adversaries combined.

Like so many other propaganda schemes developed and refined by Gorbachev, that of a Soviet defensive doctrine was taken from a Western conceptual framework and thus could be fed back to the West in a relatively convincing manner. Gorbachev and his colleagues realized that non-offensive defense and other alternatives are more acceptable to mainstream thinkers and policy makers in the Western security and arms control apparatus than are such utopian concepts as general and complete disarmament, formerly a Soviet propaganda staple. In addition, the Soviets realized that the notion of non-offensive defense was especially appealing to religious groups in the West, many of which regard nuclear weapons as immoral.

One of the propaganda concepts widely used by the Gorbachev team was "reasonable sufficiency," which Gorbachev first used in public at a press conference during his October 1985 visit to Paris. The phrase was first stated

[23] See Mendelevich, "Forty Years in the Diplomatic Service," p. 75.

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officially by the Soviets at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, the first Party Congress of Gorbachev's rule. Reasonable sufficiency reportedly became the official doctrine of the Warsaw Pact in 1987. The term "reasonable sufficiency" came in fact from the United States. It was popularized and perhaps originated by Alain Enthoven, one of the Pentagon "whiz kids" who worked for Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. (Similarly, Gorbachev has advocated "strategic sufficiency," a term that resonates favorably in the United States because it is the term that Henry Kissinger, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, and other Nixon administration officials used to describe the U.S. nuclear posture in the early 1970s.)

The real meaning of reasonable sufficiency emerges when Soviet military leaders speak, however. They prefer the term "defense sufficiency." While reasonable sufficiency seems to connote a level of military power commensurate with budgetary constraints, the perceived nature of the Western threat, and the need to erase the enemy image of the Soviet Union, defense sufficiency is a measure of what the military needs not only to conduct defensive operations but also to shift to the counteroffensive. In an interview on November 16, 1989, with the German magazine *Stern*, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet General Staff and a military adviser to Gorbachev, was asked to explain the doctrine of defense sufficiency. He replied:

> Our military doctrine has never been aimed at attack but always at the defense of our fatherland. However, the methods have changed: In the past, we wanted to answer a potential attack by NATO by destroying the enemy on his own territory. . . . Today we proceed from the premise that in the event of a conventional war we will first only defend ourselves. For this purpose, we need less armament. And therefore we have taken unilateral disarmament steps. In the event of war . . . we will try for 2, 3, 4 weeks to stop the war through negotiations and defensive operations.

Akhromeyev declined to speculate about how a counterattack would unfold if the defensive operations failed to achieve Soviet objectives. He also was asked whether the concept of "a structural inability to attack" that German proponents of non-offensive defense sought to apply to the Bundeswehr might be adopted by the Soviet army. Without answering the question directly, Akhromeyev mused that if agreement was reached with the West on this issue, the Soviets would take steps "to reduce tanks and pioneer units and to strengthen instead antitank units and air defense, for instance. . . ."

Among the most prominent Soviet proponents of non-offensive defense and reasonable sufficiency are Andrey Kokoshin and retired Major General Valentin V. Larionov, also connected with the Institute for USA and Canada Studies. They contend that the USSR should maintain a level of arms necessary solely to defend against an attack, rather than attempt to maintain parity with enemy forces; but historical allusions in their writings make clear the importance of counterattack. Shortly after Gorbachev became General Secretary, Kokoshin published a lengthy article in his institute's journal, *SShA* [*USA*], that portrayed non-offensive defense as an alternative to the Rogers Plan. This plan,

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named after then-NATO commander General Bernard Rogers and later adopted as FOFA, called for deep strikes by long-range, highly accurate conventional weapons against Soviet second- and third-echelon forces. The strategy was designed to halt a Soviet invasion force by preventing reinforcement of the first-line units.

Kokoshin also collaborated with Larionov in a number of historical studies designed to prove the advantages of defensive strategy.[24] The most important of these focused on the Battle of Kursk in 1943, in which the Red Army stalled and weakened German forces through defensive measures and subsequently went on the counteroffensive to drive the enemy back into his own territory.[25] Kokoshin and Larionov reportedly had an important input into the Warsaw Pact declaration, announced in May 1987, that defined the chief purpose of the Pact's doctrine as prevention of war.[26]

Soviet Defensive Doctrine: Theory and Practice

Moscow has paraded its propaganda and arms control specialists to convey substance to its alleged shift to a defensive military posture. Marshal Akhromeyev, a man with considerable insight into the theory and practice of strategic deception, has been in the forefront. During his visit to the United States in July 1988, for example, Akhromeyev told Admiral William Crowe, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Warsaw Pact "under no circumstances" would be the first to use nuclear weapons, would not initiate conventional war, and would retaliate only if it became "a target of military aggression."[27] During a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Akhromeyev stated that:

> Guided by the experience of World War II, we considered the offensive to be the main method of warfare for our armed forces. . . . We have addressed the Western concerns on this score and modified our military strategy. In the event of aggression, the Soviet armed forces will *initially* be engaged in retaliatory defensive operations. The defense — in training of our armed forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels — has come to the forefront.[28]

Akhromeyev's article on "The Doctrine of Averting War and Defending Peace and Socialism" stated that "[t]rue equal security . . . is guaranteed by the

[24] See, for example, Andrey A. Kokoshin, "Razvitie voennogo dela i sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzhenii," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia* (hereafter, *MEMO*), January 1988, pp. 20-32; Andrey A. Kokoshin, and Valentin V. Larionov, "Kurskaia Bitva v Svete Sovremennoi Oboronitel'noi Doktriny," *MEMO*, August 1987, pp. 32-40; Kokoshin, and Larionov, "Protivostoianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obespecheniia strategicheskoi stabil/nosti," *MEMO*, June 1988, pp. 23-30;

[25] Another historical example of non-offensive defense that Soviet military writers refer to is the October 1944 campaign against German forces dug in around the Murmansk region. After expelling the Germans, the victorious Soviet forces refrained from pursuing them across the Soviet-Norwegian frontier.

[26] See, for example, Eberhard Schneider, "Soviet Foreign-Policy Think Tanks," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1988, p. 154.

[27] *The Washington Times*, August 15, 1988.

[28] "The New Political Thinking and Soviet Military Doctrine," presentation of Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev at the Council of Foreign Relations, July 11, 1988; emphasis added.

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lowest possible strategic balance level totally rid of nuclear and other . . . weapons of mass destruction."[29]

A NATO alliance denuded of nuclear weapons, however, would lack the element of deterrence that has restrained the Soviet Union from risking an attack on the West to date.

Soviet defense minister Dmitri Yazov is reputed to be a proponent within the military establishment of a shift from offensive to defensive military strategy. Perhaps his willingness to accommodate Gorbachev — at least rhetorically — on this matter explains why Yazov was promoted to his present post above the heads of several more senior and more experienced officers. In March 1988, Yazov and U.S. defense secretary Frank Carlucci met for three days in Bern, Switzerland, in the first-ever Soviet-American working session between men of their rank. Yazov claimed during the meetings that the USSR was revising its military doctrine but that evidence of the revisions (in military exercises, for example) would require some time to manifest itself. He also claimed, however, that doctrinal shifts would not occur as unilateral Soviet initiatives but rather would depend upon mutually negotiated force reductions by the superpowers.[30] Furthermore, while Yazov had earlier asserted that "Soviet military doctrine considers defense to be the primary type of military action for repelling aggression," he added that "it is impossible . . . to smash the enemy with defense alone. Therefore, after repelling the attack, land and naval forces must be capable of conducting a decisive offensive."[31]

Other Soviet military writers also emphasize the counteroffensive, along with the necessity to fight to victory. For example, Colonel General Makhmut Gareyev, a deputy chief of the General Staff, wrote that ". . . the side which merely defended itself was inevitably doomed to defeat. With other questions being equal, the offensive is always better than the defensive." Gareyev also quoted Lenin: ". . . we would be not only stupid but also criminals if we gave our pledge to wage only a defensive war."[32]

Just as Soviet propaganda contends that socialist states are peaceful by nature while capitalist states are inherently bellicose, so Soviet military doctrine claims that the Red Army's actions by definition cannot be aggressive. Thus, the conception of defense becomes essentially a pause to gain time and prepare Soviet forces for a counteroffensive. The Soviets are attempting to emphasize the political side of the doctrine at the expense of the military-technical side; that is, the goals (as the current political leadership chooses to describe them) as opposed to the actual wartime strategy (which is determined by the General Staff). Even under new thinking, Soviet defensive doctrine still calls for a "crushing rebuff" of an aggressor. The new doctrine may be defensive politically, but militarily it calls for defense through a counteroffensive. A West German expert noted that:

[29] *World Marxist Review*, December 1987, p. 44.
[30] See *Time*, March 28, 1988.
[31] Dimitry T. Yazov, *Na strazhe otsializma i mira* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987).
[32] Makhmut A. Gareyev, *M.V. Frunze: Voennoye Teoretik* (Moscow: Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1985).

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The current exposition of the defensive orientation of [Soviet] military doctrine deviates little from...the Brezhnev period. It sticks to the postulate that military defense in the event of war requires offensive measures directed at the destruction of the Western adversary.[33]

Moscow's propaganda campaign on the virtues of non-offensive defense is an integral part of Gorbachev's efforts to make the West believe that enhancing Soviet military power is no longer a top priority for the USSR. The campaign also tracks neatly with the general secretary's theme that military force is no longer an appropriate instrument for the resolution of East-West disputes. In his book, *Perestroika*, Gorbachev wrote that "armaments should be reduced to the level of reasonable sufficiency, that is, a level necessary for strictly defensive purposes." He also advocated a posture of "non-aggressive defense" for the West — a posture to which the Warsaw Pact allegedly was already committed.

All of these elements of new thinking were on display at the 27th CPSU Congress. Gorbachev announced there that "in the military sphere, we in the future intend to act in such a way that no one is given a basis for fears, even imaginary ones, for their security." This statement lay at the heart of the Soviet campaign "to banish the enemy image," as Arbatov expressed it.

It was in this atmosphere that Gorbachev had his exchange of letters with the leaders of the Pugwash workshop. In October 1988, Boserup discussed the prospects of conventional-force reductions with senior Soviet officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPSU Central Committee and civilian defense researchers, including Aleksey Arbatov and Sergey Karaganov.[34] Von Bülow also held discussions with Warsaw Pact officials during this period.[35] Although it is impossible to posit cause and effect, on December 7, 1988, Gorbachev made his announcement at the United Nations regarding unilateral Soviet conventional force reductions in Europe. Reflecting the judgment of non-offensive defense theorists that a decrease of East-West asymmetries in offensive systems was the key to European stability, Gorbachev cited tanks, heavy artillery, and bridge-crossing equipment among the items to be reduced unilaterally. His speech dramatically improved the atmosphere for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, which began in March 1989 and led to the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990.

Non-Offensive Defense and NATO

The Western policy of nuclear deterrence has been largely responsible for keeping the peace for more than forty-five years. This policy, however, is

[33] Gerhard Wettig, "Has Soviet Military Doctrine Changed?" *Radio Liberty Research*, November 20, 1987, p. 4.

[34] "Report on Moscow IGCC Conference, October 2-8, 1988," *Defense and Disarmament Alternatives*, January 1989, p. 10. For a sample of Karaganov's writings, see Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency — of How to Break the Vicious Circle," *New Times*, October 1987, pp. 13-15.

[35] Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Threat, the Conventional Balance and 'Common Security': The Emerging 'Alternative View' in Europe," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1990, p. 39.

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one of the chief targets of criticism by proponents of non-offensive defense. The German SPD, the Greens, and most of the European peace research community, as well as the Soviet Union, now call for phased nuclear disarmament. Applying this policy to Europe, they propose following up the INF Treaty with a "third zero" (elimination of short-range nuclear systems) and with the creation of nuclear-free zones, first in Central Europe and eventually throughout the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region.

Although Gorbachev and others have paid lip service to the doctrine of non-offensive defense, the radical changes that would be required to establish it in practice are nowhere on the horizon.

Most of the schemes put forth by German and other peace researchers presuppose a much smaller standing army, complemented by sizable reserve forces. Such a scheme would be financially attractive and thus politically popular, but its credibility remains an open question. For the Soviet Union, the possible deployment of a territorial militia as the embodiment of non-offensive defense would raise even more serious problems. Such a scheme would amount to the sanctioning of national armies in the various republics — and, perhaps, even among the minority populations of the Russian Republic. Gorbachev — as well as the Soviet military leadership — has strongly opposed the creation of any type of military forces under the control of republican leaderships; they realize that such forces would be a strong spur to secession and, at the very least, would pose a danger of partisan attacks against the Soviet army.

These and other circumstances strongly suggest that non-offensive defense in the pure form envisioned by some of its West European originators is infeasible for the near future. Not surprisingly, Western non-offensive defense advocates have been remarkably quiescent since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, the various theories of non-offensive defense will continue to enjoy broad support in Europe at a time when the Soviet threat appears to be fading and political pressures against European defense budgets are increasing.

Moscow agreed reluctantly to reunified Germany's membership in NATO, but Soviet political and military leaders alike continue to call for a dissolution of military blocs in Europe. Even if NATO remains intact, it could become a hollow shell if proponents of non-offensive defense and similar strategies succeed in discrediting its strategies of nuclear deterrence and flexible response. West European and Soviet advocates of defensive doctrine already have drawn considerable official support in NATO countries for their portrayal of these NATO strategies as outmoded. Western and Soviet critics of NATO have even raised questions about the rationale for the alliance's continued existence since the enemy allegedly has disappeared.

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Non-offensive defense almost certainly will not become a feature of Soviet military strategy and force structure. Although Gorbachev and others have paid lip service to the doctrine in their public diplomacy, the radical changes in force posture, strategy and tactics, weapons systems, and military education and training that would be required to establish non-offensive defense in practice are nowhere on the horizon. Restructuring in the Soviet armed forces seems intended to render the forces leaner but meaner. Some of the changes in exercise patterns and equipment transfers that NATO has observed are easily reversible and, at any rate, seem designed largely to impress Western military inspectors. Moreover, Soviet military officials have conceded that the distinction between offensive and defensive weaponry has been blurred with the introduction of new high-tech conventional systems and that troops prepared to undertake counteroffensive operations must by nature be equipped for purely offensive ones.

While non-offensive defense may never be put into practice in Europe and almost assuredly will not materialize in the Soviet Union, its advocacy has weakened the cohesion of NATO.

Thus, while non-offensive defense may never be put into practice in Europe and almost assuredly will not materialize in the Soviet Union, its advocacy has generated ferment in West European political and military circles and weakened the cohesion of NATO without offering a credible strategy or structure to replace it. If Germany and other European members of NATO move to implement non-offensive defense, the alliance would become Balkanized, with each country attempting to provide for its own territorial defense.

The notion of common security, popularized by the Palme Commission, connoted a security partnership between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that would entail institutionalized East-West cooperation in safeguarding peace in Europe. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the weakening of NATO, however, raise the question of whether the Soviet Union and Germany might attempt to form a bilateral security partnership in Europe. There are ample historical precedents for German-Soviet cooperation on the political, military, and economic levels. Lenin suggested that there was a "natural alliance" between the two countries. The Soviet Union and Germany signed a nonaggression treaty in November 1990, and the accord reached between Gorbachev and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl at Stavropol in July 1990 that paved the way for German reunification raised the specter of a new Rapallo.[36] A German-

[36] Under the Treaty of Rapallo, signed by the USSR and Germany in 1922, these countries waived war reparations against each other, resumed diplomatic relations, and placed commercial relations on the most-favored-nation principle. The treaty, in conjunction with Soviet-German economic and military cooperation established to help Germany circumvent the Versailles Treaty, preempted efforts to forge an all-European mechanism for economic cooperation and facilitated Germany's subsequent rearmament.

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Soviet security partnership (which could materialize even while Germany remains officially in NATO) might well involve unilateral German moves in the direction of non-offensive defense, especially if the SPD comes to power or acquires a balancing position in the Bundestag.

Non-offensive defense is more than an alternative military option; it is also a political statement by Germans and Soviets that their differences are now behind them and that they are consciously cooperating to achieve a European peace order, according to their own perceived common interests. Such a peace order would herald the demise of NATO and a greatly diminished — if not eclipsed — security role for the United States in Europe.

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

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Thatcher's Wholly British Foreign Policy

by Paul Sharp

Less than a month after the link-up of the Channel tunnel between Britain and France, Margaret Thatcher resigned the British prime ministership that she had held for over eleven years. Her colleagues advised her that she no longer enjoyed the confidence of the Conservative party, and that a change in leadership offered the best prospect of the party's fourth successive general election victory.

A number of causes lay behind Thatcher's resignation. During her years in power, the firm control that she wielded over ministers and policies created many rivals and enemies within her party. More recently, she had doggedly pursued domestic policies on interest rates and local tax reform that were highly unpopular with the property owners who form the natural electoral constituency of the Conservative party. And, after eleven years, her government exhibited a certain tiredness.

The immediate cause of her downfall, however, was her policy toward the European Community (EC). At a summit in Rome a few days before the tunnel link was completed, Thatcher strenuously opposed the plans of her EC colleagues for proceeding toward full monetary union, maintaining that this would unacceptably compromise national sovereignty and political independence. As a result, Britain found itself diplomatically isolated. Shortly after, Thatcher's deputy and long-serving cabinet member, Sir Geoffrey Howe, resigned, beginning the chain of events leading to her resignation and replacement by John Major. Both Howe and Michael Heseltine, a former cabinet minister in the Thatcher government and her initial challenger for the leadership of the Conservative party, maintained that the prime minister's conduct in Rome had been prejudicial to British interests in Europe, and was an example of an increasingly stubborn and abrasive leadership style that was making the government unnecessarily unpopular at home and abroad.

That Thatcher should have rivals in the Conservative party who would challenge her if the opportunity presented itself is scarcely surprising. What is surprising, however, is that when this opportunity finally appeared, it did so in the realm of foreign policy, generally regarded as one of Thatcher's strong suits. Many believe that British foreign policy under Thatcher — based upon firmness

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towards the Soviet Union and staunch support for America's leadership of the Western alliance — increasingly lost touch with the spirit of the times.[1] Her approach had little to say to post-cold war Europeans absorbed with designing their new supranational structures, or to the increasing numbers of Thatcher's own countrymen interested in participating in this exercise. Even the Bush administration was annoyed with Thatcher's conduct, most notably at the beginning of 1990, when the prime minister voiced caution at the pace of German unification, and more recently when her saber-rattling pronouncements during the Gulf crisis threatened the administration's efforts to reassure the American public that force remained the policy option of last resort.

The Nationalist Dimension

Had history been tidier and kinder, it might have arranged for Thatcher's retirement to resemble more closely that of her ideological soul mate, Ronald Reagan. To treat Thatcher's foreign policy as a holdover from the Reagan era, however, is to oversimplify it and misunderstand its significance.

Thatcher was willing to confront a major foreign policy challenge that most European leaders have spared no efforts in avoiding — namely, nationalism.

What Thatcher attempted — and what she will be remembered for — was a complete reform of the assumptions upon which postwar British foreign policy was based. This reform was long overdue and radical in scope. Briefly stated, she built her foreign policy on the simple idea that Britain was a political community that existed for itself. When conflict arose between the requirements of some alleged international order on the one hand and British interests more narrowly defined on the other, Thatcher challenged the foreign policy establishment's traditional practice of giving precedence to the former as an altruist habit that Britain could no longer afford.

Thus, Thatcher's foreign policy seemed narrow and carping at times. But she was willing to confront a major foreign policy challenge of the post-cold war era that most other European leaders have spared no efforts in avoiding — namely, nationalism. With the lessening of Soviet power, nationalism has become the driving force of world politics. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, nationalist forces were crudely suppressed for decades, only to erupt in often virulent forms when suddenly freed from authoritarian restraint.

Less obvious, as Thatcher understood, have been the more subtle attempts in the West to erode, outflank, and ignore nationalist forces in the name of economic efficiency or political concord. For her, the danger of the EC was not that it might legislate Britain and other European powers out of existence.

[1] See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Case for Leadership," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1990-91, pp. 35-36.

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On the contrary, she feared that the Community itself would emerge as the major casualty of any overambitious attempt to give European supranational considerations precedence over national interests. Further, and in contrast to the good Europeans in the EC who tried to convince themselves otherwise, Thatcher recognized that the unification of Germany was primarily a national event, with implications for the balance of power in Europe and beyond. She accepted the need to acknowledge and harness nationalism as a political force, rather than suppress or ignore it. What she failed to do was to convince others that it was everybody's problem, not just Britain's or, as it appeared in the months before her fall, just hers.

British Foreign Policy before the Falkland Crisis

Thatcher's reputation as an international stateswoman did not emerge whole with her becoming Britain's prime minister in 1979. She had acquired the soubriquet of "the Iron Lady" from the Russians as early as 1975, but in the campaign that led to her election, foreign policy was not an area to which she devoted much attention. She spoke of strengthening the armed forces and being firm with the Soviet Union, but largely left the conduct of foreign affairs to Francis Pym and Lord Carrington, both of whom represented the paternal, interventionist section of the Conservative party, for which she had little sympathy. It was even rumored that Edward Heath, whom Thatcher had replaced as the party's leader, was offered the Foreign Office in return for a strong campaigning effort on her behalf — despite his enthusiasm for European integration and Thatcher's personal dislike for him. Thus, the assumption was that, while a Thatcher government might result in a reinvigorated foreign policy, this new enthusiasm would emerge from people other than Thatcher and would be directed away from the United States and towards a greater role in Europe.[2]

Thatcher was not heavily involved in the conduct of foreign policy in 1979, nor for some time to come, for two reasons. Firstly, she was personally rather indifferent to foreign affairs. Two of her closest advisers at the time concurred that she came into office "literally neither knowing nor caring where Calais was" and equipped with a "*Daily Mail* understanding" of foreigners — that is, one that regards all foreigners as equally strange.[3] Secondly, and more important, foreign policy was no longer a realm where a British prime minister could expect to exercise much power. Although it is perhaps unfair to say, as a minister in Harold Wilson's government did, that British foreign policy had been reduced by the late 1960s to "fish and Rhodesia,"[4] it had nonetheless be-

[2] For the Heath story, see *The Daily Telegraph*, April 30, 1979. For discussions of Thatcher's expected European tilt and Pym's exposition of the Conservative's European policy, see *The Times* (International Weekly edition), April 30, 1979, and *The Daily Telegraph*, April 5, 1979.

[3] Author's interviews with a senior minister and a policy adviser from Thatcher's first government, May and June 1990. All interviews conducted for this paper were given on the understanding that no direct attributions would be made.

[4] "Fish" referring to a series of disputes with Iceland over fishing grounds, in which the Royal Navy became involved in a number of confrontations with Icelandic gunboats.

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come directed at meeting international obligations whose relationship to specific British interests had become tenuous.

In such circumstances, a prime minister who wished to make an impact on international affairs would have had to devote considerable attention and resources to them. Thatcher was not prepared to do this; her priority was the restoration of Britain's economic and social vitality. British foreign policy as practiced in the postwar period was, in her view, essentially tangential to this project. Thus it was that the first great foreign policy project of the Thatcher era — bringing the colony of Rhodesia to independence as the republic of Zimbabwe — was not really Thatcher's at all, but an undertaking of her foreign secretary, Lord Carrington.

Rhodesia

The Rhodesia story in many ways epitomized what postwar British foreign policy had been all about.

A government of the white settler minority had unilaterally declared its independence from Britain in 1965, and existed in a state of rebellion until 1979. Through the application of economic sanctions backed by the United Nations and a series of negotiations, successive British governments had sought to regain control of the colony, and grant it independence on the basis of majority rule. In the mid-1970s, the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith had attempted its own settlement with local black politicians, and a more democratic political system was established that produced the black-led government of Bishop Muzorewa in 1979. However, the white minority retained firm control over the armed forces, the police, and the civil service, as well as effective veto power in the legislature.

Many in the Conservative party were inclined to recognize this settlement and end economic sanctions, thus ridding Britain of a long-standing problem and leaving Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as it was briefly known, with a competent and, by local standards, sufficiently democratic administration. Thatcher's instincts also lay in this direction, as evidenced by her comment that "there was an election; 'one person, one vote' for four different parties. Where else would you get that in Africa?"[5] Once in office, however, Thatcher was persuaded by Lord Carrington that such a settlement, which did not enjoy international recognition, would condemn the colony to a civil war from which the nationalist forces of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe would emerge victorious. Instead, Carrington gained her assent to a plan in which all the parties to the conflict were invited to a conference in London. There, a new constitution without as many white safeguards was drawn up; the country was then returned briefly to its colonial status while a ceasefire was arranged and elections were held under British supervision. As a result of the elections, Rob-

[5] *The Daily Telegraph*, May 6, 1979. For her praise of the turnout in the internal settlement elections, see *The Daily Telegraph*, July 2, 1979.

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ert Mugabe became the prime minister of an internationally recognized Zimbabwe in 1980.

Among diplomats, Carrington's handling of the affair was considered a tour de force that produced an agreement few had thought possible. Pragmatically speaking, however, the agreement merely ended an affair to which London had devoted far more attention than Britain's interests warranted. This willingness to lavish attention on Rhodesia was largely confined to the Foreign Office. Thatcher was barely involved.

The Falklands: A Turning Point

The Falklands war in 1982 stood out in sharp contrast to the Rhodesia episode. Not only was Thatcher involved, but the British interests at stake could not have been more unambiguous. Argentina had committed blatant armed aggression against British territory, and whether it was the prime minister's fault or not, the attack had happened on her watch. Her immediate fate, as well as that of the Conservative government, depended on the outcome of the crisis.

The Falklands crisis exposed the fundamental rift between Thatcher and the foreign policy establishment.

Most likely, any British government would have eventually gone to war over the Falklands if no Argentine concessions were forthcoming. It would have been hard to do otherwise after the armed forces had advised that a recovery of the islands was militarily feasible — as occurred at an emergency meeting among Thatcher, Defence Minister John Nott, and the chief of naval staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, on March 31, 1982.[6] Several things had happened since 1979, however, that explain why Thatcher so readily adopted a course of action that put Britain's reputation and prestige at further risk. Firstly, while her economic strategy had increased productivity and lowered inflation, unemployment had soared, and she was deeply unpopular at home; there were even rumors of a coup against her in the party. Secondly, and more important (for short term unpopularity never overly worried her), she had conceded that monetarism was not enough. If Britain was to be restored to its status as a pre-eminent trading power, as she had promised in her election campaign,[7] then macroeconomic policy would have to be buttressed by a social policy encouraging older and simpler virtues — virtues that the government had to be seen practicing. Foreign policy lent itself to this exercise because of its obvious association with Britain's former greatness.

The Falklands crisis exposed the fundamental rift between Thatcher and the foreign policy establishment. The Argentine attack was a humiliation that had been made possible by the failure of the Foreign Office. Whatever sig-

[6] George Michael Dillon, *The Falklands, Politics and War* (New York: Saint Martin's, 1989), p. 168.
[7] *The Daily Telegraph*, February 23, 1979; *The Daily Telegraph*, April 14, 1979.

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nificance the Argentineans placed on the government's defense cuts and their consequences for Britain's tiny forces in the South Atlantic, only the Foreign Office could have conveyed the impression (in the Anglo-Argentine talks at the United Nations on the future of the islands) that Britain might not fight. This failure was compounded by the foreign policy establishment's persistence in seeking a diplomatic solution, both to the immediate crisis and to the long-term dispute. The situation was only exacerbated when Francis Pym succeeded Lord Carrington as foreign secretary. He not only suggested that Argentina's response to the Haig peace mission offered grounds for hope, when the prime minister said it did not, but also speculated that the islanders might not be so firm in their desire to remain British once the fighting was over. In contrast to Thatcher's firm stance, Pym stressed the importance of a negotiated settlement, conceded that Argentina had some claim to the islands, and suggested a possible role for the United Nations in the islands' future administration.[8]

As far as the prime minister was concerned, this sent Buenos Aires absolutely the wrong message about Britain's resolve to recover and hold the islands. Yet such positions flowed naturally from the "Rhodesia" disposition in the foreign policy establishment, which put the requirements of international order above British interests — a disposition that, for Thatcher, smacked of appeasement.[9]

Thatcher had her own conception of international society and its requirements. As an affronted power in a world of powers, Britain would not be judged on its ability to turn the other cheek or to pursue some chimerical peace process, but on its ability to look after itself. Buenos Aires had evidently already deemed the British government wanting in this ability, and others at home and abroad would be interested in knowing if this was the case.

Britain's success in the war demonstrated London's resolve, and also transformed Thatcher's attitude toward foreign policy. Before the war, she had been content to leave it to the experts; as practiced by members of the diplomatic establishment, foreign policy was not an area essential to her project of revitalizing Britain. For them, and for Thatcher before coming to office, foreign policy stood apart from domestic issues.

Between 1979 and 1982, however, the limitations of Thatcher's attempt at social renewal through monetarism, coupled with the rise of international tensions following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Polish crisis, suggested the possibility of a foreign policy more firmly tied to domestic interests and politics. The Falklands war enabled Thatcher to seize this opportunity and define it. She hoped that this resolute conduct of foreign policy in pursuit of British interests would demonstrate the government's commitment to restoring Britain's strength.[10]

[8] See *The Times*, May 5, 1982; *The Times*, May 8, 1982; and *The Times*, May 26, 1982.
[9] Author's interview with a minister in Thatcher's first administration, May 1990.
[10] *The Times*, June 16, 1982.

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At home, the "Falklands factor" would see Britain through its problems and help Thatcher deal with what she referred to as "the enemy within."[11] As soon as the war was over, she attempted to wrest control of foreign policy — for example, by appointing her own foreign policy advisor. It had become too important to be left to people whose habits of mind she regarded as epitomizing the postwar failure of the country as a whole.

The Special Relationship with America

Thatcher's success in the Falklands depended greatly on the willingness of the United States to provide military and diplomatic support to Britain, and more generally, the return to prominence of the Anglo-American "special relationship" was a central feature of Thatcher's foreign policy. From Britain's side, the special relationship was characterized by support for American positions on a number of issues, from world trade reform to arms control and international security. In view of the importance of the American connection to Thatcher, the claim that her foreign policy constituted a radical and independent re-assertion of British interests might appear hard to sustain. Certainly, her American policy received much criticism at home, principally from the opposition parties. But on occasion, the criticism came from anti-American currents within the Conservative party: from those with a strong European orientation, such as Edward Heath; from the heirs to the Suez group, who still remember the United States's role in dismantling the British Empire; and from English nationalists who resent American globalism and the materialist values it sustains. Thatcher's critics charged that, by slavishly following America's lead, the prime minister sought to escape either Europe or the wrath of the British people — a course that the British establishment had been pursuing since 1941.

Thatcher's policy toward the United States, however, represented a major departure from the postwar maintenance of the special relationship in two important ways. The relationship was directed primarily at acquiring rather than exercising influence in Washington; and it was directed at the pursuit of specific British interests, rather than at shoring up Britain's fading reputation as a world power.

Acquiring influence. The need to work at acquiring influence in Washington was acute by 1979, because Britain's postwar decline had made that country less important to America than several other allies on a range of issues. Certainly, their high degree of shared culture, language, and historical experience continued to make America and Britain receptive to each other.[12] In addition, owing to their common ideological outlook, Thatcher and Ronald

[11] By this, she primarily meant the trade unions. For Thatcher's claims on the significance of the Falklands factor for a wide range of British problems, see Peter Jenkins, *Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution* (London: Pan Books, 1989), pp. 164-65.

[12] For a discussion of these themes, see J. Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-84*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1984).

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Reagan developed a close personal relationship not seen between a British prime minister and an American president since the wartime collaboration of Churchill and Roosevelt.

Nevertheless, relationships between sovereign states, even special ones, are based upon a calculation of interests, and because Britain had less to offer the United States, Thatcher enjoyed no easy access to U.S. policy makers. She chose to cultivate influence in Washington by strongly supporting American policies that others found troubling, such as regional and theater arms build-ups, the confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union, and Reagan's tough line on combating terrorism.

Thatcher was not afraid to part ways with Washington when British and American interests diverged. Thatcher was never, as some would have it, Reagan's lapdog.

This she was able to do without cynicism. Providing such support for America flowed easily from Thatcher's personal convictions, particularly on issues like the Soviet threat, nuclear deterrence, and arms control. In terms of British politics, however, it was not always an easy policy to pursue. A close association with America has rarely generated electoral support in postwar European politics, and this was particularly true during Ronald Reagan's first term, when he was most outspoken and, to many Europeans, most frightening. Nonetheless, the Labour party's commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament and closing American nuclear bases in Britain was perceived to be one of the weakest areas in its election manifestos of 1983 and 1987. Thus, Thatcher's conviction that British strength and security depended on a close relationship with America was evidently accepted by a majority of the voters.

Pursuing British interests. British voters accepted Thatcher's Atlanticist approach owing, in great part, to the second major difference between her American policy and previous efforts to maintain the special relationship — namely, her interest in using it to further British interests. Thatcher was not afraid to part ways with Washington when British and American interests diverged. Thatcher was never, as some would have it, Reagan's lapdog.

Standing Up for British Interests

Some of the disagreements between Washington and London during Thatcher's tenure were of relatively minor significance. Problems with Middle East policy, for example, flared up in 1981, when America asked Britain for a contribution to the peace-keeping force in the Sinai. London, owing to conditions imposed by Israel, chose not to comply.[13]

[13] *The Times*, November 6, 1981.

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A more serious problem was presented the following year by Washington's decision to ban the involvement of European subsidiaries of American companies in the construction of the gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Several British engineering companies were affected by this ban, and the situation grew worse when the dispute became mixed up with an argument about whether EC steel exports to the United States were heavily subsidized; the British feared that their exports too would be adversely affected, although Washington appears to have been less troubled by Britain per se than by other EC members. Thatcher at first sought to moderate the EC's response to Washington's pressure.[14] Nonetheless, when Washington ruled that European steel exports were in fact subsidized, Britain, following France's lead, invoked its "Protection of Trade Interests Act," and forbade four companies from complying with the American ban against helping Moscow build the pipeline.[15]

Such disagreements between the EC and America gave Thatcher room for diplomatic maneuver. Much harder to deal with were the cases when Washington appeared to ignore specific British interests or sensitivities. For example, the American intervention in Grenada in 1983 clearly took the prime minister by surprise, and undermined her claim to a close relationship with the American president. Thatcher was not merely angered by America's decision to invade a Commonwealth country without consultation; her criticism extended to the fundamental assumption that it was permissible to intervene against an internally inspired tyranny. She maintained that, even when well-intentioned, such actions provided excuses for aggression and thus undermined international order. In an interview for the BBC World Service, Thatcher pointed out that "if you are going to pronounce a new law that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people . . . the United States shall enter, then we are going to have [some] really terrible wars in the world."[16] The Grenada affair was short-lived, but it put Thatcher in the difficult position of opposing decisive U.S. action against the expansion of communist influence.

Surprisingly, the conspicuously successful area of Anglo-American collaboration in nuclear security policy posed similar problems. Britain's retention of nuclear weapons — in the face of increasing costs and questions regarding the credibility of deterrence strategies that risk one's own destruction — has been justified on several grounds.[17] The position of British governments has been that Britain's independent nuclear force ensures that America does not shoulder NATO's nuclear burden alone and complicates Soviet strategy and targeting policies. Like the French, the British also regard possession of such weapons as confirmation of their status as a great power. Unlike the French,

[14] *The Times*, June 30, 1982.
[15] *The Times*, August 3, 1982.
[16] Quoted in *The Times*, October 31, 1983.
[17] For a discussion of defense options in the 1980s and the place of nuclear weapons in them, see *The Times*, October 27, 1981; *The Times*, October 29, 1981; and *The Times*, October 30, 1981.

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however, the British have been content to regard a force that is merely under their control (rather than designed and procured by them) as sufficiently independent.[18]

Thatcher's government encountered three distinct problems in the area of nuclear collaboration with the United States. Firstly, and least important, was the revival of fears that changing American security requirements or arms control policies would end Washington's support for Britain's independent deterrent. This became an issue in the early 1980s, when the Soviets began counting British and French missiles in their proposals for reducing theater nuclear forces in Europe.

A second and more serious problem was posed by the American decision to proceed with the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. In Britain, as elsewhere, great debates ensued about the project's costs, technical feasibility, and strategic consequences for Western Europe. More worrisome, however, was the expectation that the Soviets would respond to SDI by deploying a similar system of their own, thus calling into question the effectiveness of the British and French nuclear forces. After all, a ballistic missile defense designed to meet a nuclear attack from a superpower would certainly be able to cope with the much smaller number of missiles that the British and French possessed. Once again, therefore, Thatcher found herself in the uncomfortable position of resisting a strong American policy, and one that moreover became an acid test of support for Ronald Reagan. Only SDI's continued technical and financial difficulties, the promise of related expenditure on research and development in Britain, and the claim that Trident II, the more sophisticated system that Britain was to obtain, could penetrate Soviet defenses, permitted Thatcher to stop voicing her doubts — but the problem was not solved.[19]

Lastly, problems of a political rather than strategic nature were posed by the Thatcher government's offer in the early 1980s to provide sites for basing cruise missiles. This commitment generated considerable domestic opposition, both from the peace movement and from a section of the defense community that saw no credible use for the missiles, yet feared that they might prompt a preemptive Soviet attack in a time of crisis. Judging by the Thatcher government's emphasis on matching the Soviets' SS-20 deployments, rather than modernizing theater forces per se, the strategic arguments for the cruise missiles seemed of secondary importance to their political significance as evidence of NATO's and Britain's resolve.

The government, however, expressed no doubts about the need for the missiles. The nettling question was who controlled them. In the course of the debate on this, the government revealed that a dual-key system of control was not on offer from Washington, and conceded that it had to accept American assurances that the missiles would not be launched without British authoriza-

[18] For the Thatcher government's statement of its arguments for retaining an independent deterrent, see *The Times*, July 16, 1980.

[19] For a treatment of Thatcher's concerns about the ramifications of SDI, see Hugo Young, *One Of Us* (London: Pan Books, 1990), p. 395.

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tion.[20] American policy was that dual-key arrangements accompanied only dual-financing arrangements: if the British wanted joint control, they would have to pay. Evidently, London was not prepared to do this. But for a government such as Thatcher's — which took national control of nuclear weapons very seriously — this remained an uncomfortable state of affairs until it was resolved by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty at the end of 1988.

British Gains

Looking at what Britain got out of the special relationship, compared to what it put in, Thatcher's American policy must be judged an outstanding success, despite the difficulties mentioned. One general benefit was Washington's increased receptiveness to British concerns. For example, according to one diplomat, Britain's support for the bombing of Libya in 1986 resulted in the removal from a trade bill of clauses harmful to certain British interests. The first action was not taken to produce the second, but the connection was clear.[21]

In addition to creating a favorable disposition toward British interests in Washington, Thatcher also achieved specific gains of substance, not least of which were the acquisition of the Trident missile system and America's support during the Falklands war. The first of these might have been obtainable whether Thatcher was prime minister or not. Less clear, however, was whether Britain's reputation as a major contributor to international order, assiduously cultivated by the Foreign Office, would in itself have been sufficient to resolve America's dilemma over the Falklands in Britain's favor. Indeed, that reputation might have actually encouraged those in America who sought a negotiated settlement.

In return, Thatcher offered the Americans little of substance that they were not already getting, could not do without, or could not obtain elsewhere. Cooperation in America's drug war from British islands in the Caribbean scarcely compensated for the price America paid for supporting the British position on the Falklands. Intelligence-sharing procedures and America's bases on British territory were in place before Thatcher arrived (although her election victories over a Labour party committed to the closure of American nuclear facilities in Britain may have secured their future). And Thatcher's commitments of British forces to the Persian Gulf in the 1980s and the Gulf war, although presented as evidence of staunch support for the United States, were actions that British interests demanded.

Insofar as Thatcher offered anything of value to the United States, it was her reliable support for Washington's world leadership and, on occasion, her willingness to take the lead when, in her view, America momentarily faltered. Shortly after the Reykjavik summit in 1986, when Reagan flirted with a Soviet proposal for getting rid of all nuclear weapons, Thatcher hurried to America to

[20] *The Times*, November 1, 1983.
[21] Author's interviews with British diplomats.

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review with the president the central role of nuclear weapons in NATO's plans for the defense of Europe.[22] And, if British diplomats are to be believed, she repeated her leading role after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when Bush was president and Thatcher's access to the center of American decision making was supposedly a thing of the past.[23]

Troubles with the EC

Ultimately, it was Thatcher's European policy that, although sound in principle, contributed greatly to her undoing. Geography, history, and culture have produced a fundamental ambiguity in British attitudes towards Europe, pithily summarized by Churchill's observation that Britain was "with Europe, but not of it." Throughout modern history, Britain has, like America, avoided entanglement in European affairs, engaging in them only to prevent the emergence of a dominant continental power that could threaten the country's independence. Therefore, Britain's postwar policy of "continental commitment,"[24] expressed initially by stationing troops in Germany, and eventually by membership in the EC, was a major departure from the past, necessitated by Britain's reduced circumstances, the emergence of the Soviet threat, and a widespread belief that the economic and military security of European states could be found only in their shared membership in a bigger community.

Even so, the British continued to regard schemes for a European union with skepticism. If pushed too far, such plans were certain to collapse in the face of the reality of multiple and resilient nationalisms or, worse, permit one nationality to dominate. Thus, even as their policy shifted from aloofness to tentative participation in the European enterprise in the late 1950s, British governments continued to reject the idea that they had made a strategic shift from a global to a regional focus. Europe remained but one source of British power and influence (the others being the Commonwealth and Britain's North American relationships), albeit an increasingly important one.

The significance of the Commonwealth shrank dramatically during the 1960s, however, and Washington seemed to prefer that the British be "good Europeans" rather than the Anglo-Saxon Trojan horse that Charles de Gaulle feared. By the time Britain became a member of the EC in 1973, its claim to a world role was increasingly based upon its influence in the new Europe — a claim that, in light of Britain's failing economic performance and reservations about how successful it wanted the EC to be, was not entirely convincing.

Thatcher's problem with Europe, however, was the more modern one of reconciling the requirements of the British national political community with the increasingly international character of economic development. Because

[22] Interviews with British diplomats.

[23] See Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *Survey of Current Affairs*, August 1990, for details of Thatcher's view of the invasion of Kuwait, given August 2, 1990, while in the United States. President Bush recently recalled her advice to him at the time not to go "wobbly."

[24] Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).

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Thatcher was both an ardent free marketeer and an instinctive political nationalist, the European challenge presented itself both differently and more sharply to her than it did to most other European leaders.[25] She did not fear, as did most of her European colleagues (and some of her cabinet ones, too) that opening Britain to foreign competition would weaken it.[26] Thatcher's problem, rather, was that her national policy of openness and deregulation took place in an environment characterized by increasing closure and regulation at the regional level. Between 1979 and 1990, the EC, where (as Thatcher herself acknowledged) Britain's future as a trading nation lay, was transformed from a target of her reforming zeal to a grave threat to her priorities.

During her first two governments between 1979 and 1987, Thatcher's concerns about the EC focused on the process by which the Community's budget was funded. The formula by which each country's contribution was calculated favored countries with a larger agricultural sector. As a result, in the early 1980s, Britain was the second-largest contributor to the Community's budget (after West Germany), despite the strength of the Italian and French economies. What made this more galling was that most of the money went into supporting the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), a system of price supports for produce from which, of course, Britain benefitted less than others. Thatcher, like her Labour predecessors, argued for a revised formula that would take economic performance into account. Even with such a system in place, however, net transfers away from Britain proved unacceptable. Citing the fairness issue, Thatcher threatened to block Community business, particularly attempts to raise farm prices, saying that no progress on these issues or the objective of European union could be made until the CAP and the Community's system of financing were reformed.[27]

However, Thatcher's eventual success in persuading her European colleagues that she was correct on this issue brought its own problems. Others, principally the Germans, Italians, and senior EC officials, had been working on proposals to recover the Community's lost momentum toward European Union as early as 1983, with the Solemn Declaration on European Union. They wished to create a single European market, a strengthened monetary system, and a new procedure for making Community policy. In 1986-87, the Single European Act committed Community members to most of these measures, and set 1992 as the target date for their implementation.

Thatcher lost the battle to have her vision of Europe accepted in the series of conferences undertaken to work out the details of these general commitments. She strongly objected to the regulative character and the "social dimension" of the changes. Establishing European standards on such matters as minimum wages and working conditions, she argued, amounted to letting in by

[25] Author's interviews with ministers and civil servants from her first administration, May 1990.

[26] Author's interview with a senior minister in Thatcher's first administration.

[27] For an account of Thatcher's European policy, see David Allen, "British Foreign Policy and West European Co-operation" in Peter Byrd, ed., *British Foreign Policy Under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin's, 1988).

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the back door the socialism she had defeated in Britain. In a famous speech at Bruges in 1988, she rejected the notion that any EC policy could override members' national sovereignty. She also rejected the idea of progressing from a tight exchange rate mechanism to a single European currency with a single European central bank, having previously made some concessions towards this aim in Madrid the previous year. Despite her supporters' claim that she simply expressed what many believed but were reluctant to say, she became increasingly isolated diplomatically. Finally, her outspoken intransigence at the Rome meeting on monetary union provided the opportunity for her leadership to be successfully challenged at home.[28]

Style versus Substance

Thatcher's European policy failed for a number of reasons. Her first line of defense, making progress contingent on the reform of existing Community practices, fell with her initial success in demanding reform. She also suffered from divided support for her policy in the Conservative party, where a succession of leading members of the government — Defence Minister Michael Heseltine, Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, and finally, Sir Geoffrey Howe — resigned, citing various aspects of the government's European policy as the reason.

Thatcher's more pro-European ministers (and members of the professional foreign service) insisted that her problem was one of style rather than substance. The prime minister, they maintained, understood neither the danger of being rude to her European colleagues nor the extent to which European practice could be guaranteed to fall far short of lofty European principles. In the opinion of one former foreign secretary, Thatcher, by her very abrasiveness, actually risked forcing her EC opponents to live up to their principles in a way that they had never really intended.[29] This is not to say that the other Europeans secretly agreed with the vision of Europe that Thatcher presented; but her rhetoric did tend to obscure the considerable common ground that existed between Britain and the rest of Europe.

Conclusion

Thatcher failed to win her European battle, but in foreign policy, at least, her eleven years of power brought successes from which much may be learned. Firstly, she demonstrated that even in an age of sprawling foreign policy bureaucracies and complex international issues, strong personal leadership based on firm convictions and simple principles continues to count; indeed, it matters all the more. In this, Thatcher was no doubt aided by the built-in legislative majority that the Westminster form of democracy usually delivers.

[28] Young, *One of Us*, pp. 556-57.
[29] Author's interviews, May 1990.

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No American president, for example, could ignore his domestic political base to the extent that she did. (On the other hand, no American president could be so easily unseated by a reversal of fortune within the ranks of his party.)

Those who yearn for stronger executive control of American foreign policy might reflect that Thatcher's years of effectively unchallenged exercise of power had damaging effects on the way in which she pursued her objectives, even though the objectives themselves remained sound. For example, she increasingly neglected to mobilize political support for her positions in the EC, among the British electorate, in her own cabinet, and, eventually, in the Conservative party. She preferred to believe that merit and conviction would see her through. The result was increasing resentment, isolation, and opposition.

At her best, Thatcher's strength came from her willingness to make and explain policy in terms of national interests.

However, the charge that Thatcher lacked the flexibility to compromise is not necessarily true, at least when British interests were at stake. The Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985, which formally conceded Dublin's interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland, and the negotiated return of Hong Kong to China are prominent examples where it might be said that Thatcher permitted a sober appraisal of national interest to overrule her instincts. Her visit to Hungary in early 1984 at the height of the "second" cold war, and her early recognition of Gorbachev as a person with whom the West could do business, demonstrated a willingness to see Britain's international environment transformed, and to take a hand in the process.

At her best, Thatcher's strength came from her willingness to make and explain policy in terms of national interests. In this, she may have enjoyed a cultural advantage: British leaders do not seem as disturbed as their American counterparts by the exercise of power purely for national self interest. Foreign policy based upon a clear sense of national identity, purposes, and interests is usually most successful for two reasons. Firstly, it assures support at home for actions that may be troubling by domestic standards or expectations. Not the least of Thatcher's achievements was her return of British foreign policy to the arena of democratic politics, thus securing support for her objectives and reinvigorating the electorate's expectation of what the country was capable of doing. Secondly, a policy articulated in such terms is more likely to be intelligible to other governments, which must at least respect reasons of state and national interest, even if they cannot always agree with them. Thatcher, one imagines, would have been much less bashful than the current leadership in Washington about the extent to which its policy in the Gulf was necessitated by American national interests, and she would have been quick to remind others of the extent to which they had similar interests.

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The decline of the cold war has left nationalism in a multiplicity of forms, both benign and malignant, as the primary motive force on the world stage. Thatcher's own convictions left her well-equipped to grasp the implications of these changes, if not always the tact to express them adroitly. Projects for international cooperation that ignore the national realities of their participants will likely end in disappointment and possibly conflict. This applies to plans for new security orders in the Middle East; to hopes that the United Nations will begin to function as originally envisaged in its Charter; and, of course, to the steps toward full European union currently being attempted. Regrettably, the architects and builders of the EC seem not to have heard the essential wisdom underlying her reservations.

In a world of nationalisms ascendant, cultural affinity and international understanding will be at a premium. These cannot be constructed by policy, but are, rather, the windfalls of history for the countries that are lucky enough to enjoy them. British and American policy makers would be well advised to follow Thatcher's example of keeping their special relationship in good repair, not as an ideological axis or cultural community that might exclude other commitments, but as a relationship based upon a fortunate and extensive coincidence of interests, at which the United States and Britain have independently arrived.

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Washington Must Rely on London, Not Bonn

by B. Vivekanandan

The changes that have taken place on the international scene since the mid-1980s have made it imperative for the major actors in world politics to reassess their bilateral relationships. The introduction of perestroika and glasnost in the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev, the conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe have cumulatively closed the curtain on the cold war. At the same time, a united Germany has emerged as potentially the most powerful nation on the European continent. In light of these changes, Washington has begun to review its policy options and bilateral relationships in Europe — particularly the relationship with its most important ally, Great Britain.

The questions now confronting the United States are: What importance should the United States attach to its special relationship with Britain in view of the newly emerging situation in Europe? Is there any meaningful substitute for Britain in America's global strategy in the coming years? Would it be wise for the United States to shift its present anchorage in Europe from Britain to some other country in the heart of the continent?

Origins of the Special Relationship

The special relationship between the United States and Britain was forged in the fires of the two world wars, when the two countries collaborated closely to defeat aggressive nationalism in Europe. Although the United States retreated from Europe in the aftermath of the First World War to pursue a policy of "splendid isolation," it took a very different path at the end of the Second World War, owing to the onset of the cold war with the Soviet Union, the need to help rebuild a devastated Europe, and a new-found sense of global obligation. The United States found a natural ally in Britain — a country that could share with the United States its strength, influence, and experience.

Winston Churchill, the son of an English father and an American mother, was deeply attached to the idea of close cooperation across the Atlantic, an attachment that was manifest in his dealings with President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War. Churchill carried this idea over into the post-1945 world. After the war, he did much to articulate the concept of a

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"special relationship," notably in a speech to the House of Commons on November 7, 1945, and in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. In Fulton, he emphasized that peace could not be preserved without "the fraternal association of the English speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States."[1] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cooperative efforts in nuclear weapons development, and numerous other collaborative ventures soon institutionalized this special relationship, elevating its place in the foreign and security policies of both countries.

In addition to the trust that emerged from their collaborative efforts in war, the two countries have many common features that predate the American Revolution and provide the foundation for their special relationship — a common language, similar political values and ideological perceptions, and a shared history. These factors served to bring the United States and Britain closer to each other than they are to any other major power.[2]

Manifestations of the Special Relationship

The United States and Great Britain have cooperated closely in a number of important fields, including intelligence, diplomacy and other political contacts, technology and defense, and economic matters.

Intelligence. Since 1941, Britain and the United States have formally coordinated intelligence activities, enabling them to share numerous secrets. In fact, no other two independent countries have collaborated so closely on this level, and it is hard to imagine that either the United States or Britain would share such secrets on an institutionalized basis with any other country in Europe or elsewhere in the foreseeable future. Prominent examples of this extraordinary cooperation include the joint U.S.-British listening post at Cheltenham in southern England, and their signals intelligence center in Cyprus (which covers southern parts of the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Israel, and the Mediterranean region), both of which are vital links in U.S. world-wide intelligence gathering.

Diplomacy. Equally important are the exceptionally close ties at the diplomatic and bureaucratic levels. The British embassy in Washington, composed of about five hundred personnel drawn from the various ministries, is the largest British embassy in the world. Moreover, British diplomats appear to be welcome participants in the debates in Washington on policy formulation, particularly the formulation of policies relating to strategic and disarmament questions. Indeed, U.S. administrations have seldom viewed such involvement by British diplomats as interference in the internal affairs of the United States.

[1] Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), vol. 7, p. 7289.

[2] For a background, see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783-1952* (London: Archon Books, 1954).

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British diplomats enjoy easy access to the State Department and the Pentagon, and they have exceptional opportunities to influence U.S. policies at a very early stage.[3] The position of U.S. diplomats in London is similar.

The number of political contacts between the two countries is extensive. For example, about sixteen thousand U.S. officials visit Britain every year for official purposes.[4] These official contacts are also evident at the highest levels. The U.S. secretary of state and the British foreign secretary meet, on an average, about eight times a year. According to official sources in Britain, there are at least fifty ministerial or very high-level visits from Britain to the United States each year. Finally, there are regular summit meetings between the U.S. president and the British prime minister that often transcend formal procedures — the two sometimes meeting, for example, on very short notice.

In 1987-88, British firms accounted for 46 percent of new foreign direct investments in the United States.

Technology and defense. Significantly, Britain is the only country with which the United States has shared its technological expertise. Moreover, the two countries consult with each other regularly and exchange notes on guidelines to be observed in the modernization of nuclear technology and weapons. Examples of U.S.-U.K. cooperation in the nuclear field include the British decision in 1962 to give up its Blue Streak missile program in favor of American missiles for its submarine-based Polaris missile system, the American decision in 1982 to provide Britain with Trident II missiles, and the British contribution of $116 million for joint research on Trident II.

Economic cooperation. The United States and Britain maintain strong economic ties as well. Each is a leading investor in the other country. In recent years, approximately two-thirds of British investment abroad has been channeled into the United States, and one-fourth of American investment in Europe has gone to Britain. In 1987, Britain had total holdings of about $80 billion in the United States — roughly twice the value of U.S. holdings in Britain.[5] In 1987-88, when popular fears of Japanese "overinvestment" in the United States were at their height, British firms still accounted for 46 percent of new foreign direct investments in the United States, and roughly 30 percent of total foreign investments in the United States at the time were British. (According to the U.S. Commerce Department, foreign direct investments in the United States were worth $261.9 billion at the end of 1987. Of this, Britain accounted for as much as $75 billion; the Netherlands and Japan were second and third with investments totaling, respectively, $47 billion and $33 billion.)[6]

[3] For a discussion, see David D. Newsom, "U.S.-British Consultation: An Impossible Dream," *International Affairs*, Spring 1987, pp. 227-31.

[4] Figures provided by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

[5] U.S. holdings in Britain in 1987 totaled $44.6 billion. See *The Independent*, January 20, 1989.

[6] *The Times*, July 1, 1988.

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Thus, through such cooperative efforts, the two countries have strengthened their special relationship over the years — a relationship that has no parallel in modern international relations. Indeed, Washington feels that it can confide in London on almost any matter pertaining to world politics or security. According to Henry A. Kissinger, the consultation system that the two countries have established makes it "psychologically impossible" for the United States to ignore British views. He continues:

> They evolved a habit of meeting so regular that autonomous American action came to seem to violate club rules. Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional that American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain British advice before making major decisions.[7]

The Personal Dimension

Added to the core factors mentioned above, a number of important personal relationships have existed between British prime ministers and U.S. presidents, dating back to Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and continuing with Clement Attlee (1945-1951) and Harry S. Truman. There have, of course, been exceptions, such as the poor relationship between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1955-57), who resigned in the wake of Britain's retreat from Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Harold Macmillan, who succeeded Eden as prime minister in 1957, and who was, like Churchill, the son of an English father and an American mother, quickly established personal rapport with Eisenhower by invoking their wartime friendship. He maintained this goodwill during the administration of John F. Kennedy, and the two worked together on a strategy for dealing with the Cuban crisis of 1962.[8] Lyndon B. Johnson and Harold Wilson (1964-66, 1966-1970), however, did not get on well personally, the Vietnam War being an added irritant. Edward Heath (1970-74), with his Eurocentric approach, did not make the situation any better. A slight improvement in relations finally occurred in April 1976, when James Callaghan became prime minister and established a friendly relationship with Jimmy Carter.

But the U.S.-U.K. relationship acquired a new dimension altogether in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The personal chemistry between these two leaders and the international environment at the time provided the impetus that elevated U.S.-British cooperation to a level unseen since the end of World War II. Thatcher and Reagan chose to present themselves as ideological twins — champions of individual initiative, unlimited growth, and the unrestrained interplay of market forces. Both favored the withdrawal of the state from the sector of public wel-

[7] Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1979), p. 90.

[8] For details, see Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day, 1961-1963* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 182-216.

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fare, and Thatcher sought to promote the privatization of Britain's largely socialized economy. In dealing with international issues, Reagan and Thatcher maintained a high degree of unity.

While Reagan thought that the United States and Britain were "kindred nations of like-minded people," Thatcher was guided by the conviction that "an enduring alliance" with the United States was of fundamental importance in furthering British objectives. The agenda for the 1980s was set when Reagan and Thatcher met in February 1981 in Washington. There, Reagan declared that "absolute trust between the prime minister of the United Kingdom and the president of the United States will continue to be the hallmark of Anglo-American cooperation." Thatcher responded "We in Britain stand with you. America's success will be our success. Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends, we will be there."[9] Both acknowledged the vital importance of U.S.-U.K. cooperation; Thatcher in particular believed that it held the key to the success of her efforts in world politics.

Some analysts have attributed the high profile of the special relationship between the United States and Britain in the 1980s to the personal equation between Reagan and Thatcher. The personal factor, however, was just a small part of the relationship between the two countries. Reagan and Thatcher were hard-headed realists; they tried to influence each other on the basis of realistic assessments.[10] This continues to be true of the relationship between the United States and Britain under George Bush and John Major.

Cooperation in Crisis

In recent years, the U.S.-U.K. special relationship has been tested several times, and has passed. The crucial U.S. support for Britain during the Falklands war in 1982 and British support for the United States during the Libyan crisis in 1986 provide striking evidence of the solidarity between the two countries, as does their coordination of policy during the recent Gulf crisis.

The Falklands. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands precipitated the most serious crisis for Britain since the Suez crisis of 1956; its potential to inflict damage on British prestige was incalculable. It was crucial for Britain to come out of the confrontation honorably. Eventually, this meant going to war with Argentina. The two countries fought a brief conflict that ended when the occupying Argentine forces surrendered to a British task force in June 1982.

The United States helped Britain to overcome the unfavorable logistics of fighting an enemy that was eight thousand miles away, offered diplomatic support, and provided indirect assistance in recapturing the lost islands. In assisting Britain, the United States was risking its own position in Latin America,

[9] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 165.

[10] For Reagan's tribute to Thatcher, see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 21, 1988), p. 1510.

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where opinion was solidly on the side of Argentina — a fact fully appreciated in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

U.S. support for Britain during the Falklands crisis was qualitatively and quantitatively substantial. Besides military equipment, spare parts, and fuel, the United States, in response to a British request for intelligence assistance, positioned a satellite above the war zone in the South Atlantic, thus enabling the officials of the British Defence Ministry to watch the war from London and effectively plan their strategy. A senior official in the British diplomatic service acknowledged that "the speed with which the facilities were made available [by the United States] . . . helped Britain to win the war quickly," and that, without U.S. support, the outcome would have been uncertain.[11]

Libya. During the Libyan crisis in April 1986, Britain repaid its debt to the United States by providing air base facilities to launch the air strike on Tripoli. Although other U.S. allies in Europe (somewhat reluctantly) honored their commitment to support the United States when Reagan decided to impose economic sanctions on Libya in response to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's terrorism, they were uniformly opposed to a punitive military attack. U.S. efforts to persuade countries like France and Spain to provide logistical support came to nothing. Reagan eventually approached Britain for the facilities necessary to mount the attack. Thatcher, risking public criticism at home, decided to stand by the United States. In doing so, she redeemed her pledge to Reagan, that "when you look for friends, we will be there."

The Gulf war. The United States and Britain followed an integrated strategy, diplomatically and militarily, in dealing with the Gulf crisis triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Margaret Thatcher was the first world leader consulted by George Bush in the wake of the Iraqi action. In fact, when Iraq attacked Kuwait, Thatcher was in the United States. Bush and Thatcher met almost at once in Aspen, Colorado, and called for a collective international response to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Britain fully endorsed the U.S. decision to deploy forces in Saudi Arabia; although U.S. forces constituted a large majority of the coalition forces ranged against Iraq, Britain provided the second-largest contingent, a not-inconsiderable force of forty-two thousand army, navy, and air force personnel.[12] In addition, British fighter pilots flew some of the most dangerous missions in the initial stages of the war, suffering disproportionate losses.

John Major's succession as prime minister of Britain in November 1990 did not affect the basic approach of the U.S.-U.K. strategy. In the United Nations Security Council and elsewhere (such as formulating military strategy), Britain continued to display a remarkable sense of unity and purpose; Major proved to be just as resolute as his predecessor in pursuing these policies.

[11] Author's interview with senior Foreign Office official.

[12] This figure was given by Defence Secretary Tom King, in a statement in the House of Commons on January 31, 1991. See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Survey of Current Affairs*, February 1991, p. 58.

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When military operations against Iraq became inevitable following Saddam Husayn's refusal to pull out of Kuwait by the U.N.-mandated deadline of January 15, 1991, Bush and Major held close and extensive consultations on the conduct of the war.[13] Together, they succeeded in dissuading Israel from retaliating against Iraq for the Scud missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa.[14] Similarly, by synchronizing their diplomatic efforts, they were able to maintain successfully the unity of the alliance throughout the Gulf war. Their coordinated moves in the U.N. Security Council throughout the crisis were remarkable. Britain's contribution to the war effort in the Gulf was singled out for acclaim by President Bush in his State of the Union speech on January 29, 1991.

Areas of Disagreement

One important reason for the healthy state of the U.S.-U.K. special relationship is that areas of disagreement tend to have no appreciable effect on the basic trust that exists between the two countries. During the 1980s, for example, London and Washington differed on many issues. When the United States intervened in Grenada without consulting London, Thatcher publicly criticized the U.S. administration. Also, Washington and London differed in their perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the best way to resolve it. While London favored an international conference on the Middle East, Washington resisted the idea, saying that the time was not yet appropriate for such a conference. Similarly, they differed sharply over the use of economic sanctions to bring recalcitrant states to heel. Thatcher was basically opposed to sanctions, while Reagan favored their selective application. Thatcher also expressed serious initial reservations about Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, although she refrained from voicing them publicly. (Later, however, Thatcher did come out in support of Reagan's plan to initiate research on SDI.)

Moreover, despite their extensive cooperation, The United States and Britain have at times disagreed on economic questions. London publicly criticized the U.S. move to impose quotas and increase tariffs on U.S. imports of British steel. Similarly, London resisted Washington's move to impose an embargo on the use of U.S. technology for the USSR's Siberian gas pipeline in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The dispute heated up when Washington made the embargo applicable not only to U.S. companies, but to their overseas subsidiaries as well, including those based in Britain. British officials did not want U.S. subsidiaries in Britain to be subjected to commands from across the Atlantic. However, the episode ended amicably when, in November 1982, after protracted diplomatic exchanges, the United States relented and lifted the sanctions it had imposed against the British companies.

[13] For the statement on the Gulf war made by John Major in the House of Commons on January 17, 1991, see British High Commission in India, *British Information Services*, January 18, 1991.

[14] British High Commission in India, *British Information Services*, January 22, 1991.

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What is conspicuous in all these disagreements is the absence of acrimony. The two countries kept their differences within certain respectable limits, thus sustaining their mutual trust and confidence. According to Thatcher, the two countries' differences were "infinitely less important than the purposes and loyalties that bind us together."

The New Calculus in Europe

The United States and Britain long perceived the Soviet Union as the principal military and ideological adversary of the West, thus facilitating the development of a cautious joint approach to their relations with that country. Before the mid-1980s, there was little need to revise that perception, as Soviet leaders consistently took a confrontational stance toward the West.

Thatcher was perhaps the first world leader to notice signals of change coming from the Kremlin after Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985. She asked a former British prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, to go to Moscow to hold discussions with — and make a comprehensive assessment of — the new Soviet leader. This special emissary reported that, during the discussions, he found in Gorbachev a new kind of Russian, one who had a modern mind and who, unlike his predecessors, was prepared to argue with critics and seek to convince them of the wisdom of his positions on various issues. Douglas-Home was deeply impressed, and told Thatcher that "Gorbachev is the man with whom we can do business."[15] This became Thatcher's own position on Gorbachev, and she, in turn, convinced Ronald Reagan of the need to adopt a more flexible approach toward the Soviet Union and to hold serious talks with Gorbachev on important global issues.

By pooling their wisdom and experience, the United States and Britain helped to open a new chapter in East-West relations. They moved forward to the conclusion of the INF treaty, established a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, and aided the restoration of democratic governments in Eastern Europe. In the wake of these successes, many observers have begun to proclaim the end of the cold war in Europe.

The apparent end of the cold war has brought about a transformation in the strategic environment of Europe. As the dividing line between the cold war blocs blurs and bipolarity gives way to a multipolar world, one finds new centers of power emerging — particularly Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. The United States must consider what role it will play in the new world order.

Developments in the last two years have generated anxiety as well as hope. Although NATO was devised primarily as an instrument of deterrence against the Soviet threat, it also served to prevent its own member states from pursuing aggressive nationalist policies, and facilitated the maintenance of an

[15] Private interview with former prime minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home, July 21, 1986, in London.

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equilibrium among these states: the nature and the extent of the military programs in each member state have been largely transparent to the others, and NATO members have done much to coordinate their military programs, thus promoting integration. It remains to be seen, however, whether this cooperation can be preserved without the context of the cold war and the Soviet threat to Western Europe that gave birth to it. At the very least, significant changes are sure to develop in the character of NATO and its role in Europe.

Thatcher's opposition to certain aspects of European Community control were merely the most open and frank acknowledgement of the nationalism that still pervades Western Europe.

Moreover, the establishment and growth of the European Community (EC) has hastened the process of economic — and, to a lesser extent, political — integration among the West European states. The EC brings together all the major economies of Western Europe and is already a force to reckon with in the global trading system.. Its program of establishing a single market by the end of 1992 will make the integration process even more dramatic. However, the establishment of an integrated trading system among the twelve member states of the EC cannot obscure the nationalist currents still evident in all the member states, excepting perhaps Benelux. Margaret Thatcher's steadfast opposition to surrendering certain aspects of British sovereignty to EC control badly tarnished her reputation among advocates of EC pan-Europism; but her protestations, far from being a lonely case of recalcitrant nationalism, were merely the most open and frank acknowledgement of the nationalism that still pervades Western Europe.

Germany in the New Europe

Germany, as the most populous and economically powerful European country, will doubtless be a major player in European politics in the years ahead. Indeed, it possesses the potential to dominate Europe in the coming decades. The Deutsche mark is already one of the strongest currencies in the world, despite Bonn's costly ongoing bail-out of the floundering former East German economy. The emergence of the German juggernaut in Central Europe has, however, bred anxiety about the possible revival of German nationalism and the way in which German power will express itself in the coming decades.

During the Allied occupation of Germany, Bonn sought to create the conditions that would make the restoration of Germany's nationhood and sovereignty an acceptable — if not inevitable — alternative, by cooperating energetically in the institutions of postwar Europe, such as NATO, the EC, and the

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The so-called 2 + 4 settlement in September 1990 finally placed a seal of approval on the unification of Germany, with the guarantee of sovereign power squarely in the hands of the Germans and the Bundestag.

But the history of a united Germany from the time of Bismarck onwards is not a reassuring one, and gives ample evidence of some disturbing national attitudes toward power and aggression.[16] Although postwar Germans, especially West Germans, have persistently sought to demonstrate that these attitudes were discarded at the end of World War II, recent incidents, such as the Kohl government's initial unwillingness to sign a treaty with Poland over Germany's eastern border and Bonn's preemptive announcement of inter-German monetary union (without consulting its partners in the European Monetary System), provide evidence that national considerations still come first for many Germans. At the grassroots level, as well, one can see the persistence of a sometimes aggressive nationalist sentiment, most obviously in areas of the former German Democratic Republic, but also in parts of West Germany.

Nationalist feeling in Germany was rarely displayed openly after World War II, but it erupted once again in the national euphoria that accompanied the breaching of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. It reached a crescendo in the days after this event, revealing that German national pride is still a powerful force in that country; reunification has intensified this force. It would be a mistake to assume that the cooperative interaction between Germany and the other European powers during the last forty-five years has tempered this sentiment so much that it is no longer a concern to Germany's European neighbors. The prospect of a nationalistic Germany establishing itself as the dominant power in Europe cannot be discounted.

This possibility has produced tremendous anxiety and apprehension in other West European countries, especially Belgium, Britain, France, and the Netherlands — not to mention Eastern European countries, such as Poland, which endured huge losses in World War II. Allegedly, the French even took the initiative to organize secret conclaves of leaders of other neighboring countries that had suffered German occupation in the past.[17] Thus, in the years ahead, new alignments are likely to form in Europe with a view to checking the resurgence of German power.

Few in Europe today expect any serious threat to their security from the Soviet Union. Instead, many Europeans now focus their attention on the power of a united Germany. Should Germany choose to pay more attention to its military programs, the situation will become even more complex. The United States must consider this new situation before planning a strategy for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.

[16] For an analysis of the German national psyche, see Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1969).

[17] Author's conversations with French officials, December 1989.

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A New U.S. Anchorage in Europe?

William E. Odom has argued in the pages of this journal that Germany — not Britain — should be the United States's key partner in Europe, and that a strong German-American connection is the best insurance policy against another war in Europe.[18] Such arguments stem from the ties that the United States and Germany have established in the postwar years. These connections, however, viewed in their proper perspective, must be seen as an aberration. Germany did not choose to foster ties to the United States in the postwar period; this arrangement was thrust upon Germany. Few historical or cultural factors exist that make such cooperation between America and Germany inevitable.

Indeed, many well-informed Germans already resent the presence of foreign — particularly American — troops on German soil, and, with the lessening of East-West tensions, question the need for them. It should be recalled that Germany began to express such resentment against the United States as early as 1973, when, during the Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. warships called at a Bremen base without obtaining prior permission from the German authorities. Unmindful of the fact that the ships belonged to a friend and ally, Bonn did not hesitate to blow the incident out of proportion and make a noisy protest against Washington.

Moreover, instances in which Bonn has brushed off serious U.S. concerns are numerous: Bonn's seemingly ambivalent attitude toward Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; its determination to provide Brazil with nuclear technology (thus potentially undermining the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), despite Washington's vehement opposition; its refusal to join the boycott of the Moscow Olympics; its lukewarm support for U.S. actions against Libya in 1986; and so on. Such examples are not offered as evidence of a conspicuously hostile or uncooperative relationship between Germany and the United States; but such incidents do collectively tend to undermine the possibility of a special relationship between the United States and Germany.

The Gulf war provided the United States with a unique opportunity to gain insight into the reliability of its European allies in times of crisis. Although no West European country could be fairly described as uncooperative in this matter, Britain stood out yet again as the most committed and trustworthy ally, while a hesitant and self-preoccupied Germany was a disappointment. Although Germany made a financial pledge of $6.6 billion, it was obvious from the outset that Bonn preferred to remain aloof from the military effort, and made full use of a convenient interpretation of Article 115 (a) of the Federal Republic's constitution as a justification for avoiding any military contribution. Germany was even reluctant to accept a proposal to use its air force in Turkey against Iraq if Turkey (a NATO member) was attacked by Iraqi missiles. Bonn took the position that a missile attack on the Turkish borders would not con-

[18] William E. Odom, "The German Problem: Only Ties to America Provide the Answer," *Orbis*, Fall 1990, pp. 483-504.

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stitute an attack upon NATO.[19] This stand was certainly not consistent with the established policy of NATO concerning attacks on member states.

U.S. policy makers must ask whether a nation that practices such obliqueness at a crucial moment can be treated as a stable anchorage for U.S. interests in Europe. The Gulf war proved that the United States's best friend in Europe continues to be Britain. The United States and Britain still have the will to assume a global leadership role, and to stand united against dictators and expansionist aggression, while Bonn continues to focus predominantly on its own concerns in the most narrow sense.

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In the ultimate analysis, arguments in favor of tethering U.S. policy in Europe to Germany fail because of their sheer impracticality. Of course, this does not mean that the American and German governments should not seek to establish a constructive working relationship with each other, and build on the ties they have established since 1945. But it does suggest that Germany is no replacement for Britain as the United States's key partner in Europe.

Conclusion

The end of the cold war has not relieved Europe's worries. Rather, it has complicated the security problems of the continent. The military presence of the United States in Europe, therefore, must continue, even if at a reduced level. Many countries in Europe will wholeheartedly welcome this. NATO as a military mechanism, with a high degree of military cooperation and coordination, will have to continue as an insurance policy against instability in Europe. Perhaps it was prudence — rather than simply the prospect of German aid — that led Gorbachev to relent on his stand against allowing Germany's continued participation in NATO. Perhaps he too came to realize that one little-mentioned but vital function of NATO has been to restrain Germany from pursuing a completely independent military policy.

Although the Soviet threat to Western Europe has decreased, the twenty-first century will call for a more concerted trans-Atlantic approach to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. The United States and Britain would do well to pool their wisdom, resources, and influence to meet all eventualities. Certainly, on strategic issues, they will have a lot to do together. In the unfolding European and global situation, no credible alternative exists to America's special relationship with Britain.

[19] *The Times*, January 25, 1991.

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Moscow Report

Russia's Surprising Reactionary Alliance

by John B. Dunlop

During the period from September 1990 through January 1991, a resurgent right-wing coalition succeeded in scoring one political victory after another in the Soviet Union. It soon became apparent that the coalition had, to a considerable extent, managed to capture the elusive Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been tacking to the political right since early-to-mid 1989.[1] In December 1990, the coalition played a major role in obtaining the resignation of two powerful Soviet ministers, both of whom were political moderates, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin. The regime's attempted political putsch in Lithuania and Latvia in mid-January 1991 was also strongly supported by members of the coalition. A subsequent vigorous reaction to the coup on the part of Soviet democrats and republican elites served, however, to slow down the USSR's movement to the right. Thus, one observes an unstable polarization of political forces in the Soviet Union, with vehement hardliners facing off against democrats and the advocates of republican rights.

The Conservative Coalition

Since the spring of 1987, conservative nationalists and National Bolsheviks (conservative Russian nationalists who believe that the "inner" Soviet empire can be preserved only by keeping a firm grip on Marxist-Leninist ideology) have been in close alliance with so-called neo-Stalinists (conservative Marxist-Leninists who, like Stalin in the latter years of his reign, are prepared to manipulate Russian nationalist sentiment and anti-Semitism in order to prop up and strengthen the Soviet state).[2] As Walter Laqueur has noted, this alliance of

[1] It should be noted that the term "right" reflects current usage in the Soviet Union and does not correspond to the general meaning of the word in the West. President Gorbachev has recently complained that his opponents among Soviet democrats should be called rightists, and not leftists, since "they reject the socialist idea and favor the capitalization of society." *The Los Angeles Times*, February 27, 1991.

[2] On the vicissitudes of the right-wing alliance, see John B. Dunlop, "Soviet Cultural Politics," *Problems of Communism*, November/December 1987, pp. 34-56; John B. Dunlop, "The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, special edition, December 19, 1988, pp. 1-10; and John B. Dunlop, "The Return of Russian Nationalism," *Journal of Democracy*, Summer 1990, pp. 114-22.

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conservative Russian nationalists and neo-Stalinists has in many ways been a peculiar one: "There are the Russian nationalists," he writes, "whose homes are decorated with icons and pictures of [Tsar Nicholas II's prime minister] Stolypin. They have no sympathy for Marx, who wrote nasty things about Russian history, and they loathe Lenin, a *déraciné* Russian. . . . And there are the neo-Stalinists, who have little enthusiasm for the icons and 'old women in old villages'. Stolypin ('the hangman') is anathema to them. They would not be caught dead in a cathedral."[3]

Indeed Laqueur is correct: the conservative nationalists are distinguished from the neo-Stalinists by major and often irreconcilable differences. The neo-Stalinists for their part want to firm up the Marxist-Leninist legitimacy of the Soviet state, to beatify the figure of Lenin, and to extol the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution as a leap into a higher, sacred reality. The prerevolutionary monarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church are rejected by the neo-Stalinists as reactionary institutions. The views of neo-Stalinists find expression in such journals as *Molodaya gvardiya* and *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, while the daily newspaper of the Russian Communisty Party, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, serves essentially as a neo-Stalinist tribune, though at times it opens its pages to conservative nationalists.

The conservative Russian nationalists, by contrast, hold a negative view of the Bolshevik Revolution, of Lenin, and of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and are attracted both to the prerevolutionary monarchy and to the Russian Orthodox Church. They express a generally positive opinion of the writings of Nobel prize-winning novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who is despised by the neo-Stalinists. The views of conservative nationalists are aired in such journals as *Nash sovremennik* and *Moskva*, while the weekly newspaper of the RSFSR Writers' Union, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, serves as a sounding board for conservative nationalist and National Bolshevik spokesmen.

Common Enemies

Given the large differences separating the nationalists and the neo-Stalinists, one might ask how they have managed to remain in alliance for four years. One conservative nationalist put it simply: "Better the communists than the democrats."[4] (By communists, he meant such outspoken neo-Stalinists as Ivan Polozkov, head of the recently-created Russian Communist Party, and former Politburo member Egor Ligachev.) Democratic leaders like Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov, and Yury Afanasyev, and reform communists like Aleksander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze are assailed for advocating policies that are perceived as threatening to blow up the "inner" Soviet empire. Even worse, they are seen as threatening the unity and integrity of Russia by being willing to countenance the granting of self-rule to such minority peoples

[3] Walter Laqueur, "From Russia with Hate," *The New Republic*, February 5, 1990, p. 23.
[4] Private interview with author.

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of the RSFSR as the Tatars and Bashkirs. In short, considerations of national security, broadly interpreted, presently bind the conservative nationalists to the neo-Stalinists.

Hostility to the contemporary West and to the idea of a market economy is another significant bond conjoining the conservative nationalists and neo-Stalinists. This enmity toward the West is at times linked to anti-Semitism, to a belief that the Russophobic West is in fact controlled by anti-Russian and anti-Soviet Jews. Capitalism is seen by members of the conservative coalition as a harsh economic system indifferent to the well-being of the individual. Capitalism is also held responsible for the existence of mindless Western mass culture that swamps the populace with Satanic rock music and pornographic films. Russia, conservative nationalists and neo-Stalinists believe, must be preserved from this spiritual contagion.

Hostility to the contemporary West and to the idea of a market economy is one significant bond conjoining the conservative nationalists and neo-Stalinists.

An open letter to RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman Boris Yeltsin, published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, demonstrated how such fervently held sentiments prompt conservative nationalists to side with the neo-Stalinists.[5] The authors of the letter included the well-known nationalist writers Valentin Rasputin (a member until recently of Gorbachev's now-defunct Presidential Council), Vasily Belov, and Vladimir Krupin (chief editor of the journal *Moskva*); critics Viktor Likhonosov and Yury Loshchits; and publicists Aleksandr Prokhanov, Eduard Volodin, and Karem Rash. In this truculent letter, which united pure nationalists like Rasputin with National Bolsheviks like Prokhanov, Yeltsin was assailed for supporting the desire of the Baltic republics to secede from the USSR. The authors stressed "the historical rootedness of Russia in the Baltic lands" and emphasized that Yeltsin's primary task as head of the Russian Republic must be to defend ethnic Russians and Eastern Slavs living in the borderlands. "Russia," the signatories declared, "has always had, and still has, one great right and obligation: to defend her compatriots and blood brothers wherever they live."

Even worse than Yeltsin's perceived sins against the unity of the Soviet Union, in the authors' opinion, is his conniving in the breakup of Russia itself. "Only a politician indifferent to the fate of the Fatherland," they write scornfully, "could hand out willy-nilly free economic zones and sovereignties on the territory of Russia, de facto dissmembering the Russian state. . . ." And they conclude: "Taken as a whole, your [that is, Yeltsin's] actions can be simply defined as the disintegration of the USSR and the destruction of Russia, neither of which was created by you, and it is not up to you to decide their fate."

[5] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 19, 1991.

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Conclusion

As long as this alliance of conservative nationalists and neo-Stalinists persists, the prospects for the development of democracy, pluralism, and a market economy in the Russian Republic are dim. The issue is not that the alliance enjoys strong political support from the Russian public; the March 1990 RSFSR elections witnessed a stinging defeat for candidates from the alliance who were united in the so-called Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Movements.[6] While its program was decisively rejected by the Russian electorate, however, the alliance continues to enjoy strong support from such critical Soviet institutions as the KGB, the military, the military-industrial complex, and the Russian Communist Party. Gorbachev's present position as a virtual captive of the alliance also serves greatly to strengthen its position. By controlling much of the weaponry of the USSR, the alliance is in a good position to promote its political agenda.

[6] See "Europe's Christian Democrats," *The Economist*, March 17, 1990, p. 19.

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Documentation

Averting Moscow's Baltic Coup

by Jan Arveds Trapans

Baltic affairs were relatively quiet during the later months of 1990 — more quiet certainly than in the spring of that year, when Lithuania's declaration of independence prompted an economic blockade from Moscow. Late 1990 was also more quiet than the tumultuous years 1988 and 1989, with their massive, defiant demonstrations and the formation of popular fronts.

In December of 1990, however, signs began to emerge that Moscow was planning to suppress the independence-minded governments of the Baltic states. Eduard Shevardnadze resigned as Soviet foreign minister, and his resignation speech implied that a military assault, much like the April 1989 assault in Tblisi, Georgia, was in the offing. Representatives of the Soviet army in the Baltic states called upon the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies to introduce military rule there, and Soviet minister of defense Dmitriy Yazov claimed that the local authorities were "threatening the army." (The purported threat was a statement by Latvia's government that local government would no longer be responsible for provisioning Soviet garrisons. Baltic parliaments continued to call for a withdrawal of Soviet troops as a step toward establishing the de facto independence of the Baltic countries. They were careful, however, to state that there would be no activities that might insult the dignity or violate the human rights of soldiers and their families.)

Warnings from the Baltics[1]

In December, the Soviet military declared it would seize young men who did not comply with Soviet draft laws, and early in January the army moved additional troops into the Baltics, ostensibly to enforce this edict. The draft had been a major issue in the Baltics during the previous year, and had receded from view only after the Baltic governments made provisions for alternative service — provisions that, not surprisingly, the Soviet military refused to accept.

[1] Statement by the Council of Baltic States, January 8, 1991.

Jan Arveds Trapans, former director of the Radio Free Europe Latvian service, is the author of *Impatient for Freedom? The Baltic Struggle for Independence* (London: Alliance Publishers, 1990).

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In response to the ominous announcements from the Baltic Military District in December 1990, the Baltic governments braced themselves for an attack. In a coordinated action, they explained their actions to their own peoples and called for world support.

Additional Soviet troops are being brought into the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in order to enforce the draft and to capture escapees, according to an announcement made by the Commander of the Baltic Military District.

This new development may result in serious acts of violence, since the military has been given the right to use firearms. This escalation will dramatically destabilize the political situation and increase inter-ethnic tensions.

The people of the Baltic States, which fifty years ago were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, have through their parliaments expressed their free will and have given their assessment of the presence of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in their countries. The Supreme Councils of all three Baltic Republics have adopted laws concerning the Soviet military presence and alternative civil service. The Baltic States will not help conscript their young men into the armed forces of the Soviet Union. If the Baltic leaders were to help facilitate conscription, they would be acting counter to the resolutions of their Supreme Councils.

The Council of the Baltic States protests against the above-mentioned actions of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. We have reason to believe that the ultimate aim is the suppression of the Baltic peoples' aspirations for freedom.

The Council of the Baltic States calls upon the world community, the parliaments and governments of all nations, to take a stand against the actions of the Soviet Union. These actions once again confirm the Soviet foreign minister's timely warning — which he made during the recent session of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies — about the threat of imminent dictatorship in the Soviet Union. Attempts to preserve the empire — at the expense of people's rights to express their free will — can create a new hotbed of tension in Europe.

The Council of the Baltic States demands an immediate end to Soviet military actions. The relations between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union must be determined by negotiations carried out by the authorized representatives of all parties. The leaders of the Baltic States are prepared to partake in immediate discussions with the Soviet president and other Soviet leaders in order to determine the date for the start of negotiations.

A. Ruutel	A. Gorbunovs	V. Landsbergis
Chairman	Chairman	President
Supreme Council	Supreme Council	Supreme Council
Republic of Estonia	Republic of Latvia	Republic of Lithuania

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E. Savisaar
Prime Minister
Republic of Estonia

I. Godmanis
Prime Minister
Republic of Latvia

K. Prunskiene
Prime Minister
Republic of Lithuania

Moscow's Loyalists[2]

In January, forecasts of an impending civil war proliferated in that part of the Soviet media given to supporting reactionary elements of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the military. Moscow loyalists spoke excitedly of armed bands gathering in the forests. In Latvia and Estonia, bombs exploded throughout the night, damaging party or army facilities (though always very slightly). The Baltic governments denied the existence of such armed bands, and intimated that the bombers — never identified by the KGB — were in fact agents provocateurs operating out of well-guarded Moscow-loyalist buildings.

Complementing Moscow's military strength in the Baltics were shadowy local political organizations such as the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee and the All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee. These committees declared that they would wrest power from the elected Baltic governments, which, they claimed, had lost their legitimacy, the support of the people, and indeed their senses. The committees were known to be staffed by communists loyal to the CPSU, but generally did not disclose their leaders' or members' names. The following declaration is typical of proclamations issued at this time by the national salvation committees.

Developments in Lithuania have revealed the bankruptcy of the current parliament and government.

Lithuania's leaders have been unable to ensure normal economic and social life in the republic and have brought its people to the brink of poverty, political reaction, and national strife.

They claim that they act for the benefit of the people, but this is a lie. They are struggling for money, property, foreign trips, and power.

The events [of recent months] reveal that republican authorities have lost control over what is taking place, and are trying to retain their influence through deceit and demagoguery.

They have failed to heed President Mikhail Gorbachev's appeal, which suggested "a normal political solution."

Authorities continue to whip up tensions in the Republic, nudging the people toward a confrontation and violation of Soviet laws.

The National Salvation Committee considers it its duty to take all power and avert the economic crisis and civil war.

We do not seek power. We want a normal life and peaceful work for all peoples of Lithuania.

[2] Declaration of the National Salvation Committee, January 11, 1991, as reported by TASS, January 12, 1991.

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The Committee [considers] most important the restoration of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR Constitution in the Republic.

We declare that Lithuania is a Soviet Socialist Republic, developing within the USSR and protecting democracy and human rights.

Gorbachev's Warning[3]

Soviet president Gorbachev used these calls by loyalists as an excuse to threaten Lithuania on January 10.

The situation [in Lithuania] is essentially becoming deadlocked. The need to escape from the present situation dictates that urgent measures be adopted. Numerous messages from sociopolitical organizations, production collectives, and citizens of all nationalities are being delivered from the republic to the Union organs of power. The people demand the restoration of constitutional order, reliable guarantees of security, and normal living conditions. Bereft of confidence in the policy being pursued by the current leadership, they are demanding the imposition of presidential rule.

I propose that the republic's Supreme Soviet urgently restore in full the force of the USSR constitution and the constitution of the Lithuanian SSR, and that it should repeal the unconstitutional acts previously passed.

Landsbergis's Reply[4]

An hour and a half after Gorbachev's warning was broadcast, Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis replied.

The Soviet Union's political leadership has taken a step which is dangerous to peace and humanity, and which is irresponsible. I have in mind an ultimatum which has been announced and received by us — written I do not know by whom, but signed by the Soviet Union's president. The unfounded basis of all the accusations which have been made up to now and which continue toward Lithuania is stressed there several times. This unfounded basis refers to the Soviet Constitution. We are accused of having transgressed the Soviet Constitution, some undefined constitutional laws, and we are demanded immediately to restore the validity of the Soviet Constitution.

I have two remarks in this respect. If somebody seizes another country, announces that the invader's constitution is valid in that country, immediately announces to the world that he bases himself on the constitution, and demands

[3] Except from "Gorbachev Sends Warning to Lithuania Council," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereafter, FBIS, *Sov*), January 11, 1991, from the Television New Service program of Moscow Central Television's First Program Network, January 10, 1991.

[4] "Landsbergis on 'Irresponsible' USSR Action," FBIS, *Sov*, January 11, 1991, from news conference of Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis, broadcast by Vilnius Domestic Service, January 10, 1991.

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that within the occupied country his constitution is legally valid, such demagoguery has not been seen [words indistinct] centuries. Comparisons with the fate of Kuwait, maybe, are not necessary this time.

The second remark in this same ultimatum is a paradox. Mikhail Gorbachev demands that the validity of the Soviet Union's constitution be restored in the Republic of Lithuania. This means that Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledges that the Soviet constitution is not valid in the Republic of Lithuania. Thus one may demand that in other neighboring countries, too, especially where there are sufficient numbers of the Soviet army, the validity of the Soviet constitution must be acknowledged. This is an example to the world of the legal and political frame of mind of people who talk about the establishment of a state government by law and order in place of a former dictatorship.

Crisis Politics[5]

By the middle of January, the Baltic governments were expecting an imminent attack. In the early morning hours of January 13, it came. Special troops — known as OMON or "black berets," and subordinate to Moscow's Ministry of Interior — attacked government buildings and press centers in Lithuania and Latvia. The attacks took fourteen lives in Lithuania and six in Latvia.

This fighting was accompanied by less spectacular but perhaps equally important political moves designed to internationalize a conflict that Moscow dearly wished to downplay as a local matter. On January 13, Boris Yeltsin flew to Tallin, Estonia, and, together with Baltic leaders, proposed that the United Nations call an emergency conference on the future of the Baltic states. At the same time, the Republics of Estonia and Latvia and the RSFSR concluded a treaty through which these states recognized each other as sovereign. (Lithuania was expected to sign this document as well, but chose not to do so after considering the hurriedly assembled final draft.) Lastly, Yeltsin and the Baltic presidents issued the following statement.

The current actions of the leadership of the Soviet Union toward the Baltic states have created a real threat to their sovereignty. These actions have escalated the use of force, which has led to a loss of human lives.

Confirming the unbreakable will of our nations to maintain and strengthen sovereignty which has been declared by the executive power;

Realizing how real a threat exists that the human rights of all Baltic nations may be injured, the given nationality notwithstanding;

Guided by the conviction that all further development of our States is made possible only through the course of radical change to establish the foundations of freedom and democracy;

[5] Declaration of The Republic of Estonia, The Republic of Latvia, The Republic of Lithuania, and the Russian Soviet Federated Republic, January 13, 1991.

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The Republic of Latvia, Republic of Lithuania, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and the Republic of Estonia declare:

1. The signatories recognize each other as sovereign states.

2. The sovereign power within the state territories of the signatories are executed only by lawfully elected bodies. The actions by other bodies, which pretend to possess the right to execute power, is illegitimate.

3. The signatories recognize that armed force may not be used to solve any internal conflicts, apart from situations when an official demand is made by lawfully elected government bodies.

4. Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, and Estonia consider it impermissible that their citizens participate in armed actions which harm state sovereignty of any one.

5. The signatories declare their mutual readiness to provide concrete support and assistance in cases where sovereignty is threatened.

6. The signatories consider the incitement of intra-national conflicts as illegal and categorically condemn such, be they carried out for any political purpose.

7. Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, and Estonia declare their determination to develop mutual relations based on international law and principles mutually agreed upon.

8. The signatories ask that all states which constitute the Soviet Union, as well as all states of the world, categorically condemn the armed acts of oppression against the sovereign statehood of the Baltic states and their peaceful inhabitants, which threaten democracy and stability in the Soviet Union as well as the international community.

This Declaration is sent to the United Nations Organization and other international organizations, as well as the parliaments and governments of all states of the world.

This Declaration is signed, on January 13, 1991, in the City of Tallin, the capital of Estonia.

Translation of text signed and published by the Republic of Latvia, January 13, 1991.

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Appeal to Russian Soldiers[6]

Among the more dramatic gestures of January 13 was Yeltsin's plea that Russian troops refrain from acting against legitimate political institutions in the Baltic states.

Soldiers, sergeants, and officers, our fellow countrymen drafted into the army on the territory of the Russian Federation and now in the Baltic republics:

Today, when our country is going through an economic and political crisis, and the healthy forces of society are seeking ways out of the existing difficult situation using lawful and constitutional means, you may be given the order to act against legally constituted state bodies, against the peaceful civilian population that is defending its democratic achievements. Moreover, you may be told that with your help, order will be established in society. But is it really possible to regard violations of the constitution and laws as the establishment of peace? It is precisely toward this end that you are being pushed by all those who are attempting to solve political problems with the force of army units.

Before you undertake to assault civilian installations in the Baltic countries, remember your own homes, the present, and the future of your own Republic, of your own people. Violence against lawfulness and against the people of the Baltics will bring about a serious crisis, both in Russia itself and in the situation of the Russians who live in other Republics, including the Baltic Republics. . . .

Surely you will not accept the role which they have assigned to you. I draw your attention to the fact that sending of servicemen — called up for military service from the Russian Federation — outside the Republic in order to participate in carrying out duties not stipulated in article 29 of the RSFSR constitution, contradicts the decision of the RSFSR Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, accepted on December 11, 1990, and is therefore unlawful . . .

We recall historical experience, which tells us that the wrong step today could affect not only those who take it but also the next generations. I wish you success in your service and happiness for your families.

Boris Yeltsin
Chairman
RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The Death of Glasnost[7]

The Baltic crisis was accompanied by an immense propaganda effort from that section of the Soviet media that supports the army and reactionary elements. A

[6] Appeal by Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, to Soldiers, Sergeants, and Officers of the Army drafted in the Russian Federation, January 13, 1991, from Riga Radio, January 14, 1991.

[7] Alexander Nevzorov in the Baltics, Radio Riga, January 16, 1991.

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key figure in this endeavor was Alexander Nevzorov, formerly popular as an investigative journalist but also known to have connections with the KGB. Nevzorov frequented Riga and Vilnius, and subsequently disseminated a preposterous report that all the Lithuanian victims had died of heart attacks. Radio Riga expressed its outrage at Nevzorov's exploits.

Leningrad's popular television program "Six Hundred Seconds" host Alexander Nevzorov is the producer of a so-called documentary film with the cooperation of the black berets. The film is about the massacre at the television tower in Vilnius, Lithuania. It is not a documentary. It is totally staged propaganda. The actors in the film portraying the Lithuanians are armed. The Lithuanians in the television tower were unarmed, as are all the citizens of the Baltic states. Nevzorov, who shot the so-called documentary in a few hours, stated that the bodies taken from the morgue were not shot by the black berets but died of "natural causes, such as heart attacks, etc." People who die from natural causes do not leave blood footprints up to the thirteenth floor.

This film is now being shown on Soviet Central television from Moscow to demonstrate how brave the black berets are. There is nothing brave about shooting unarmed civilians. The Soviet empire, in its last wave of terror, is spreading lies, disinformation, and propaganda typical of all tyrannies.

This so-called documentary is an insult to all documentary film makers around the world. It can only be called terrorist propaganda.

Appeal for International Support[8]

Continuing its attempt to internationalize the conflict with Moscow, the Baltic states sought support from the West, including the United States. By the standards of international law, the three republics had an attractive case. The United States had repeatedly declared that it did not recognize the forced incorporation of the states into the USSR in 1940. President Bush had apparently made clear that military oppression would not be tolerated. And, while it was not clear what the United States might do, the potential analogy with Kuwait was not lost on the Balts.

To the Governments of the Countries of the World and Republics of the Soviet Union.

Events in the Baltic area are entering a tragic and decisive stage. Reactionary circles of the CPSU, with the support of the armed forces of the USSR, disregarding any rules or moral principles, are preparing for a bloody coup, the elimination of the existing constitutional order of the Baltic states. According to information at the disposal of the government of Latvia, such a coup in the Baltic area may be carried out in the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours. . . .

[8] Statement from the Supreme Council, the Republic of Latvia, January 14, 1991.

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At this threatening hour we appeal to all peoples and governments to prevent another Kuwait, to come out against a bloody international crime in the Baltic area. We ask all who hold dear common human values and the idea of humanity and democracy to act in a united front against reaction, and to support the right of the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to survival and the restoration of statehood by democratic means.

The American Response[9]

Such were the terms of the conflict within the Baltic states. The reaction of leading Western states to the crisis was, perhaps, less than the Baltics had hoped for. The European Parliament in Strasbourg spoke fairly decisively — perhaps because it does not represent a specific government against which Moscow could direct its ire — and threatened to suspend aid totaling $1.5 billion in food and technology.

On the other hand, London, Paris, Bonn, and Washington mainly spoke of "deep concern" and of "[following] the situation closely." As an explanation for this apparently restrained reaction, some observers point to the preoccupation of the United States and its partners with events in the Persian Gulf, and the need for Soviet diplomatic support there. Nevertheless, the following statement from Secretary of State James Baker III clearly reveals Washington's displeasure with Moscow's strategy in the Baltics.

President Bush has spoken with Mikhail Gorbachev about his concern on the Baltics. As you know, when I was in Milan, I expressed my concerns about Soviet actions as well. Moreover, I conveyed those concerns directly to minister Shevardnadze.

The events of the last twenty-four hours are deeply disturbing and make us even more concerned.

Let me make several points:

Firstly, the United States has never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. We support — and will continue to support — the aspirations of the Baltic peoples to determine their future.

Secondly, we have supported perestroika and glasnost and democratization in the Soviet Union because they have offered the best prospects for lasting improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relations and for a better, freer future for the Soviet peoples.

Thirdly, the use of force by Soviet government in the Baltics fundamentally and tragically contradicts the principles of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization. Perestroika is based on the rule of law, not rule by force.

Fourthly, we will continue to monitor the situation closely. Soviet interests above all else require the reform process to go forward. Only with continued reform will progress and hope for the Soviet Union be possible, and in the

[9] Statement by Secretary of State James Baker III, January 13, 1991.

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end, enduring U.S.-Soviet cooperation, indeed partnership, depends on continued reform — for partnership is impossible in the absence of shared values.

Fifthly, it is hard for me — and many of the colleagues I have been speaking to on this trip — to understand how force can be used, especially now, to suppress newly emerging democratic institutions.

Lastly, let me simply say that I am deeply disturbed and saddened by these developments. Peaceful dialogue, not force, is the only path to long-term legitimacy and stability.

The Nordic Response: Iceland[10]

As the following documents make clear, the boldest assistance for the Baltics came from the Nordic countries—Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—which had a more forceful policy toward the Soviets, both individually and jointly. At the end of February, the presidents of the Baltic republics were invited to attend the Assembly of the Nordic Council in Copenhagen. The Baltic states will have observer status in that body in 1992.

On February 11, Iceland's parliament voted (forty-three to one) to recognize Lithuania as an independent state, and instructed the government to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible. (Iceland's action came immediately after Lithuania's February 9 poll on independence, and prompted the Soviet Union to recall its ambassador from Reykjavik for "consultations.") The following document concerns a similar arrangement with Estonia.

At a meeting between Prime Minister Steingrimmur Hermannsson and Minister for Foreign Affairs Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson of Iceland and Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and Minister for Foreign Affairs Lennart Meri of Estonia, views were exchanged and information given on the status of the Baltic states' independence efforts.

The parties agreed that the matter must be seen as an international problem with its origins in the Second World War, and therefore [it is] appropriate to seek its solution in international forums.

Despite great changes in the European political scene in recent years, the matter of the Baltic states remains unsolved. Despite efforts made by the Baltic states over the past year, negotiations with the Soviet Union have not materialized. Therefore it is imperative to seek new ways in the effort to reach a realistic solution to the problems. The parties discussed the steps that would be involved in the independence process and agreed that international agreements and guarantees would be required.

On Iceland's part, full support for the independence struggle of the Baltic states was reiterated. Iceland will continue to pursue efforts in international forums to gain support for full independence of the Baltic states.

[10] Text of a communique issued by the prime minister of Iceland, Steingrimmur Hermannsson, and the prime minister of Estonia, Edgar Savasaar, February 21, 1991.

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Iceland further agrees to act as a mediator in negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic states. Estonia will consult Latvia and Lithuania on that question. It was agreed that the first step in such a mediation effort should be to invite representatives of the Baltic states to a meeting in Reykyavik in the month of March.

The parties also discussed means to strengthen cooperation between Estonia and Iceland. It was suggested that an Icelandic representative might be stationed in Tallin in order to establish a closer relationship with the Baltic states.

Reykjavik, February 21, 1991.

Steingrimmur Hermannsson	Edgar Savisaar
Prime Minister	Prime Minister
Iceland	Estonia

The Nordic Response: Denmark[11]

Denmark and Lithuania also agreed to resume diplomatic relations "when the situation makes it possible."

The foreign ministers of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Lithuania met on February 28, 199,1 in Copenhagen and agreed to continue and further strengthen their cooperation to mutual benefit on the basis of the following basic principles:

Denmark welcomed the fact that the people of Lithuania in the spring of 1990 had the opportunity to express themselves in free elections, which resulted in a democratically elected parliament and the subsequent formation of a legitimate government, which aims at creating a democratic society based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Lithuanian parliament decided on March 11, 1990 to reestablish the full national independence of the Republic of Lithuania, and this decision was confirmed by the plebiscite of February 9, 1991.

The parties expressed the hope that negotiations will soon be started between Lithuania and the Soviet Union with a view to solving the problems related to the reestablishment of full national independence in Lithuania.

Denmark will continue its efforts to gain support for the admission, or readmission, of Lithuania to full membership of relevant international organizations of which it wants to become a member. In this context, the Danish foreign minister reiterated Denmark's support for the desire of Lithuania to participate fully in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process.

The parties will seek to take full advantage of their agreement on the establishment of a joint contract group on economic, industrial, and technical

[11] Joint Protocol on Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Lithuania.

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cooperation, which was concluded in 1990. The first meeting of the contact group will be held in the near future. On that occasion the parties will examine a number of concrete projects for cooperation to their mutual benefit. . . .

When the situation makes it possible, Denmark and Lithuania will seek to reestablish diplomatic relations.

Copenhagen, February 28, 1991.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen	Algirdas Saudargas
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Denmark	of the Republic of Lithuania

Interview with Victors Alksnis[12]

After the worst of the Baltic crisis had passed, evidence came to light that Moscow had been planning a move against the Baltics since August 1990. Lieutenant Colonel Viktors Alksnis — a prominent leader among Soviet reactionaries, and one closely connected with OMON activities and the All-Latvian National Salvation Committee — charged that Gorbachev had initiated the Baltic action, but had hesitated to carry it through to its natural conclusion, thus betraying his loyalists in the Baltics.

Question: In a conversation with foreign correspondents you said that the National Salvation Committees in the Baltic Republics were established upon the initiative of the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, in order to establish presidential rule.

Alksnis: Yes, that is quite true. I spoke to the comrades from Lithuania's National Salvation Committee. They said: We did everything that Moscow demanded from us. Moscow promised that the second stage — declaration of presidential rule — it would achieve all by itself. But Moscow deserted us. We have been betrayed by the president, we have been betrayed by the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and RSFSR, by the government of the USSR, by Boris Yeltsin. . . .

Now, because of [Gorbachev's] indecisiveness, we are in a worse situation than before. We were drawn into this ill-considered adventure. I already knew a few days ago that this was the case. . . . I repeat, the president betrayed us. He is afraid to assume responsibility.

I am surprised by some political leaders in the Baltics who spoke with much conviction that everything was in order, that we shall win, that the center would support us, that it would give us help.

I had a talk with Alfreds Rubiks [leader of the National Salvation Front in Latvia]. He no longer has any hope in the president or in support from Moscow.

[12] Interview with Colonel Viktors Alksnis, *Argumenty i fakty*, January 1991.

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Lithuanian comrades are in utter despair. Why did we have to start all of this? Just think: A surgeon begins an operation, makes an incision in the sick body, then deserts it.

Conclusion

It seems likely that the political actions of the Baltic leaders and Boris Yeltsin, plus the outcry from the West (and even, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe) may have stayed Gorbachev's hand. We do not know for certain. But we do know that the stern resistance at home and abroad insured Gorbachev could employ military measures only at enormous cost to his government's standing. And we know that, ultimately, he edged away from the use of massive force, such as an imposition of presidential rule would have required.

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

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Correspondence

How Socialist Is Israel?

To the Editor:

A good number of Israeli economists, who enjoy international reputations, favor a stronger movement towards policies in Israel that espouse private enterprise, more conservative fiscal and monetary policies, and a reduction or elimination of various subsidies. Thus, most of the recommendations made by Bruce Bartlett in "The Crisis of Socialism in Israel" (Winter 1991) have long been held by economists at various academic institutes in Israel for at least the past twenty years or so.

What troubles me are not Bartlett's recommendations, but his analysis and strong proclivity towards exaggeration, if not worse.

As an economist, what interests me are changes over time. In fact, the Israeli economy has been moving towards free or freer enterprise, sharp reductions in subsidies, reduced budgetary deficits, far less inflation, etc., over the past several years. The following is by no means an exhaustive list of some of these developments, but it is illustrative.

The figures for inflation show a sharp deterioration since 1974 (40 percent), peaking at over 300 percent in 1984 and 1985. A radical improvement followed — 48 percent in 1986 and about 20 percent per annum in 1987-89. Figures for 1990 are not yet available, but I believe that inflation was still around 20 percent (the reference is to annual changes in the Consumer Price Index). Twenty percent inflation is not yet low enough, but is a vast improvement over earlier years. This improvement stems from smaller budgetary deficits, resulting in part from sharp cutbacks in subsidies and defense spending.

Bartlett says that most new immigrants from the USSR are living entirely on government handouts. This charge hits below the belt. Israel considers this assistance to be of vital importance in encouraging immigration, and for the most part, the record shows, with respect to all past immigrations, that the new immigrants find productive employment within a year or two after their arrival. These immigrants come to Israel penniless. Also, the United Jewish Appeal in the United States and in other countries provides a part of the aid to these immigrants.

The figures for foreign aid are often inaccurate or misleading. Bartlett lumps together U.S. grants and loans. During the latter 1970s and early 1980s,

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the loans were given at high rates of interest, and most of the foreign debt to the U.S. government today stems from that period. Interest payments alone to the U.S. government on past loans were almost one billion dollars per annum in 1984-88.

Furthermore, Bartlett states, "It is commonly estimated that Americans alone contribute $2 billion per year through the United Jewish Appeal, the United Israel Appeal, and other organizations." If the author had troubled himself to look into the Bank of Israel Annual Reports (which are both authoritative and detailed) he would have found the following (annual averages for 1985-89, in millions of dollars):

- Personal restitutions from Germany — $485 million (these restitutions are paid to individuals who were victims of the Nazi German government, regardless of their present residence. The above figure refers to receipts of those residing in Israel);
- Personal transfers of immigrants — $382 million; personal transfers of others (mainly Israelis who have worked abroad and returned and those receiving pensions from abroad) — $241 million;
- Private nonprofit institutions (Israeli universities, hospitals, and religious institutions soliciting funds abroad) — $294 million;
- The National Institutions (The United Jewish Appeal and other similar organizations) — $358 million.

The sum total is $1,760 million from all countries, not only from the United States. But lumping together personal funds with the "national institutions" is, to say the least, misleading.

Bartlett states, "As a result, it appears that Israel's economic growth has been hurt by foreign aid." During its first twenty-five years, Israel had an impressive economic growth rate. However, since 1973 — a date that coincides with a sharp increase in U.S. foreign aid — growth has stagnated." What absurdity. Has the sharp deterioration in Israel's international terms of trade (the two oil shocks) not been a major factor? Has the arms race fueled by massive Arab oil revenues not been a major factor? If socialism was the culprit, why twenty-five years of high economic growth rates until 1973? Was the second oil shock not a major factor? Israel's oil import bill rose exponentially from less than $100 million in 1972 to $2.1 billion per annum in the early 1980s, more than all U.S. government grants at that time.

I could go on. There is certainly room for criticism of Israel's economic policies, but the presentation made by the author is imbalanced and often in-

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accurate. Moreover, if large budgetary deficits are equated with socialism, then Presidents Reagan and Bush are the most socialistic presidents the United States has had in a long time.

Eliyahu Kanovsky
Yeshiva University

To the Editor:

In "The Crisis of Socialism in Israel" (Winter 1991), Bruce Bartlett makes an impassioned plea for withholding U.S. aid from Israel. His argument is that Israel is heading towards total economic ruin, resulting from forty years of perverse socialist economic policies made possible — if not indeed promoted — by massive U.S. aid.

Israel's economic problems are indeed formidable, and the pressing need for economic reforms is widely debated in Israel. But this debate will be little helped by Bartlett's biased presentation, his often erroneous use of "supporting" data and facts, and his apparent lack of understanding of Israel's economic structures, as well as of its history.

To support his case against the economic interventionism practiced in Israel and its results, Bartlett musters a highly selective collection of damaging evidence from different times in the past, implying that it is also valid in the present. Thus, a reference to the waste engendered by commodity subsidization is illustrated by an estimate (not really substantiated) published in 1954; and only a suspicious reader will notice that the statement following it, that "subsidized fuel . . . greatly increased Israel's dependence on imports," also refers to that period, and does not describe the present situation.

To demonstrate the Israeli government's dependence on inflationary financing, the share of the budget financed by money creation is cited for 1963. Similarly, the effects of inflation on marginal tax rates are shown (in table 5) for the decade 1964-1975. The impression is created that the underground economy grew from 7.8 percent to between 15 and 20 percent of GNP since 1972. But no mention is made that the two estimates were derived by different methodologies, and that the latter, higher estimate found the figures to be constant over time. (In a similar manner, one could also show the underground economy in the United States to have increased from 9.4 percent of GNP in 1948 to 27 percent, or even more, in 1979.)[1]

Claiming that the "Israeli budget is notoriously difficult to decipher," Bartlett asserts private transfers to Israel by Americans alone to be "commonly estimated" at $2 billion per year. But the easily accessible and interpretable Israeli balance of payments statistics reveal no single year before 1989 in which

[1] For the stability of the higher estimate for Israel, see Yaakov Kondor, "Haalamot Mas be'Israel, 1975-1983," Sappir Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 86.13 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1987). For the United States, see Bruno S. Frey and Werner W. Pommerehehne, "Measuring the Hidden Economy," in Vito Tanzi, ed., *The Hidden Economy in the United States and Abroad* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), tables 1-1 and 1-2.

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the total of all net private transfers has been so high. Subtracting personal restitutions from Germany and transfers by (mainly non-U.S.) immigrants, the remaining private transfers, by no means all of them from the United States, averaged less than $800 million per year in the last decade.[2]

Some of Bartlett's statements verge on intellectual dishonesty, or to put it charitably, suggest considerable ignorance of the economy he purports to analyze. Thus, to support his argument that Israel's defense needs did "not explain the expansion of government spending," Bartlett states that "military expenditures have declined steadily as a share of GNP since the 1973 war"; but the data in his own table show this share to have remained virtually unchanged in the six years spanning 1975-1980, amounting precisely to the same figure, 29.2 percent, during three of those years, and to 29.7 percent in the fourth!

An estimate of the excess burden of the income tax "at the margin" is interpreted by Bartlett to mean that "the tax system discouraged 45 cents worth of production for every dollar collected." That an economist with the U.S. Treasury is not aware of the difference between marginal and average is difficult to believe. For the record, the source cited by Bartlett quotes an average rate of excess burden almost half the marginal one, and the latter falls within the range of "preferred estimates" for the United States of between 31.8 percent and 46.9 percent.[3]

To prove his contention that "Israel's economic growth has been hurt by foreign aid," Bartlett insinuates a causal connection between the two, pointing out that "since 1973 — a date which coincides with a sharp increase in U.S. foreign aid — growth has stagnated." It so happens that 1973 coincided with the Yom Kippur war, and that the total U.S. aid granted in the war's wake was not enough to cover defense purchases abroad. So it could not have had much effect on the economy.[4] The slowdown in economic growth can be attributed to other (possibly more persistent) factors, and in fact has been in studies that Bartlett has presumably read, as he does refer to them on occasion, when it suits his purpose.[5] Or does he really expect us to believe that *post hoc* is a sufficient proof of *ergo propter hoc*? (Incidentally, as Bartlett rightly points

[2] The most accessible source of data on all private transfers, as well as on private restitutions from Germany, is Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various years, table VII-1. See also, Bank of Israel, *Annual Report 1984*, table VI-16, and *Annual Report 1989*, table I-13, which provide figures for transfers by immigrants.

[3] Estimates of both marginal and average excess burden rates in Israel, stemming from the same study by Shlomo Yitzhaki, appear in Eitan Berglas, "Taxes and Transfers in an Inflationary Decade," in Yoram Ben-Porath, ed., *The Israel Economy: Maturing Through Crises* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 25. For the United States, see Edgar K. Browning, "On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation," *American Economic Review*, March 1987, pp. 11-23, especially the discussion on p. 21.

[4] In the 1974-80 period, defense imports averaged $1.9 billion per annum, whereas U.S. grants (including grant components of loans) for both defense and civilian purposes averaged about 1.25 billion. Even adding the transfers by Jewish institutions, to the tune of $477 million per year, there was a shortfall. See Eitan Berglas, "Defense and the Economy," in Yoram Ben-Porath, ed., *The Israel Economy*, table 8-3, p. 183.

[5] See, for example, Jacob Metzer, "The Slowdown of Economic Growth: A Passing Phase or the End of the Big Spurt," in Yoram Ben-Porath, ed., *The Israel Economy*, pp. 75-100. (This volume is cited on at least three different occasions in Bartlett's paper.)

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out, "During its first twenty-five years, Israel had an impressive economic growth rate." Yet these years were the heyday of what he refers to as "socialist" practices in Israel. Should we conclude then that socialism fostered growth, and the later stagnation is the result of socialism being abandoned?)

The author's misuse of economics is matched only by his ignorance of Israel's institutes and history. The statement that "Under Turkish rule, the Jews of Palestine achieved a large measure of economic and political independence" has not the slightest factual basis, referring as it does to a community of, at its biggest, no more than eighty thousand souls.

Also, the author's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, the relation of the Israeli Labor Party to the (highly centralized) labor union organization, the Histadrut, is very much unlike that of the British Labor Party to the (highly decentralized) British union movement. The argument that this close tie made it "very difficult for the party to take a truly national view and do what is best for the country [rather than for the unions]" seems to reflect a preconception, rather than hard facts. The charge often levied at the Israeli Labor party has been, indeed, the opposite one, namely that it subjugated the interests of the workers to what it considered to be national goals, or to the profitability of Histadrut-owned enterprises. The 20 percent of GNP figure for the Histadrut, besides being outdated, overstates the real share of these enterprises by a factor of two. Half of this percentage originated in cooperatives and collectives nominally affiliated with the Histadrut, but for all practical purposes run as independent businesses.[6]

Bartlett also makes a number of purely factual errors, some minor, and some major. Milton Friedman was invited to Israel in 1977 to receive an honorary degree, and not, as Bartlett states, "to offer some economic advice" to the government. As for the results of the Israeli election of 1984, the Likud Party was not "thrown out, and the Labor party . . . reinstated" as Bartlett suggests. Rather, Shimon Peres became prime minister in that year as a result of a Likud-Labor coalition agreement, rotating the post between himself and Yitzak Shamir, with the Ministry of Finance retained by the Likud.

But what is perhaps most revealing of all is that immigration gets no mention in Bartlett's paper, except for "the heavily subsidized . . . immigration of Soviet Jews" being brought up as another, more recent example of the wasteful "policies unrelated to economics" resulting from Israel's "socialism." It seems Bartlett has missed, or else has chosen to ignore, what the country he is criticizing is all about.

The idea which led ultimately to Israel's establishment, indeed the very essence of Zionism, was of restoring the homeland to which Jews, dispersed and oppressed for centuries, could return and where they could redefine their national identity. Economic prosperity was a condition for the success of this

[6] The original benchmark estimate for 1959 is attributed to Haim Barkai, "The Public, Histadrut, and Private Sector in the Israeli Economy," *Sixth Report, 1961-1963* (Jerusalem: The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, April 1964), pp. 13-85. Later figures are mainly guesswork; see Yaakov Kondor, *Kalkalat Israel* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1984), p. 125.

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enterprise, but was not its primary aim. It so happened, however, that the country where Jewish national existence was to be reestablished was not, certainly at the time, attractive as an investment prospect. Hence a need existed for public and, in part, philanthropically motivated sources of finance — as well as for rules and frameworks to administer the funds provided by them. While this arrangement did indeed fit the socialist ideology of the Zionist Labor parties, it was also then accepted by the majority of the Zionist movement as the only practical means of carrying out its agenda.[7]

Later on, in Israel's early days, the mobilization of the capital required for the absorption of the mass immigration that doubled the population between 1948 and 1951, and the spatial distribution of settlement ensuring the territorial integrity of the state, could hardly have been achieved without intensive government intervention in the economy.

The economic system which ultimately evolved — to a great extent not out of ideology but in response to needs which markets failed to fulfill at the time — was not so much socialistic (certainly not in the East European or Soviet sense) as *dirigiste*. Some of this interventionist machinery has been gradually dismantled over the years. But as it offered considerable scope for the manipulation of the public through economic means for factional political ends, much of it was kept in place long after the original reasons for it ceased to exist. Significantly, the trend towards economic liberalization, which could have been expected to get a boost from the coming to power of the explicitly antisocialist Likud bloc in 1977, seems, on the contrary, to have been reversed since then.

The Israeli economy certainly needs a thorough reform. In particular, competition should be strengthened, capital markets should be set free of the Treasury's preemptive grip, and trade liberalization — gradually implemented in a steady process from the early 1950s until it virtually stopped in the 1980s — should be urgently pressed forward. (Is the absence of any mention of trade protectionism in Bartlett's list of Israel's sins owing to protectionism not being particularly "socialist," or not being easily ascribable to U.S. economic aid?)

But the basic fact remains that the absorption of immigration, which is Israel's raison d'etre, is not profitable on purely economic grounds, certainly not within the time horizon of private investors. In his only, very brief reference to immigration, Bartlett points out rightly that "there are not enough jobs or housing" for "the immigration of Soviet Jews estimated at 180,000 in 1990 alone." One wonders how quickly the proportionately equivalent number of 10 million immigrants would find jobs and housing in the United States. Bartlett's censorious remark, that because of this "most of these immigrants are living entirely on government handouts," implies that immigration should be discouraged until sufficient demand for labor is generated by a freely operating

[7] The reader interested in the problems and attitudes associated with early Jewish settlement in Palestine may wish to consult the reports and memoranda of Arthur Ruppin, the man charged by the Zionist Organization with furthering its aims in the country from 1908 onwards. See his *Three Decades of Palestine* (Jerusalem: Schocken Books, 1936).

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market. In view of the Jewish experience in this century, the wisdom of such advice is, to put it mildly, highly questionable.

Temporary bottlenecks aside, there arises the question of the large-scale provision of employment opportunities in a country so poor in natural resources. Because of the magnitude of the problem — with one million immigrants expected over a four-year period, the equivalent to an immigration of some 55 million people going to the United States — Israel is unable to deal with it effectively from its own resources. For this resettlement of immigrants, as well as to ensure its survival in hostile surroundings, Israel requires economic aid from the United States. However "sensible [and] market oriented [the] policies" Israel adopts, to imagine it attracting the capital needed for the former task is difficult. Nor will any amount of laissez faire in Israel protect it from a Saddam Husayn's Scud missiles.

Bartlett is perfectly entitled to feel, whether as a private individual or as an economist with the U.S. Treasury, that the United States should not be called upon to help Israel in these two tasks of absorbing immigration and of protecting itself against the animosity of some of its neighbors. But if this is his attitude, it would be more honest to say so openly, rather than under the guise of pretending to save Israel from itself.

Ephraim Kleiman and Nadav Halevi
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Author Responds

Eliyahu Kanovsky states that Israeli economists have long held free market views favoring private enterprise, the elimination of subsidies, and so forth. If this is true, then economists in Israel must be among the least influential on earth, for precious little evidence exists that the government has taken such advice.

While it is true that the inflation rate in Israel has come down from hyper-inflationary levels, the rate remains extremely high. In the first quarter of 1990, the Consumer Price Index rose at an annual rate of 12 percent, increasing to 21.2 percent in the second quarter and 23.3 percent in the third (latest data available).[8] In virtually every other area, economic policy is moving away from free markets. A recent report in *The Financial Times* summarizes the situation:

> A number of reforms proposed over the past year have either been watered down, delayed, or blocked. A package produced amid great fanfare last September by Mr. Moda'i, the finance minister, has never been implemented. Plans to break down rigidities in the labour markets were blocked by the Histadrut trade union federation and its political allies. Proposals to liberalize imports are not due to be brought in until September. . . . Privatization, a central plank of the reform plans, has also proceeded slowly, with the only significant sell-off in a large state enterprise being the floatation last September of a small stake in Bezak, the telecommunications monopoly.[9]

[8] Bank of Israel, *Recent Economic Developments*, December 1990.
[9] *The Financial Times*, April 9, 1991.

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Further details on Israel's failure to follow through on even its most modest reform efforts can be found in numerous reports from the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem, such as its annual *Scorecard on the Israeli Economy.*

Kanovsky also objects to my characterization of Soviet immigrants as living on government handouts. I should have made it clear that the problem is not so much with subsidies per se, although few other countries grant subsidies to immigrants, but rather with Israeli government policies that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the immigrants to get jobs or housing. As *The New York Times* recently reported:

> Many of the immigrants' problems are caused by weaknesses in the Israeli economy. Economists and immigration experts say the Government has for years ignored warnings that it should make major changes in the nation's socialist economy. As a result, they say, business and industry are not capable of the level of growth needed to create jobs and housing for the 220,000 Soviet immigrants who have already arrived, not to mention the one million others expected in the next two or three years.[10]

Kanovsky disputes my statement about American Jews contributing $2 billion per year to keep Israel afloat. While it is true that the official data do not show a number this high, the $2 billion figure is indeed commonly used.[11] According to the International Monetary Fund's balance of payment statistics, private unrequited transfers to Israel amounted to $1.566 billion in 1989. Considering the generally poor quality of such data (the IMF lists "errors and omissions" in the Israeli data of $1.2 billion in 1989), it is not unreasonable to think that if unrecorded transfers are included, then the $2 billion figure may be close to the mark.

In any event, the point is simply that in addition to official foreign aid, Israel received significant amounts of private foreign aid which has the same effect of helping to bail the economy out of its self-imposed morass.

Lastly, Kanovsky disputes my contention that a relationship exists between the increase in aid since 1973 and the deterioration of the Israeli economy since that time. While this is obviously a difficult proposition to prove, recent research by Moshe Syrquin of Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv supports this view. In a recent paper on the effect of U.S. aid upon the Israeli economy, Syrquin concluded that while aid may not have caused Israel's problems, it did contribute to them by softening the blows, permitting inefficiencies to go on and reforms to be postponed, eventually generating additional aid requirements.[12]

Kleiman and Halevi repeat many of the same concerns as Kanovsky. For the most part, their objections amount to nit-picks. For example, they attack

[10] *The New York Times*, March 9, 1991.

[11] See the *Boston Globe Magazine*, April 29, 1984, and *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1986.

[12] Moshe Syrquin, "U.S. Aid and the Structure of the Economy," in *U.S. Aid to Israel: Issues in Israel's Economic, Foreign and Defense Policies* (Tel Aviv: Israeli International Institute for Applied Economic Policy, 1990), p. 34.

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my statement that Israeli defense spending fell steadily since 1973 by pointing to a few years in the late 1970s when it did not. This is silly, since there obviously is a clear downward trend. According to a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's report, Israeli military expenditures as a share of GNP have fallen from 24.7 percent in 1984, to 20.5 percent in 1985, 17.7 percent in 1986, 14.7 percent in 1987, to 13.8 percent in 1988 (latest year included).[13]

Similarly, they cite imprecisions in my use of language that may score college debating points, but do not in any way undermine the thrust of the argument. Most important to me is their implication that my motives are insincere. They imply that my goal is to cut off aid to Israel, perhaps with the intention of weakening Israel's defenses. They say that I am dishonest in stating that my concern is to save Israel from itself.

Such accusations are slanderous and unworthy of scholarly debate. Unfortunately, these statements reflect a certain mind-set that is common whenever any non-Jew criticizes Israel's policies. Defenders of the status quo invariably invoke thinly veiled accusations of anti-Semitism rather than address the substance of the argument. In part, they do so because the government's policies are indefensible. Yet rather than channel their energies into reform, people such as Kleiman and Halevi would rather kill the messenger. This does a grave disservice to those, such as myself, who consider themselves friends of Israel, but who disagree with many of its policies.

For the record, I do not favor a cut-off of aid to Israel. What I would like to see is a joint effort on the part of the United States and Israel to attach meaningful conditionality to such aid, such as that used by the World Bank and the IMF. Such conditionality would make aid contingent upon deregulation, privatization, the reduction of subsidies, and other market-oriented measures. Adoption of such policies would greatly strengthen the Israeli economy, thus making the country less dependent upon such aid.

Unfortunately, efforts to impose conditionality have been defeated by those claiming to be Israel's friends. In my view, this is the equivalent of giving liquor to an alcoholic in the name of friendship. A true friend of Israel would try to help the country overcome its addiction to socialism, rather than attack those who do try to help.

Bruce Bartlett
U.S. Department of the Treasury

[13] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 51.

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

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

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

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Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

Irredentism and International Politics. Naomi Chazan, ed.

Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis. Deon Geldenhuys.

Narcoterrorism. Rachel Ehrenfeld.

Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Richard Elliot Benedick.

Peacekeeping in International Politics. Alan James.

WAR STUDIES

Casey: From the OSS to the CIA. Jospeh E. Persico.

Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Donald Mackenzie.

Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Janne E. Nolan.

War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance and the Battle of the Euromissiles. Jeffrey Herf.

The World Fact Book 1990.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Agents of Influence. Pat Choate.

Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System. Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick, eds.

The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third World. John Powelson and Richard Stock.

Powernomics: Economics and Strategy after the Cold War. Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds.

U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s. John Heinz.

THE UNITED STATES

At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. George C. Edwards III.

Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of The New York Times' Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy. Nicholas O. Berry.

George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment. David L. Di Leo.

Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961. H. W. Brands.

The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945. Holly Cowan Shulman.

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

A Biographical Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials. Alexander Rahr.

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Dubcek. William Shawcross.

Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Be Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw. Ralf Dahrendorf.

The Russian Revolution. Richard Pipes.

Le 7e Secretaire: Splendeur et misere de Mikhail Gorbachev. Michel Heller.

Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941. Robert C. Tucker.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Culture, History & Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89. Amatzia Baram.

A History of the Arab Peoples. Albert Hourani.

Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der islamischen Weltliga. Reinhard Schulze.

The Middle East Military Balance, 1989-90. Joseph Alpher, ed.

The Monument: Art, Vulgarity, and Responsibility in Iraq. Samir al-Khalil.

The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. Jacob M. Landau.

War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security. Efraim Inbar.

AFRICA

The ANC and Its Leaders. Willie Esterhuyse and Philip Nel, ed.

Hope for South Africa? L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan.

They Live by Sword: 32 "Buffalo" Battalion — South Africa's Foreign Legion. Jan Breytenbach.

The War for Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent. Fred Bridgland.

War in Angola: The Final South African Phase. Helmoed-Romer Heitman.

EAST ASIA

Almost a Revolution. Shen Tong, with Marianne Yen.

Bringing Down the Great Wall. Fang Lizhi.

The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation. Gil Rozman, ed.

A Higher Kind of Loyalty. Liu Binyan.

Voices from the Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Cultural Revolution. Feng Jicai.

LATIN AMERICA

Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict. William F. Sater.

Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall.

The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader. Courtney E. Prisk, ed.

The Democratic Revolution in Latin America. Howard J. Wiarda.

Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism. Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano.

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WORLD POLITICS
By Adam Garfinkle

Irredentism and International Politics. Edited by Naomi Chazan. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reiner, 1991. 160 pp. $26.50.

Chazan presents ten tightly written, well-reasoned essays on an important subject that is not often studied comparatively — irredentism. Irredentism is defined here as any political effort to unite within a common political framework segments of a population that is ethnically, historically, or geographically related but residing in adjacent countries. Clearly, it is a major force in contemporary international politics from Assam to Zagreb. It touches on subjects like separatism and nationalism, especially in the Third World, which seems to be reverting to pre-colonial patterns. Obviously, no book of 160 pages can do justice to the topic, but this collection of essays provides a good beginning.

Four essays, including two short ones by the editor, are theoretical, one is thematic (taking up the role of language as an aid and a barrier to irredentism), and five are case studies (Alsace, boundary adjustments in pre-World War I Europe, Germany since 1945, Turkey, and post-independence Africa). Perhaps the most tantalizing argument in the book is that of Hedva Ben-Israel, who suggsts that the key aspect of irredentism is not demographic but symbolic. It's not how many of which people happen to be in a certain place that matters, but the conviction that a certain piece of ground either is or is not part of a national heritage.

Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis. By Deon Geldenhuys. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 764 pp. $79.50.

Geldenhuys looks at the phenomenon of the pariah state, concentrating on the Republic of China on Taiwan, Israel, Chile under Augusto Pinochet, and South Africa. *Isolated States* has sections on four types of isolation: political and diplomatic, economic, military, and sociocultural. The author hopes to discern what ostracized states have in common by collecting a vast array of data; but he fails because information is not by itself knowledge any more than thread by itself is clothing. If you want to know the frequency of state visits to and from Israel over a certain period compared with the same to and from Chile, this is the place to look.

But if you want a comparative political sociology of how state institutions adapt under the stress of isolation, or a systematic comparison of the motives for isolating states, you will search *Isolated States* in vain. Worse, the author suggests (in discussing issues for further research) a project to attach specific numerical weights to each data indicator, and to devise formulas for comparative scores of ostracization — all this in preparation for a really thorough statistical analysis of the subject!

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Narcoterrorism. By Rachel Ehrenfeld. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 225 pp. $19.95 (paper).

There can be little doubt that unholy alliances exist in some parts of the world between the drug trade and Marxism-Leninism. The North Korean government has been involved in drug-smuggling activities; drug money plays a vital role in sustaining so-called political groups (some Marxist-Leninist, some conservative) in the Golden Triangle region of southeast Asia; and Peru's hard-core Maoist Shining Parth is financed almost entirely from taxes on coca leaf production.

Odd, then, that Ehrenfeld barely mentions these instances, even though they support her case that a partnership exists between international drug-trafficking organizations and Marxist-Leninists (both groups and states) that use terrorist tactics to subvert democratic governments. Instead, her chapters on Bulgaria, Cuba, Lebanon, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia offer arguments that range from the misconceived to the outrageously wrong. (A concluding chapter, on the impact of drugs on U.S. society, has little to do with the rest of the book.) Among the misconceived notions is her implication that terrorists are an important part of the drug business. Among the outrageous statements is her contention that "the narcotics industry could not flourish as it has without one critical factor, and that is the drug traffickers' alliance with the guerillas of Colombia." In fact, the traffickers finance private armies that attack the guerillas. To be sure, the activities of both traffickers and guerillas weaken the Colombian state and the rule of law, but that does not mean that the two groups cooperate. P.C.

Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. By Richard Elliot Benedick. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. 300 pp. $27.95 ($10.95, paper).

Discovery of a wintertime "hole" in the stratospheric ozone layer over Antarctica gave Leftists, planners, and technophobes a springboard from which to launch the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. This treaty requires its signers to ban an entire class of chemical substances crucial to refrigeration, fire suppression, plastic foam manufacturing, and microchip production. *Ozone Diplomacy* argues that the ban "saved life on earth from possible destruction — the first time that the international community faced such a global threat" and acted in concert to halt it. A more accurate lesson of Benedick's book, however, would be that international treaty and protocol processes can be used to circumvent ordinary American legislative procedures and safeguards. By internationalizing economic and social legislation, anonymous environmentalist *dirigistes* can get anticapitalist schemes endorsed by a far-off conference, skip completely over the fractious House of Representatives, and then go hunting for fifty-one (or perhaps fewer) senators who will sign on against some media-hyped "environmental catastrophe."

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Clearly, environmentalists have grasped the significance of this "new direction"; they are racing to create a world climate treaty, patterned after the Montreal Protocol, that would use the questionable science of global warming to reduce the United States to the status of a second-rate power. Ordinary Americans should likewise grasp the import of this new direction in environmentalism, and ensure that treaty-making powers are not used to take away their control over social, economic, and personal decisions. R.J. Smith

Peacekeeping in International Politics. By Alan James. New York: St. Martins Press, 1991. 378 pp. $59.95 ($24.95, paper).

Peacekeeping in International Politics is a useful but unsatisfying tour of international peace keeping. James rightly recognizes that peace keeping works only when states wish it to work, that it is not a United Nations monopoly (think of the U.S. troops in the Sinai Peninsula), and it has little bearing on keeping real peace. Yet, having put forth a brief but clear and commonsensical typology of peace keeping, the rest of the volume consists of narrative capsules describing fifty-seven peace keeping operations over the last sixty years. These snippits are too short and the conclusion too scant to provide significant lessons. Better would have been to describe fewer cases at greater length and to analyze them in greater depth.

James divides his fifty-seven episodes into five categories: "backyard" efforts handled by the regional hegemon, as for example when the United States sent Marines to separate belligerents in Santo Domingo in 1965; "club" efforts handled by the international powers, such as the international regime for the Saar between 1920 and 1935; "neighborhood quarrels," efforts handled by several neighbors, as with the attempt to manage attacks against civilians in the Iran-Iraq war; "high-street embarrassments" handled only with difficulty, exemplified by the way the French exited Southeast Asia through an international conference in 1954; and dangerous crossroads usually not handled well at all, like the so-called Arab Deterrent Force for Lebanon in the middle 1970s. One can quibble with some of James's facts and with categorizations, but the real disappointment here is the sheer lack of analysis. The book's conclusions take up only eight out of 370 pages of text — and those pages seem more a set of equivocations in lieu of conclusions — making this a better reference book than a study.

WAR STUDIES
By Bruce Berkowitz

Casey: From the OSS to the CIA. By Jospeh E. Persico. New York: Viking, 1990. 601 pp. $24.95.

William Casey, who served six years as Director of Central Intelligence (from January 1981 until a few months before his death in May 1987), was the

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most controversial individual yet to hold that position. By turns brilliant and notorious, both sides of his personalaity are captured by Persico in this excellent biography.

Although the book lacks the trappings of formal footnotes and references, the depth of Persico's research is evident. He had access to Casey's personal papers, interviewed Casey several times prior to his death, and also interviewed most of Casey's family, friends, allies, and enemies. The result is a complex picture of a complex man: gruff and at times uncouth — yet a voracious reader of books, apparently knowlegeable on all subjects; deeply Catholic and devoted to his wife and daughter — yet displaying a streak of ruthlessness and a willingness to play any game to the limit of its rules.

Persico makes clear that he did not share Casey's politics, especially what he considers Casey's willingness to override constitutional principles for the sake of expediency. But he is scrupulously fair in giving Casey credit where it is due, and he genuinely admires his subject's achievements. By intertwining Persico's own conflicting views, this well-written book provides the perfect epitaph to Casey himself.

Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. By Donald Mackenzie. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. 464 pp. $29.95.

What makes this book "a historical sociology" is hard to fathom, but in any case, Mackenzie has written an excellent technical history of inertial guidance systems. These systems — essentially advanced gyroscopes — enable ballistic missiles to hit a target just a few hundred yards in diameter halfway around the world. Such accuracy, in turn, is at the heart of arguments over the stability of nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons policy, and arms control.

Mackenzie begins with the theoretical disputes over the very feasibility of inertial guidance (some thought the theory of relativity made such systems impossible) and the subsequent developments that transformed a theoretical puzzle into an engineering task. He neatly links specific weapon programs, political debates, and engineering breakthroughs.

The author's main argument is that technological development is not inevitable, but is driven by man, and thus can be controlled. He never proves this last point, but *Inventing Accuracy* is nevertheless impeccably researched and written.

Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Janne E. Nolan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991. 209 pp. $29.95 ($10.95, paper).

Several studies of missile proliferation have appeared lately; Nolan's is likely the most comprehensive. She addresses all aspects of the issue: the technology, the current state of proliferation, the military significance of missiles, and previous attempts to control proliferation. She also takes up the very knotty issue of U.S. interests; for example, balancing the pros of Saudi support

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for U.S. policy in the Middle East against the cons of watching Saudi Arabia stock up on missiles from China.

Nolan views missile proliferation as an example of military "technology diffusion" — proliferation driven not only by arms exports, but also by the industrial development of the Third World. Such diffusion is hard to prevent because the technology necessary for building missiles has too many non-military uses. In addition, so many countries already have missiles that a technology cartel would likely fail. Thus, she favors arms control, but warns it is likely to be of limited use. Instead, she maintains, the only solution is to address Third World conflicts directly. True enough, but hardly encouraging.

War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance and the Battle of the Euromissiles. By Jeffrey Herf. New York: The Free Press, 1991. 369 pp. $27.95.

Herf argues in this fine work that the struggle over the NATO deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Germany to counter Soviet SS-20s between 1979 and 1983 was a crucial turning point — indeed the last great diplomatic act — of the cold war. Before the decision to prevent Moscow from overturning the military balance in peacetime, Soviet policy was aggressive and successful; afterwards, the tide turned. Not only is Herf right, but he focusses on the key element that allowed the deployment to take place: the strength of liberal democracy in Europe, and particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany.

War by Other Means charts the Soviet campaign to play to European publics, and tells the tale of U.S. policy as well. But the narrative is most interested in West German political culture, and here, Herf admits, Bonn's doing the right thing was by no means a foregone conclusion. He examines carefully the seeds of neutralism, the pervasive peace research mentality of the German intelligentsia, and the penetration of that mentality into the Social Democratic party. He also shows why, ultimately, this influence failed to deflect Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl from doing what needed to be done.

Herf's study not only allows us to look back on this crucial period, but suggests that a united Germany in the post-cold war epoch is still a fragile container. Although he does not dwell on it, Herf is led by his understanding of German political culture to argue for continued U.S. engagement in Europe and especially with the Federal Republic, fearing that a neutral Germany (whether strong or weak) will pose a hazard to European security in the long run. Right again. A.G.

The World Fact Book 1990. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 382 pp. $23.00 (paper).

One of the better examples of your tax dollars at work, this year's edition of the *Fact Book* follows the same basic territory-by-territory format as previous editions, and offers a tremendous amount of data in a small volume and at

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a reasonable price. The book includes entries for all existing countries, with each entry containing sections on the country's geography (plus a small black-and-white map), population, government, economy, communications and transportation, and defense forces. An interesting, though disturbing, new item in the "economy" section is the information in this year's edition on illegal drugs.

The *Fact Book* also includes entries for entities other than countries, such as trust territories, disputed areas, and a few uninhabited islands. The last section offers tables on international organizations and weights and measures, and a set of fold-out color maps for the world's regions.

The introduction states that the *Fact Book* is prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and is designed for use by government officials, but it is a nearly indespensible addition to any reference library. One complaint, however: the cut-off date of the book's information should be made clear. The effects of the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait are not reflected in the contents.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
By Patrick Clawson

Agents of Influence. By Pat Choate. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. 295 pp. $22.95.

Japanese lobbying in the United States has been successful at several levels: influencing federal policy, winning the favor of local and state politicians, giving pro-Japan thinkers the wherewithal to carry out their studies and publicize their views. While angry at the role of Japanese lobbyists in influencing U.S. policy, Choate directs his ire at the American system that allows foreign interests to assume such a role in domestic politics. Within that context, he congratulates Japanese lobbyists for their success in adapting to local customs, and does not accuse them of being uniquely evil for exploiting the American political system; quite the contrary, he sees them as simply the most successful of many foreign agents who take advantage of the U.S. system of pressure group politics.

Choate's thesis rests on the dubious assumption that Japan's government and all Japanese firms aim for the same ends, if not actually coordinating their actions. He overlooks significant differences among them. For example, Honda (which is fully committed to U.S. production) and Nissan (which is not) have different interests and policies. Further, Choate's account of Japanese successes would be more convincing if he also discussed Japanese failures as well. How, for example, does he explain the recent pressure on Tokyo to contribute billions for the Persian Gulf forces? Japanese lobbying is clearly not the only influence on U.S. policy toward Japan.

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Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System. Edited by Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990. 268 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Aggressive Unilateralism is a strong collection of essays examining U.S. retaliation against foreign trade barriers. In one thought-provoking essay, Robert Hudec analyzes the relationship between U.S. law and the free-trade-promoting General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT); he recognizes that GATT procedures are so lax that disobedience can sometimes be justified as the best way to force compliance with the underlying GATT rules, although he doubts that the controversial Section 301 trade retaliation provisions pass this test. Reaction in other countries to Section 301 — which ranges from concern to outrage — is analyzed by Makoto Kuroda (Japan), Chulsu Kim (Korea), Marcilio Marques Moreira (Brazil), and Corrado Pirzio-Biroli (Europe).

Bhagwati, in the most important essay of the collection, shows that Section 301 is a twofold break from previous trade measures: it demands unilateral concessions from other nations, and it aims to promote U.S. exports rather than restrict imports. He opposes Section 301 as incompatible with a system based on the rule of law and "symmetry of rights and obligations," but his argument will be unpersuasive to those who question the enforcibility of international laws.

The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third World. By John Powelson and Richard Stock. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1990. 401 pp. $20.00 (paper).

Farmers in many Third World countries are worse off now than they were two decades ago. The state has skimmed off resources from them to use for wasteful projects, subsidization of urban consumption, or blatantly corrupt purposes. Furthermore, the imposition of state-sponsored programs upon rural villages prevents local institutions from evolving in line with what farmers want. Powelson and Stock provide well-written studies of land reform in seven countries in Asia (the Philippines, Iran, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, India's Kerala State), five in Latin America (Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador), and four in Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania, Somalia), based on thorough research in the secondary literature. The evidence is allowed to speak for itself, despite the libertarian stance of the publisher; the accounts should be useful to anyone interested in land reform, irrespective of political leanings.

Powelson and Stock demonstrate that well-intentioned elites of the industrialized world bolster anti-peasant policies. For example, they show that the U.S. government has supported land reforms aimed at keeping the countryside free of communist guerillas; farmers' prosperity has not been a priority. The authors suggest that outsiders can help by reinforcing the ability of farmers to make their own decisions, not by assisting their incorporation into outsiders' economic institutions.

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The trouble is that the interests of farmers are not always those of society. The successful cases of agricultural growth in this sample are Taiwan and South Korea — countries where farmers have exacted a high price from consumers by demanding protection. Perhaps free markets are not best for farmers in some situations; but they are best for society.

Powernomics: Economics and Strategy after the Cold War. Edited by Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald Morse, and Alan Tonelson. Washington, D.C.: Economic Strategy Institute, 1991. 392 pp. $16.95 (paper).

Prestowitz, best known for his work on U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts, is the guiding spirit behind this collection of forty short essays whose overarching theme is that active government intervention in the economy better advances U.S. economic power than market forces and free trade.

As for the evidence: there is a kernel of truth to the thesis of Part One that the U.S. economy did not do as well in the 1980s as is commonly thought, but the claim of "especially drastic deterioration" is unsupported by evidence. Further, the world economic climate was difficult in the 1980s; and the United States did spectacularly well compared to that quarter of the world's population that lives in Latin America, Africa, and the ex-Soviet bloc, whose per capita income fell more than 10 percent in the 1980s.

The middle five parts of this collection argue for activist government intervention in the economy, which is said to be in line with U.S. traditions and with the practice of other nations. Specific proposals, however, neglect pro-growth ideas that might elicit a broad consensus, from neo-libertarian to neo-welfare-statist: promoting human capital formation (for example, through better schooling) and cutting the government deficit so as to free more capital for productive investment. Indeed, the single theme in this collection that could draw broad support is the need for more investment in infrastructure.

The editors use the seventh part to complain that "our elite foreign policy establishment has long put fighting communism over cultivating economic power." True: while Americans defended world freedom, their economy did not perform as well as Western Europe's or Japan's. But wasn't it worth the price?

U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s. By John Heinz. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 170 pp. $21.95.

The government spends $48 million annually on monitoring about 1,500 sensitive export license applications, but the cost of inefficiencies in regulating strategic trade is much higher; delays caused by bureaucratic backbiting are a significant cause of sales lost to U.S. firms, while sniping in Washington impedes effective enforcement of export controls. The late Senator Heinz (Republican of Pennsylvania) has written the best account to date of the mess that makes up U.S. government control over sensitive exports. The two-page summary of the first chapter, for example, provides a depressing list of expensive inefficiencies resulting from petty turf battles.

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Although not exactly exciting, Heinz's analysis of the export control issues for the 1990s is comprehensive and more than competent. He demonstrates that trade in sensitive items with Eastern bloc nations is economically marginal, and he does not fall into the standard American trap of regarding China as somehow deserving of uniquely favorable treatment. But Heinz does not discuss the wider global economic context in which some of the most worrisome technologies (such as missiles and weapons of mass destruction) are coming within the range of industries in countries that have no experience with export controls.

Heinz proposes some useful steps to address these problems. Some of his initiatives — such as the proposed Office of Strategic Trade and Technology — need more refinement, but his problem-solving approach is a welcome change from analysis divorced from policy.

THE UNITED STATES
By Kevin J. McNamara

At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. By George C. Edwards III. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1989. 233 pp. $27.50.

Presidential influence over Congress is marginal, Edwards contends, but a president's greatest potential for leadership of the legislative branch has been in the foreign policy realm. Yet this finding is based almost solely on congressional votes during the Eisenhower administration, when, according to the author, liberals in Congress supported Eisenhower's "internationalist" and, in the terms of the times, "liberal" foreign policy.

"The principal underpinnings of presidential leadership of Congress," Edwards notes, are popular support and congressional leaders of the president's own party. Because party affiliation is relatively stable and turnover of congressional leaders infrequent, influencing public support is key to influencing Congress. Yet even here, Edwards argues, a president's influence is measured in the margins and depends on the public's predisposition to support a president, its level of interest for the issue at hand, and the president's approval rating, speaking ability, and decisiveness. All of these can limit a president's ability to influence opinion. The public tends to defer more to presidents on foreign policy, however; Edwards cites presidential influence on opinion about nuclear weapons testing, relations with Peking, and conduct of the Vietnam War.

Edwards uses quantitative efforts to measure presidential influence, and these may mislead. It could very well be more difficult for the White House to influence one congressman than fifty and, if successful, could be evidence of greater presidential influence. It could also be of greater consequence: conscription was approved by Congress in 1940 by one vote, and the consent of a mere three senators provided the 52-47 vote that authorized President Bush to

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wage war in the Middle East in 1991. A president's slim margin of influence provides the playing field on which administrations succeed or fail.

Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of *The New York Times'* Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy. By Nicholas O. Berry. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990. 184 pp. $39.95.

Berry claims, in this useful study, that those who criticize the press for being too hard on the executive branch are wrong; and so are those others who say it is too easy on presidents. On the basis of *New York Times* reports on five U.S. foreign policy failures (the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, the Cambodian incursion, the Iran hostage crisis, and the 1982-84 debacle in Lebanon), he shows that, although the *Times* eventually reported these as failures, news reports did not question administration assumptions until obvious setbacks occurred. Berry concludes that the press is neither overly critical, nor too subservient. To explain the media's early support, he cites the initial lack of interest in the cases cited (as compared to a trade dispute, for example) and the initial unity of policy makers.

Berry's analysis contains serious flaws. He overlooks, for example, the more subtle power of the press to set an agenda by choosing what to report, emphasize, or ignore. Castro was forewarned of the Bay of Pigs invasion because the *Times* (and other publications) decided to announce it beforehand. Berry concedes "the uprising was crippled before the landings commenced," but then pursues the ludicrous argument that the text of the advance story was "strongly consistent with Kennedy's assumptions," and thus supported U.S. policy.

George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment. By David L. Di Leo. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 265 pp. $37.50 ($12.95, paper).

Di Leo has written a political hagiography, as even the dust jacket (which declares George Ball to be "generally recognized as one of the most original and insightful strategists of the past quarter century") makes clear. Conversely, while carefully drawing the complex relationship between Johnson and Ball between 1963 and 1965, he hates Lyndon Johnson and assumes that, because the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy was so wrong, those who opposed it, like Ball, must have been right.

Of course, Di Leo's assumption is logically false. Johnson and Ball were both wrong, the former for choosing the wrong strategy and the latter for trivializing the stakes. Take one small example: Di Leo lauds Ball for arguing in late 1964 (and repeating over the next half dozen years) that bombing North Vietnam would be militarily ineffective and counterproductive because it would raise North Vietnamese troop morale. That may have been plausible at the time, but the North Vietnamese have since admitted that the bombing *was* militarily effective and did sap their troops' morale. It did not win the war,

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however, because the strategy of which the bombing was a part was fatally flawed.

Despite the uncritical view of Ball the politician, Di Leo portrays George Ball the individual with reasonable accuracy: intelligent and diversely skilled, but also stubborn, egocentric, and a notorious leaker to the press. In addition, Di Leo's interviews with Ball and his use of documents heretofore unavailable — such as internal memos and transcriptions of telephone conversations — make the book something of a historical source. A.G.

Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961. By H. W. Brands. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 337 pp. $27.95.

Inside the Cold War argues that Loy Henderson, a long-time State Department official and U.S. ambassador to India and Iran, typified and promoted the near-mindless and neurotic anticommunism that built a vast "U.S. empire" during the cold war. Brands analyzes Henderson's many roles — from implementing the Truman Doctrine to opposing a Jewish state — in these terms. But the argument fails in two ways: Brands exaggerates Henderson's importance and the uniqueness of his fervent anticommunism, and he exaggerates the significance of Henderson's anticommunism on his views about issues outside Europe.

Henderson was doubtlessly anticommunist more strongly and sooner than most of his colleagues because he witnessed the horrors of Stalinist collectivization at first hand. But if he had not, for example, helped formulate the Truman Doctrine in 1947, someone else would have. The Soviet threat was real, was widely recognized, and the response to it was, for the most part, consensual. Since Brands cannot accept the basic soundness of postwar U.S. policy, he must invent something on the order of a conspiracy theory to explain it. Moreover, Henderson's famous opposition to a Jewish state in 1947-48 was not just a function of anticommunism — it was the easiest way to justify his view that a Jewish state would harm American interests in the Arab world. In this case Brands's attempt to analyze Henderson through the prism of America's cold war foreign policy is like trying to weigh something in inches; it just doesn't work.

It's not clear that the world needs a full-length biography of Loy Henderson. But if it does, a good one remains to be written; Brands has given us a one-dimensional book for a three-dimensional world. A.G.

The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945. By Holly Cowan Shulman. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 282 pp. $37.50.

International radio broadcasting became an accepted instrument of state policy as early as the 1920s. The United States government entered the studios reluctantly, and then only in moments of crisis, creating the Voice of

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America (VOA) as a weapon during the Second World War, and launching Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty during the cold war. Shulman chronicles America's discovery of its first radio "Voice." Her father, Louis G. Cowan, was an official of the Office of War Information which supervised the VOA throughout World War II. Thus her entrée to early VOA alumni, such as the late John Houseman who, with Orson Welles, produced the renowned radio drama, *War of the Worlds*. At VOA, Houseman similarly packaged news as drama.

When VOA went on the air to Europe in February 1942, the United States had no army in the field. Shulman describes how radio helped fill the vacuum. As the military effort began to overshadow all else, VOA shifted to hard news — a shift more acceptable at home, especially in the Congress, with its intense suspicion of propaganda agencies. VOA staff soon realized that their work was most effective when it was based on evidence, leading to the "propaganda of facts" notion which later became crucial in the success of Western broadcasting to communist societies.

Today, VOA is heard by some 130 million people around the world. Yet a law designed to protect Americans from U.S. government propaganda prevents it from being heard domestically (unless you have a short wave radio.) Shulman thus sheds light on an instrument of international influence that often goes unappreciated at home.

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
By Vladimir Tismaneanu

A Biographical Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials. Compiled by Alexander Rahr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. 210 pp. $42.85.

Students of Soviet affairs have a critical need for objective information and, traditionally, no information has been more difficult to obtain than that concerning the lives of Soviet officials. In his directory to one hundred Soviet leaders, Rahr (the Kremlinologist at Radio Liberty) exploits glasnost to assemble more details about the careers of Soviet officials than ever before. Take Boris Gromov, the former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, as an example: the directory informs us that he served in the North Caucasian Military District in the 1970s when Gorbachev was the Stavropol party leader (and thus a member of the military council of that district); that Gromov is personally credited with lifting the seige of the city of Khost in Afghanistan after three months of rebel blockade; and that his wife died in 1985 in a plane crash. Or, that Alexander Yakovlev, an architect of glasnost and a defender of the liberal press, at one time wrote books on Marxist-Leninist ideology; and that relatives of Yegor Ligachev, the former leader of the conservative faction in the Soviet politburo, were arrested under Stalin.

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Many officials checked over their entries in the directory and sent along recent photographs; some also praised its objectivity. KGB leaders were among the most cooperative. But the directory does tend to take the Soviet officials on their own terms. Thus, Filipp Bobkov, the first deputy chairman of the KGB is described as having written about "Western anti-Soviet propaganda and imperialist subversion." David Satter

Dubcek. By William Shawcross. Revised and updated. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 244 pp. $10.95 (paper).

First published in 1971, as the biography of the then-outcast communist reformer, Shawcross's book has now been updated to include a happy ending. After years of political marginalization, after having been indicted by his former colleagues for "right-wing opportunism," the man who symbolized the Prague Spring from January to August 1968 is again a public figure in his homeland: chairman of his country's parliament.

But was Dubcek's "socialism with a human face" in any way responsible for Czechoslovakia's "velvet revolution" of 1989? The answer is no, and Shawcross convincingly shows why Dubcek and Dubcekism belong to an exhausted vein of Czech and Slovak history. Despite all his virtues, including his personal tolerance and lack of dogmatism, Dubcek embodies a dated, anachronistic political formula. He may have broken with old-fashioned communism, but he never engaged in a full-fledged divorce from his own illusions, and never accepted full responsibility for bowing to Brezhnev's humiliating diktat.

Moreover, as Shawcross rightly points out in this sympathetic but not uncritical biography, Dubcek's naïve reformism could not ultimately have succeeded anyway. What people in Eastern Europe wanted was not to humanize the system but to get rid of it. In other words, the whole assumption of Dubcekism — and for that matter of its latter-day echo, Gorbachevism — was based on the fallacy that democracy could function in a one-party, bureaucratic socialist system.

Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Be Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw. By Ralf Dahrendorf. New York: Random House, 1990. 164 pp. $17.95.

Dahrendorf's major concept in this work is "civic culture," and he identifies its absence or weak development in former communist states as the major danger to the fragile democratic institutions of those countries. He knows that disenchantment with the slow and painful birth of democracy is fertile ground for those who distrust the rule of law and resent the "valley of tears" involved in adjusting to modernity.

Such Burkean reflections suggest that, if the economic situation in East Europe worsens and the emerging pluralist values fail to generate genuine consensus, populist movements could exploit existing anxieties for authoritar-

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ian ends. Thus, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* is a manifesto warning both East Europeans and their Western friends of a new fascism catalyzed by a widespread sense of powerlessness. To be sure, atavistic and tribalistic movements have more chance in Romania (where civic culture is still in its infancy) than in Poland. But even in Poland, lately, one sees the rise of clericalist and strongly anti-intellectual trends.

Dahrendorf is one of Europe's brightest political scientists and it is disheartening that he sees militaristic tyrannies as a major danger to the future East-Central Europe. At the same time, however, he remains convinced that the development of civil societies in those countries and their growing integration in the European system of cooperation will diminish the prospects for such disturbing setbacks. The question is which process will win out. Refusing both apocalyptical pessimism and hollow historical optimism, Dahrendorf places his discussion in a sobering and extremely refreshing framework.

The Russian Revolution. By Richard Pipes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990. 994 pp. $40.00.

Why was conservative Russia the scene of history's most determined attempt to remake human nature? Pipes's book, to its credit, ventures to give a definitive — although not indisputable — answer to this, one of the twentieth century's great riddles.

Pipes's history, the product of decades of work, exhaustively examines nearly all of the historical disputes surrounding the revolution. He demonstrates, for example, that Lenin's attempts to destroy the Russian imperial regime were almost certainly financed by the German general staff. More important, however, he gives a systematic explanation of the roots of the upheaval in the undeveloped Russian rural communes that, dominated by a single ruler, were tiny models of authoritarian rule. The inhabitants of the communes dreamed of a "black partition" in which the land holdings of the independent peasants would be divided among them, and it was this pool of anarchic manpower that was mobilized by an irresponsible intelligentsia lusting for power and forging utopian solutions.

Pipes ably describes a "land of sorrows," seemingly foredoomed to hurtle to its own destruction; but his detailed treatment of institutions and relative neglect of the evolution of ideas has its limitations. He leaves unanswered the question of why the Russian experience was so nearly copied in diverse countries elsewhere. David Satter

Le 7e Secretaire: Splendeur et misere de Mikhail Gorbachev. By Michel Heller. Paris: Oliver Orban, 1990. 440 pp. 149 FF.

Heller tries to explain why the sweeping and unexpected reforms initiated by Gorbachev came about. He traces these to the standard drive of Soviet leaders to create their own loyal and obedient party apparatus, a process al-

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ways justified by the need to carry out "reforms." In this case, however, the genuinely catastrophic state of the country made the need to renew the apparatus all the more pressing. Central authorities sought not only to reinvigorate the economy (which had stopped growing in the late 1970s), but also to recapture it from party-criminal mafias in the republics. Glasnost was Gorbachev's initial tool for bringing the party apparatus under his personal control and making it capable of implementing reforms; glasnost did expose the corruption of the party elite, making it easier to purge obstructive officials. When that proved insufficient, Gorbachev turned to partially free elections, which brought about a wholesale purge of the party apparatus. But it also undermined the power of Gorbachev himself.

While Heller clarifies much of the background to events in the Soviet Union, one is left with a feeling that much is still unclear. The real reasons why the Soviet regime, at the very height of its power, undertook a reform program that appears suicidal will probably only be given by future historians, who will have the luxury of looking back at today's events. David Satter

Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941. By Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1990. 707 pp. $29.95.

Tucker sees Stalinism as an exacerbation of "all that was harsh, repressive and terrorist in Lenin's legacy." Stalin used the instruments created by Lenin — including the Communist party apparatus — in order to establish a personal rule second to none in this century. In *Stalin in Power*, Tucker unifies psychological and sociological approaches in analyzing the Stalinist terror to create a masterfully written and superbly documented biography of the dictator.

For Tucker, it is impossible to make any sense of Stalinism without dwelling upon Stalin's intense emotional identification with the autocratic tradition of Russian history and his obsession with Czar Ivan the Terrible and the latter's struggle against the feudal "nomenklatura." Stalin's hatred of the Bolshevik Old Guard was rooted in an excruciating inferiority complex that could not be solved by rational political means. Tucker thus places Stalinism within the context of the Bolshevik political culture and identifies it as akin to Hitler's National Socialism.

This second volume of Tucker's Stalin trilogy is a major contribution to Soviet studies and opens new perspectives on one of the darkest chapters in human history.

THE MIDDLE EAST
By Daniel Pipes

Culture, History & Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89. By Amatzia Baram. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 196 pp. $35.00.

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Baram compellingly argues that the Iraqi government's nationalist ideology has undergone profound changes in the past two decades, shifting from Arab-oriented to Iraq-oriented. From the point of view of the Sunni Arabs who dominated the Iraqi Ba'th Party, radical Pan-Arab nationalism had the great advantage of engaging Iraq deeply in the affairs of other (Sunni) Arab states. But Sunni Arabs constitute just one-quarter of the Iraqi population, so Kurdish and Shi'i resistance to Pan-Arab nationalism compelled the rulers to make adjustments. They did so by sloughing off their single-minded preoccupation with Arab unity in favor of a much more Iraq-centered credo. This shift affected virtually all areas of Iraqi life, for the regime seeks not just to define its own mission, but to reshape the identity of its citizens. The bulk of Baram's study consists of expressions and manifestations of this change in folklore, archeology, rites, symbols, art, theater, poetry, and history.

Some of the pleasure in reading Baram's fine study lies in savoring the absurdities of Iraqi nationalist excess the author has uncovered in the course of his wide readings. Here are two: In 1980, just after war with Iran began, Saddam Husayn advised his less literate countrymen that if they had difficulty reading Ba'th principles, all they had to do was "sniff the soil of this land." Baram also includes a political cartoon with the unforgettable image of an Iraqi palm tree tossing bombs from its crown right onto the head of Ayatollah Khomeini.

A History of the Arab Peoples. By Albert Hourani. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991. 551 pp. $24.95.

Hourani, the eminent Oxford scholar, is one of a very few historians who can authoritatively paint a canvas that stretches in space from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, in time from the Prophet Muhammad to the recently concluded Iraq-Iran war, and in theme from politics to culture. His graceful way with words and his talent for getting to the heart of an issue make his survey a pleasure to read.

But close scrutiny of the book reveals some major deficiencies. To begin with, Hourani's narrative lacks a sense of history. He offers no thoughts on the evolving role of the Arabic language; on the place of Islam in public life; or on the place of Arabic-speakers in the world. A more severe problem concerns the book's overly rosy picture. Unpleasantries such as racism, the status of women, and the Arab record in Africa are either touched on lightly or sugar-coated. In a typical passage, Hourani renders a strangely favorable picture of slaves' conditions in premodern Islam. When it comes to the modern era, Hourani is even more apologetic. He also pursues a fashionably leftist agenda, impugning capitalism and attacking Israel, but with so fine a subtlety it borders on the surreptitious. Repeated use of qualifiers ("may," "might," "perhaps," "possible") allows the author to distance himself from his own assertions. He thereby implies what he cannot say.

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To understand the Arabs, stay clear of Albert Hourani's apologetic. Instead, read Bernard Lewis's *The Arabs in History* which, even after forty years, remains the best introduction to a tangled subject.

The Middle East Military Balance, 1989-90. Edited by Joseph Alpher. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990. 454 pp. $74.50.

After slipping in 1988-89, *The Balance* has picked up again. To begin with, this volume appeared in a more timely fashion than its immediate predecessor. The contents are more to the point. Though the Israeli editors still seem unduly fixed on the Israeli-Palestinian dimension (devoting three out of ten articles to the subject), they have reduced the coverage given it. Many of the articles are excellent, in particular Dov Tamari's assessment of the Syrian military and Anat Kurz's overviews of Palestinian and Shi'i terrorism.

The country-by-country breakdown of infrastructure and weaponry holds particular interest this year, and especially the chapter on Iraq, for the Persian Gulf war permits an external check. *The Balance* lists twenty-four Scud-B launchers, six al-Husayn stationary sites, and an unknown number of mobile al-Husayn units — a bit low, but not a bad estimate.

The Monument: Art, Vulgarity, and Responsibility in Iraq. By Samir al-Khalil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 168 pp. $35.00.

Khalil meditates angrily on a pair of gargantuan steel arches unveiled at a huge parade-ground in central Baghdad in August 1989, showing how these monstrous edifices serve the regime. Each arch is formed by two forearms and clenched fists rising fifty feet into the air, grasping a sword. The swords cross at the apex, forming a bow 130 feet above the ground. Even more than the vulgarity and size of the monument, what most intrigues and appalls Khalil is its literalism. The 2,500 helmets clustered at each base were worn by Iranian soldiers killed in action against Iraq. But most odious of all in Khalil's eyes is the fact that the forearms and fists of the Victory Arch are precise replicas of Saddam Husayn's own limbs ("complete with hair follicles, the odd scratch and blemish").

The author would be the first to admit that this wretched edifice may well be unworthy of serious discussion; he dwells on it despite himself, captured by its aptness as a symbol for the sordidness of Iraqi political life and the "worthless" quality of everything produced by the Iraqi intelligentsia during the Saddam years. This leads Khalil, following Milan Kundera, to postulate kitsch as a central aspect of totalitarian rule. And public architecture, because it is inescapable, has special importance in the assertion of state omnipotence; Khalil concludes that "the moment Saddam Husain turned his dreams into the city of all Iraqis, he snuffed out art and invested kitsch with a totalizing sovereignty."

The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. By Jacob M. Landau. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 438 pp. $79.00. **Islamischer**

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Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der islamischen Weltliga. By Reinhard Schulze. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. 509 pp. $93.50.

Pan-Islamic ideology, the attempt to achieve Muslim unity, takes two forms, radical (which would eliminate borders and create a single Muslim state) and moderate (which seeks only harmony between Muslim states). While providing a survey of the tensions between these two themes going back to the 1860s, Landau concentrates on several times and places: the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, Central Asian Muslims living under Moscow's rule, Indian Muslims living under London's rule, the congresses of the interwar period, and the florescence of organizations in recent years. Landau's research is impeccable and his data fascinating, yet the wooden presentation of his research makes it something of an effort to absorb.

Schulze's large, rambling, and highly original study of Islamic internationalism in the twentieth century focuses on intellectuals and learning in their historical context. His prism is the World Muslim League, a Saudi-sponsored organization founded in 1962 to fund mosques, publishing houses, cultural centers, schools, and other Islamic institutions. Whether it be attitudes toward tradition or responses to the West, Schulze sees Islamic intellectual life in this century as an elaboration of themes first developed in the eighteenth century by such groups as the Wahhabis, the Salafis, and the Neo-Salafis. He has brought together a treasure of information to which he has added a great many of his own insights. Trouble is, the book lacks almost any logic of presentation, so that the reader finds himself bouncing about between centuries, countries, and topics. The effort pays off, but one needs great diligence and stamina to plow through this jumbled presentation.

War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security. By Efraim Inbar. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991. 183 pp. $25.50.

From a U.S. vantage point, the Israeli Labor Party often seems a mirage. If only Labor could return to power, many Americans believe, the U.S.-sponsored peace process could move forward dramatically. But Labor has not yet returned to power and, if Inbar is correct, it is unlikely to do so anytime soon. Inbar argues in this tightly reasoned, well-written, and well-documented narrative that the Labor coalition, or Alignment (*Ma'arach*, in Hebrew), is moving so far to the left that it is unlikely to achieve electoral success despite considerable public disenchantment with the ruling Likud bloc. Inbar traces this movement leftward and illustrates its impact in changed perceptions of the Arab threat and the utility of force; in reduced demands for territorial adjustment; and, most important, in the party vanguard's abandoning hope for a "Jordanian Option" with a corresponding movement toward acceptance of a PLO role in peace negotiations. Inbar locates the source of change in diverse places: the psychological impact of the peace with Egypt, Labor's sensitivity to disapora Jewish views (especially those of American Jewish leaders), and the shock of the *intifada*.

A.G.

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AFRICA
By Michael Radu

The ANC and Its Leaders. Edited by Willie Esterhuyse and Philip Nel. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1990. 169 pp. Rand 26.60 (paper).

Two key issues that define the politics of the African National Congress (ANC) are its attitude toward the South African Communist party (defining its position on political freedom) and toward capitalism (defining its position on economic freedom). While the liberal Afrikaner academics who contributed to this clearly written, well-organized, and accessible volume succeed at lesser tasks, they unfortunately do little to clarify these two central issues. As regards links to the South African Communist party, a question on which the ANC has recently been waffling, the authors mistakenly interpret this tactical maneuvering as a serious internal debate over principle. Philip Nel's chapter leaves unexplored the two organizations' programmatic differences, while private property receives no consistent treatment in these essays, even though most of the authors have serious misgivings about the ANC's obsession with nationalization.

In one of the more important chapters, Hennie Kotze shows that support for the ANC is generally "soft," greater in urban area than rural ones, strongest among Xhosas and weakest among Natal Zulus and Coloureds, and more dependent on personalities (specifically, Nelson Mandela's) than on programs and ideology.

The ANC and Its Leaders fulfills its goal to serve as a primer on the ANC only partially, for its understanding of the ANC is somewhat uncritical, incomplete, and occasionally biased.

Hope for South Africa? By L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991. 224 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Those interested in a rational and well-documented analysis of South Africa's complexities will find this volume invaluable because, in addition to being distinguished historians of Africa, Duignan and Gann stand out among observers of South African politics by rejecting both emotionalism and apocalyptic scenarios. Particularly clear-headed is the authors' analysis of the impact of sanctions and divestment on South Africa, which correctly concludes that such economic ostracism neither had nor could in the future have a decisive impact on Pretoria's policy decisions (although it did harm the economy in general and blacks in particular). Political change under de Klerk has been the result of internal dynamics, hindered rather than encouraged by external hostility. Equally noteworthy is the authors' skeptical analysis of the ANC (and Nelson Mandela), its outdated Marxist economic views, and its intimate ties to the South African Communist Party.

If this volume has a serious flaw, it lies in the unjustifiedly optimistic assumptions regarding South Africa's future. True, de Klerk is pragmatic and flexible; but it is also increasingly apparent that that he lacks a vision. While post-independence Namibia may be a desirable model for a new South Africa, the

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actual scenario that emerges may well resemble Lebanon or the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

They Live by Sword: 32 "Buffalo" Battalion — South Africa's Foreign Legion. By Jan Breytenbach. Alberton, South Africa: Lemur Books, 1990. 272 pp. Rand 49.95.

Consisting almost entirely of Angolan volunteers but led by South African officers, the 32nd Battalion started as a ragtag group of refugees and evolved into one of South Africa's best counterinsurgency units during the wars in Namibia and Angola. In actions ranging from long-range reconnaissance patrols to light-armor operations against the Angolan army, the battalion performed equally impressively — though it had the highest casualty rates of any South African unit. Its value was underscored by Pretoria's decision to maintain it after the end of the Angolan and Namibian wars.

Breytenbach, a former armor and parachute officer in the South African Defense Force and Royal Navy Air Arm navigator, founded the 32nd battalion; his bias is both obvious and natural. *They Live by Sword* is of importance to war historians, particularly those involved in counterinsurgency training in the Third World. They will no doubt be interested in Breytenbach's account of how a defeated, disorganized, and hungry group of refugees could in a few years be forged into an elite military unit.

The War for Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent. By Fred Bridgland. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1990. 403 pp. Rand 59.95.

Sub-Saharan Africa's most ferocious war was probably the one in 1987-88 between the Angolan regime, along with its Cuban allies, and South Africa, along with its UNITA allies. This was a war of the future, involving advanced Soviet aircraft, radar systems, and tanks; the world's best long-range artillery; UNITA's advanced U.S.-supplied antitank and anti-aircraft missiles; modern logistical and control-and-command systems on both sides; and large numbers of troops.

Bridgland, a former apologist for UNITA who later became a critic of Jonas Savimbi, tries in this volume to strike a balance between these two conflicting inclinations. He correctly points out that UNITA would have been substantially weakened or destroyed without South African help in 1987-88, while also giving due credit to UNITA's field courage, tactical contribution to the campaign, and legitimacy.

The War for Africa provides a worst-case scenario of future African conflicts. For those ready to write off South Africa as that continent's dominant military power, it is a nightmare. And for those who believe outside powers can exercise only limited influence in southern Africa, it offers a major argument. Bridgland's volume ranks with Helmoed-Romer Heitman's *War in Angola* (see the next review) as a definitive analysis of the conflict.

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War in Angola: The Final South African Phase. By Helmoed-Romer Heitman. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1990. 368 pp. $19.95.

Heitman, a regular contributor to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, is perhaps the foremost international expert on the South African military. As a South African and a SADF reserve officer, he has a certain bias in favor of his country's military, but from a strictly technical point of view, this volume is still one of the best analyses of the war in southern Angola.

Heitman's analyses of Soviet- and South African-made weapon performance, command and control on both sides, and small-unit performance are all highly informative. His assessment of the performance of Angolan (that is, Soviet), South African, and UNITA equipment is top-notch. And his detailed examination of the main operations of the 1987-88 campaigns in Angola is hard to match, as are his first-hand sources. He shows how the conflict in Angola confirmed that arms, command, and communications sophistication are more important than sheer numbers; that logistical advantages are vital; and that quality tactical intelligence is essential for victory. For students of Third World contemporary warfare, this volume is irreplaceable.

EAST ASIA
By Judith Shapiro

Almost a Revolution. By Shen Tong, with Marianne Yen. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. 342 pp. $19.95.

Shen's memoir of the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre reveals the lack of maturity of the student activists whom Western observers applauded as the darlings of democracy. The author paints a portrait of competitiveness among demonstrating universities, a faction-ridden leadership without clearly defined goals, and an increasing sense of powerlessness to control a movement seemingly bent on self-immolation. There was little reflection on China's deeper problems and little understanding of the political difficulties faced by China's reformers or of the consequences of providing an excuse for a crackdown by hardliners.

Shen, a Beijing university student and an organizer of the "dialogue delegation," whose goal was to negotiate with the government, writes an engaging description of a relatively privileged upbringing full of girl friends, adventure, and comparatively free access to information. His detailed account of the events of "Beijing Spring" is an important historical record, and his eyewitness description of the massacre is a shocking one. The Tiananmen massacre has meant the end of the self-censorship of China's patriot intellectuals; *Almost a Revolution* is an important example of this.

Bringing Down the Great Wall. By Fang Lizhi. New York: Knopf, 1991. 336 pp. $19.95.

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When, following the Tiananmen massacre, Fang was accused of "disseminating counterrevolutionary propaganda and inciting counterrevolutionary activities," the astrophysicist and former vice-president of Anhui's University of Science and Technology sought refuge in the American embassy. This made him number one on Beijing's most-wanted list and China's best-known dissident. But Westerners have had little opportunity to evaluate the ideas of "China's Sakharov" until the publication of *Bringing Down the Great Wall*, a collection of thirty-two essays, speeches, and interviews — and a superb introduction to Fang's unpolemical and modest style.

This research scientist was thrust into a life of political activism by his awareness of the incompatibility of freedom of inquiry with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Labeled a Rightist in 1957 and sent to the countryside (where his only scientific reading was a book of cosmology), he was rehabilitated in 1978. On being appointed university vice-president in 1984, he turned his school into an oasis of democracy and free speech. When he was expelled from the party in 1987 for bourgeois liberalism, nation-wide meetings staged to criticize him served only to publicize his ideas among China's youth.

Fang is remarkable for his bluntness, courage, and total lack of self-censorship. He dared to say what was in the hearts of many thoughtful Chinese who did not enjoy the relative protection of an international reputation. With simplicity, and with humor, he condemned the Communist party's ideological vapidity, moral bankruptcy, and inane policymaking, tying China's issues to broader questions of global responsiblity and religious freedom.

The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation. Edited by Gil Rozman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. 235 pp. $29.95.

These distinguished essays make a major contribution to the debate over how Confucianism has affected East Asian modernization. Martin Collcutt writes of Japan's Confucian legacy, Patricia Ebrey discusses Confucian values and the Chinese family, Jahyun Kim Haboush analyzes the Confucanization of Korea, Michael Robinson looks at perceptions of Confucianism in modern Korea, while Rozman contributes two comparative essays. Unfortunately, the authors generally examine Confucianism's effects on East Asian societies without asking what other features made these societies distinct. Consequently, the essays are of only limited value in answering the question of why East Asia has been able to modernize more successfully than other non-European areas.

The most fascinating essay is Rozman's comparison of Confucianism in China and Japan. He frames superbly a paradox vital for any study of Confucianism and development: "Writings on China repeatedly attribute backwardness in modern development to Confucian beliefs and practices, while studies of Japan usually credit Confucian values with paving the way for modern development." Rozman's response distinguishes types of Confucianism: imperial, elite, reform, merchant house, and mass. But though this distinction may be a

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key to understanding Confucianism, it in no way obviates the possibility that differences between Japan's and China's experiences show Confucianism was largely irrelevant to modernization and other factors determinant. More promising is Rozman's argument that China's growth has been slowest during the periods such as Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, when it suppressed its Confucian heritage. P. C.

A Higher Kind of Loyalty. By Liu Binyan. New York: Pantheon Books, 1990. 294 pp. $22.95.

China's foremost journalist has written an autobiography that provides a dense historical record of the shifting climate for free expression under Mao. The book is also an exposé of myriad injustices by a man who dedicated his life to tackling party corruption. Lastly, it is an expression of a Chinese intellectual's typically deep love of country and his abiding faith in party principles, despite overwhelming evidence against their practicability and great personal suffering.

Liu Binyan became famous all over China in 1979, after his rehabilitation from his twenty-two years as a Rightist, for his "reportage literature" exposé titled "People or Monsters," an account of an ultra-leftist power-clique controlling the county. His 1985 essay, "Another Kind of Loyalty," which described two men who lived according to their consciences instead of blindly following party dictates, also brought him immense notoriety and party criticism. These and other writings lead to his expulsion from the party for the second time in 1987, and he became one of the main targets of a campaign against "bourgeois liberalism." But by then, he had become a celebrity who wore dark glasses to work to avoid the crowd of petitioners waiting at the gates of the *People's Daily* hoping he would adopt their cases. He is now a visiting scholar at Princeton, and sees himself as unable to return to China although he was living in the United States during the events of Tiananmen and did not participate directly.

Voices from the Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Cultural Revolution. By Feng Jicai. New York: Pantheon, 1991. 210 pp. $22.00.

Histories of the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution in China are incomplete or unsatisfying; memoirs remain the compelling genre.

Feng, a Chinese fiction writer, has compiled fourteen gripping and moving interviews with Cultural Revolution survivors in *Voices from the Whirlwind.* They forcefully remind us of the drama of the Cultural Revolution. A woman doctor remembers how she killed her own father by puncturing an artery in his neck in a joint suicide attempt. A Red Guard describes the brutal beatings in which he participated. An atomic scientist recalls being brought in front of a firing squad and being the only one left alive. Such ordeals were so distinctive that written memories of abuse, treachery and devotion, surrealistic twists of fate, and utterly wasted lives have yet to seem redundant. Indeed, some Chinese intellectuals have advocated, against seemingly impossible political and cultural resistance, that recording and collecting histories of indi-

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vidual stories from the Cultural Revolution should be made into an on-going historiographic enterprise. This book gives strong support to their view.

LATIN AMERICA
By Michael Radu

Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict. By William F. Sater. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991. 249 pp. $30.00 ($15.00, paper).

Chile illustrates many of the reasons for Latin America's traditional mistrust and fear of the United States. Accordingly, this well-written and carefully documented book doubles as a primer for those perplexed by the United States's unpopularity south of the Rio Grande.

During much of the last century, Sater notes, Chile was a major Pacific power; until its 1891 civil war, it was a greater naval power there than was the United States and sent naval squadrons as far as Panama to check Yankee influence. After 1891, however, Chile went into a steady decline; with this grew an obsessive fear of American intervention in its internal affairs and those of its neighbors. This obsession became part of Chilean political culture, shared by the Left (as anti-imperialism) and the Right (as nationalism). Sater also notes that racism infected American-Chilean relations on both sides: Chileans saw themselves either as Europeans or as a new and superior Indo-American mixture; Americans saw themselves as better than an upstart, brown-skinned people.

With the single exception of this last point — an exaggeration about the degree of racism on the American side — Sater's work lacks obvious ideological or cultural bias, is devoid of emotional debris, and refrains from any gratuitous revisionist rewriting of history. These virtues bear noting because they are so uncommon in Latin American studies.

Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. By Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 260 pp., $24.95.

United Brands has large banana plantations in Panama and Honduras and has worked with the governments of those countries; has it therefore used its influence to support strongmen, and "contributed to America's tolerance of drug corruption in the region"? Scott and Marshall say yes. Was salvaging their own reputations the reason why top officers of the Honduran army and police helped apprehend Central America's most notorious drug dealer and bring him to justice in the United States? Yes again.

Such assertions fill this bubbling cauldron of half-baked conspiracy theories, whispered rumors, gossip, and circular reasoning. And while nearly seventy pages of footnotes may prompt the unwary reader to think serious

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scholarly effort went into this study, a closer look shows the absence of even a single primary, explicitly named, and verifiable source. *Cocaine Politics* provides more evidence of the continued debasement of university presses in general and the University of California Press in particular. (For another example of its low standards, see *Orbis*, Fall 1989, p. 619.)

The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader. Edited by Courtney E. Prisk. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991. 145 pp. $ 25.00.

Miguel Castellanos, the highest-ranking defector from the FMLN (the Salvadoran communist insurgent movement), actively helped unmask his erstwhile comrades from 1985 on. They never forgave him, and in February 1989, FMLN assassins murdered him in San Salvador. *The Comandante Speaks* includes extensive interviews with Castellanos, some with the Chilean author Javier Rojas (and published in Spanish in 1988), some with the editor.

Castellanos joined the Marxist Left in 1974, when a student. He rose through the ranks of the FPL (Popular Liberation Front) to become third in command by 1984. He trained in Cuba, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union and became the leader of the urban guerrilla squads the following year. His revelations regarding the massive military support given the FMLN by Castro, the Sandinistas, and the Soviet Bloc confirm the claims of those supporting Reagan's policy in Central America, while Havana's and Managua's control over the FMLN went beyond the suspicions of even the insurgents' most hardened enemies. Castellanos's description of the goals of the FMLN and its manipulation of the Salvadorans' desire for peace are of particular importance, and remain as valid today as before his murder.

Although the text looks like it has never been proofread and the index is useless, this is an important volume, and necessary reading for all those interested in the real and violent nature of El Salvador's insurgent Left.

The Democratic Revolution in Latin America. By Howard J. Wiarda. A Twentieth Century Fund Book. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990. 302 pp. $39.50 ($19.95, paper).

Latin American states have alternated many times between dictatorship and democracy since achieving independence in the early nineteenth century, and the 1980s witnessed another such transformation. Throughout the 1970s, 80 percent of Latin Americans lived under dictatorships; today, about 90 percent live under democracy. This time, is democracy here to stay?

Wiarda offers good reasons to be optimistic: alternatives to democracy have proved unsatisfactory to multitudes of Latin Americans; the example of the worldwide democracy movement, especially in Portugal and Spain, beckons; a sufficient degree of socioeconomic development has taken hold to give stimulus to democratic development; and de Tocqueville's "web of associability" has finally begun to spin itself widely through Latin America. He also gives good

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reasons to be pessimistic: the military retains a hold on power even where civilians are nominally in control; severe economic crises and social problems can delegitimize governments; and continued political violence, often reinforced by drug traffickers, polarizes societies.

Combining scholarly depth with a sensitivity to the world of Washington, Wiarda convincingly argues that, for domestic political and geopolitical reasons, the U.S. government should anchor its policy in the active promotion of democracy. Alan Luxenburg

Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism. By Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano. New York: Praeger (with The Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1990. 168 pp. $12.95.

Although *Sendero Luminoso* (the Shining Path) is the most violent revolutionary group today, and although it has waged its "armed struggle" for eleven years now, virtually no in-depth studies have appeared in the United States. Tarazona (a former Peruvian judge) thus provides a needed contribution to the subject, covering the origins, ideology, organization, and strategy of Sendero as well as Lima's response to Sendero and the phenomenon of narcoterrorism.

Unfortunately, though, Tarazona places little emphasis on Sendero's party origins or the characteristics and early activities of its leadership. This leads her to overemphasize Sendero's ideological appeal and to support the popular but superficial thesis that Sendero is a response to "cultural and economic oppression," requiring an economic solution. As she herself notes, such development projects as are introduced are quickly destroyed by Sendero; in any case, the government has few economic resources for such a solution, and private and informal enterprises cannot contribute to the economy without law and order.

Tarazona's argument concerning narcoterrorism and the Sendero phenomenon is also less than fully cogent. She illustrates the uniqueness of the situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley, where narcoterrorism flourishes, yet insinuates that Sendero's control of the region is somehow representative of what could happen in the rest of Perú. Again, as she does throughout the book, the author exaggerates Sendero's ideological appeal, confusing mere tolerance with devout support.

On net, however, Tarazona succeeds in providing a well-informed and readable overview of Sendero in all of its aspects, including the Peruvian judiciary's impact on it. Patricia Olney

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